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INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs' attorneys in class action and derivative suits occupy
an uneasy place in the American legal system. The traditional im-
age of the lawyer is of an independent professional providing ad-
vice and advocacy on behalf of a client. The attorney, in this view,
is an agent of the client and subject to the client's control in all
important matters. Plaintiffs' class action and derivative attorneys
do not fit this mold. They are subject to only minimal monitoring
by their ostensible "clients," who are either dispersed and disor-
ganized (in the case of class action litigation) or under the control
of hostile forces (in the case of derivative litigation). Accordingly,
plaintiffs' class and derivative attorneys function essentially as en-
trepreneurs who bear a substantial amount of the litigation risk
and exercise nearly plenary control over all important decisions in
the lawsuit.
The absence of client monitoring raises the specter that the
entrepreneurial attorney will serve her own interest at the expense
of the client. The existing regulatory system attempts to prevent
such abuse-and to reduce what have been termed "agency
costs"-in three principal ways. First, it allocates certain elements
of litigating authority to persons other than the plaintiffs' attor-
ney-absent class members, managers of corporations involved in
derivative suits, representative plaintiffs, and the courts them-
selves. Second, it contains a number of special features ostensibly
designed to weed out inappropriate representative plaintiffs. The
representative plaintiff must assert claims that are typical of the
claims being asserted, and must represent the class or corporation
adequately. Third, plaintiffs' attorneys are subject to applicable
rules of legal ethics that purport to constrain the attorneys' behav-
ior in order to safeguard clients' interests.
We believe this regulatory structure is poorly designed in a
number of respects, particularly when applied to "large-scale,
small-claim" litigation in which the overall liability is large but the
individual interests of the class members or corporate shareholders
are small. The existing regulations are extraordinarily ineffective at
aligning the interests of attorney and client; indeed, they often im-
pair the interests of the clients they are ostensibly designed to pro-
tect. Many regulatory shortfalls can be traced ultimately to a sin-
gle fundamental, error: the inappropriate attempt to treat
entrepreneurial litigation as if it were essentially the same as stan-
dard litigation, in which the client exercises substantial influence.
Even when the regulatory system acknowledges that en-
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trepreneurial litigation poses special problems, it frequently at-
tempts to resolve those problems by forcing class action and deriv-
ative litigation back into a standard model. The inevitable result is
regulatory failure, simply because entrepreneurial litigation cannot
be transformed into the traditional model even by brute regulatory
force.
We propose revising the regulatory system in a number of
ways. Our proposals have a common goal: to control agency costs
with sensible rules that take into account the fact that the plain-
tiffs' attorney-not the client-controls the litigation. For exam-
ple, the existing regulatory regime requires that all absent class
members be given notice of a pending damages action and an op-
portunity to opt out of the suit-regardless of the size of the
claim.1 The high cost of notifying absent class members when po-
tential recovery is very small deters entrepreneurial attorneys from
bringing meritorious suits. Thus, the rule harms, rather than pro-
tects, absent class members. We suggest that notice of class action
in such cases should not be required for small claimants in advance
of some authoritative disposition on the merits.
Another problem area is judicial review of settlements and fee
requests, which is often haphazard, unreliable, and lacking in ad-
ministrable standards. Although review of settlements is necessary
so long as the entrepreneurial attorney's interests differ from those
of the client, we suggest that review could be improved by the use
of guardians ad litem to represent the interest of the class in large-
scale, small-claim cases. As to fee requests, we join other recent
commentators in finding that, despite serious drawbacks, a per-
centage-of-recovery method (in which the plaintiffs' attorneys are
awarded some percentage of the class recovery as fees, either on a
fixed percentage basis or according to some more complex sliding
scale) is superior to the currently favored lodestar approach (which
allows attorneys to recover according to the number of hours they
spend on a case). The lodestar approach has three principal, re-
lated defects: it involves enormously burdensome circulation costs;
it encourages attorneys to exaggerate their hours; and, because it
guarantees that the attorneys will receive their fees if successful, it
fails to give plaintiffs' attorneys the proper incentive to strike a
settlement agreement that maximizes recovery for the plaintiff
class.
I See Phillips Petroleum Co. v Shutts, 472 US 797, 812 (1985); Eisen v Carlisle & Jac-
quelin, 417 US 156, 173-77 (1974).
[58:1
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We also criticize the current system for regulating the identity
of the named plaintiff. The existing requirements of typicality
(under which the named plaintiff's claim must be similar to that of
the other class members or shareholders) and adequacy (under
which the named plaintiff must be capable of competently and ad-
equately representing the absent class members or the corpora-
tion)2 often exclude appropriate representative plaintiffs and re-
duce artificially the supply of attorneys able to serve the class or
corporation. Given that the named plaintiff has little control over
how the suit is conducted, the analysis should focus not on the
appropriateness of the named plaintiff but rather on the reliability
and competence of the plaintiffs' attorney.
Further, the regulatory system should acknowledge explicitly
what is already the case, namely that ethics rules on solicitation,
maintenance, fee-splitting and the acceptance of impropriety have
virtually no current force or rationale in the large-scale, small-
claim setting and are routinely circumvented with only the thin-
nest veneer of compliance. We recommend that these ethics rules
be jettisoned in this group of cases. Instead of the current attempt
to force the ethics analysis into standard, but inappropriate, doc-
trinal categories, the regulatory system should investigate whether
the attorney's behavior poses real dangers to the interests of the
class or corporation.
Underlying many of these observations is a more basic critique
of the existing regulatory system's requirement that there be an
actual identified individual plaintiff in large-scale, small-claim
cases. Because these cases are dominated by entrepreneurial attor-
neys, the identified plaintiff operates almost always as a mere fig-
urehead. The named plaintiff does little-indeed, usually does
nothing-to monitor the attorney in order to ensure that represen-
tation is competent and zealous, or to align the interests of the
attorney with those of the class or corporation. On the other hand,
the requirement that there be an actual named plaintiff artificially
limits the supply of attorneys able to bring large-scale, small-claim
cases because in many cases "appropriate" representative plaintiffs
are hard to find. The quality of representation is thereby dimin-
ished, and the private enforcement of law impaired. Further, attor-
2 FRCP 23(a) governs class actions. See FRCP 23(a)(3) (claims or defenses of represen-
tative plaintiff must be "typical of the claims or defenses of the class"); FRCP 23(a)(4) (the
representative parties must "fairly and adequately protect the interest of the class"). FRCP
23.1, which governs derivative litigation, has an analogous adequacy requirement but does
not contain an analogous typicality requirement. Courts insist on typicality when applying
Rule 23.1. however. See Davis v Corned, Inc., 619 F2d 588, 592-97 (6th Cir 1980).
1991]
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neys are routinely forced to circumvent ethical restrictions on so-
licitation and maintenance in order to obtain named plaintiffs as
their ticket into profitable litigation. We believe that the costs of
requiring an actual named plaintiff greatly outweigh the benefits.
Accordingly, we recommend that actual, identified named plain-
tiffs not be required in large-scale, small-claim litigation. Instead, a
plaintiffs' attorney should be allowed to bring "Jane Doe" or
"Richard Roe" complaints on behalf of a class or corporation.
Although we make several recommendations for- ways in which
the existing regulatory structure could be changed to deal more ef-
fectively with the unique problems posed by entrepreneurial litiga-
tion, we believe that a more fundamental change may be in order.
We draw on the economic theory of agency costs to suggest that
the special problems of entrepreneurial litigation could be substan-
tially overcome if the legal system were to allow some form of auc-
tion for plaintiffs' claims, under which attorneys (and others) could
bid for the right to bring the litigation and gain the benefits, if
any, that flow from success. A pure form of auction would simply
sell the plaintiffs' claims outright to the winning bidder, with the
proceeds to be distributed immediately to the class or corporation.
Under such an approach, the winner of the auction would have liti-
gation incentives that are very similar to those which a claimholder
would have in traditional, two-party litigation. There would be no
need for any rules on typicality or adequacy of representation or
for judicial scrutiny of settlements and fee awards. Class members
would receive a certain and quick recovery rather than an uncer-
tain and delayed one. The result would be more effective private
enforcement of the law. Other possibilities we discuss involve par-
tial bids or bids for lead counsel rights based on the percentage of
the recovery that the attorney would be willing to take as a fee;
these may be more feasible to implement, although they retain
some of the problems of misalignment between the interests of the
attorney and client.'
District Judge Vaughn Walker of the Northern District of California has recently con-
ducted an auction of lead counsel rights based on fee percentages. See In re Oracle Securi-
ties Litigation, 131 FRD 688 (N D Cal 1990) (setting up the bidding process); In re Oracle
Securities Litigation, 132 FRD 538 (N D Cal 1990) (awarding lead counsel rights to one of
four bidders). Even more recently another distinguished district court judge, Milton I.
Shadur, expressed strong support of the auction approach, referring to Judge Walker's opin-
ion in Oracle Securities Litigation as "extraordinarily interesting" and observing that "[iun
the best tradition of imitation as the sincerest form of flattery, if a like situation were to
present itself to this court on another occasion, it would give serious consideration indeed to
following Judge Walker's lead at the very beginning of the litigation." In re Telesphere
International Securities Litigation, 1990 US Dist LEXIS 16665 n 12 (N D Ill). See also
[58:1
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We do not advocate the auction approach as a panacea to the
problem of attorney-client conflicts in class and derivative suits.
There are a number of problems with an auction approach, includ-
ing difficulties in defining the claim to be sold, the possibility that
adequate financing will not be available to bidders, the problem of
obtaining the cooperation of class members whose claims have
been sold, and issues of consolidation of cases brought in different
jurisdictions. Although we recognize these problems as serious, we
believe there is considerable merit to the auction approach.
The Article is structured as follows. Part I discusses the eco-
nomic theory of agency as applied to the attorney-client relation-
ship, addresses the special role of the entrepreneurial attorney in
class and derivative suits, and illustrates the important differences
between class or derivative actions and standard client-dominated
litigation. Part II addresses the regulations allocating litigating au-
thority between plaintiffs' attorneys and other interested parties
such as absent class members, corporate managers in derivative
suits, the representative plaintiff, and the courts. Part III considers
the rules governing the selection of representative plaintiffs, in-
cluding the requirements of typicality and adequacy. Part IV con-
siders the regulation of the plaintiffs' attorney's ethics. Finally,
Part V analyzes the costs and benefits of an auction approach to
entrepreneurial litigation in large-scale, small-claim cases.
I. THE ROLE OF THE ENTREPRENEURIAL ATTORNEY
Over the past decade a number of scholars, including most
prominently Professor John Coffee, have recognized that the single
most salient characteristic of class and derivative litigation is the
existence of "entrepreneurial" plaintiffs' attorneys.4 Because these
Janet Cooper, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions
208 (John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Stanford University Law School, 1990)
(on file with U Chi L Rev).
' See John C. Coffee, Jr., Rethinking The Class Action: A Policy Primer on Reform, 62
Ind L J 625 (1987); Coffee, The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fair-
ness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U Chi L Rev 877 (1987); Coffee, Under-
standing the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private En-
forcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 Colum L Rev 669, 676 (1986);
Coffee, The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48
L & Contemp Probs 5, 12 (Summer 1985); Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney General:
Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 Md L Rev 215, 235-36
(1983). The first commentator to refer to plaintiffs' attorneys in class and derivative suits as
"entrepreneurs" appears to have been Kenneth Dam. See Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions:
Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4 J Legal Stud 47, 60
(1975); Dam, Class Action Notice: Who Needs It?, 1974 S Ct Rev 97, 121.
1991]
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attorneys are not subject to monitoring by their putative clients,
they operate largely according to their own self-interest, subject
only to whatever constraints might be imposed by bar discipline,
judicial oversight, and their own sense of ethics and fiduciary re-
sponsibilities. In this section we begin by describing the economic
rationale for class action and shareholder's derivative lawsuits. We
then discuss the role of the entrepreneurial attorney in such law-
suits by placing it in the context of the economic theory of agency,
and by contrasting it with the role of the attorney in standard liti-
gation in which the client exercises a substantial degree of influ-
ence over the attorney's actions.
A. The Economic Rationale for Class Action and Shareholder's
Derivative Litigation
Any theory of the entrepreneurial attorney requires an initial
investigation into the dynamic structure and economic rationale
for the two procedural contexts within which such attorneys flour-
ish. In both the class action and the shareholder's derivative suit,
the attorney's client is not actively involved in the conduct of the
litigation on the plaintiff's side. But in other respects these devices
are quite different in theory and rationale.
The class action is a tool for overcoming the free-rider5 and
other collective action 6 problems that impair any attempt to organ-
ize a large number of discrete individuals in any common project.
These kinds of problems are prevalent in situations when a large
number of people have been injured by another person's conduct,
but when the injury to many of these individuals is small. In the
absence of a class action device, such injuries would often go un-
remedied because most individual plaintiffs would not themselves
have a sufficient economic stake in the litigation to incur the litiga-
tion costs. Of course, some particularly aggrieved individual might
attempt to bring a large group together in a single lawsuit by using
standard joinder and intervention devices.7 But bringing large
numbers of additional parties in by this method would be very
5 Freeriding, as the name implies, simply refers to a situation where a person can ob-
tain a benefit (or avoid a cost) without paying for it. See Iain McLean, Public Choice: An
Introduction 11-12 (Basil Blackwell, 1987) (discussing connection between freeriding and
the problem of public. goods); Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action 1-2
(Harvard, 1965).
6 Collective action is used in the public choice literature to refer to any procedure for
making decisions by groups of people. See McLean, Public Choice at 11 (cited in note 5).
See generally Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (cited in note 5).
7 See FRCP 20 (permissive joinder of parties) and FRCP 24 (intervention).
[58:1
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costly. Organizing the conduct of litigation with large numbers of
additional parties would be a nightmare. The organizer, moreover,
would have no effective way of obtaining reimbursement from
other plaintiffs for these costs.
The class action procedure partially overcomes these difficul-
ties by providing an effective and inexpensive procedure for joining
large numbers of individual plaintiffs.8 A representative plaintiff
can file an action and seek class certification, which has several
prerequisites. Among other things, the class must be "so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable"; there must be "ques-
tions of law or fact common to the class"; the claims or defenses of
the representative parties must be "typical of the claims or de-
fenses of the class"; and the representative party must "fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class."9 In addition, the rep-
resentative plaintiff must establish the prerequisites for one of
three separate subcategories of class action. The role of the en-
trepreneurial attorney is most prominent in the so-called "(b)(3)"
class action, in which "questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members, and.., a class action is superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy. ''10
8 See Deposit Guaranty National Bank v Roper, 445 US 326, 338 (1980) ("[t]he use of
the class-action procedure for litigation of individual claims may offer substantial advan-
tages for named plaintiffs; it may motivate them to bring cases that for economic reasons
might not be brought otherwise"); United States Parole Commission v Geraghty, 445 US
388, 402-03 (1980) (justifications for the class action "include the protection of the defend-
ant from inconsistent obligations, the protection of the interests of absentees, the provision
of a convenient and economical means for disposing of similar lawsuits, and the facilitation
of the spreading of litigation costs among numerous litigants with similar claims"); Richard
A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 536-37 (Little, Brown, 3d ed 1986) (class action
achieves economies of scale in litigation); Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and
Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "Class Action Problem", 92 Harv L Rev 664
(1979) (emphasizing social benefit of providing small claim adjudication); Judith Resnik,
From "Cases" to "Litigation" (unpublished manuscript; on file with U Chi L Rev).
9 FRCP 23(a). The rule also permits class actions in which many individual defendants
are joined; these cases are uncommon, however.
10 FRCP 23(b)(3). A second type of class action involves cases in which the prosecution
of separate actions would create a risk of inconsistent adjudications with respect to individ-
ual members of the class, thus establishing incompatible standards of conduct for the party
opposing the class, or where adjudication with respect to individual class members would
impair or preclude the ability of nonparties to protect their interests. See FRCP 23(b)(1). A
third type of class action involves cases where the party opposing the class has acted or
refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making injunctive or
declaratory relief appropriate with respect to the class as a whole. See FRCP 23(b)(2).
1991]
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The economic rationale for the (b)(3) class action-as a
method for overcoming free-rider and other collective action
problems-stands in sharp contrast to the rationale for the share-
holder's derivative suit.11 Shareholder's derivative actions are not
premised on collective action problems in the litigation. On the
contrary, they presuppose the existence of a corporate form that is
already organized to overcome such collective action -problems. The
corporation has standing and is fully competent to bring legal ac-
tions to redress injuries to its rights. The problem, rather, is with
collective action within the corporate form itself. As scholars since
Berle and Means have observed,12 corporate managers typically
have only a small ownership stake in the firms they manage. 3
Thus, their interests deviate from those of shareholders: they may
prefer to consume excessive perquisites or practice their golf
whereas shareholders would want them to work diligently at maxi-
mizing profits.
1 4
The shareholder's derivative suit is one of many devices in
corporate law for controlling these conflicts between managers and
shareholders. Many cases arise in which a corporation has an en-
forceable legal claim against others for harm to the corporation.
Like other matters affecting the corporation, pursuit of the claim is
left initially to the managers. But if the suit would potentially
harm the managers' personal interests, the managers may be un-
willing to prosecute the claim, even when doing so would serve the
best interests of the corporation. The classic case is the action for
breach of fiduciary duty against corporate directors. Obviously the
directors cannot be trusted to cause the corporation to sue them-
selves. The derivative action allows a representative shareholder in
such circumstances to take over the litigation from recalcitrant
managers and prosecute it on behalf of the corporation. Unlike the
" For a discussion of policies underlying the derivative remedy, see John C. Coffee, Jr.
and Donald E. Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Propo-
sal for Legislative Reform, 81 Colum L Rev 261, 302-09 (1981) (expressing concern for the
long-range viability of derivative litigation).
2 Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means, 2 The Modern Corporation and Private
Property (CCH, 1932) (separation of ownership and control in large corporations).
11 This fundamental observation underlies not only the "liberal" theory of the corpora-
tion which stems from Berle and Means, see, for example, Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The
Modernization of Corporate Law: An Essay for Bill Cary, 37 U Miami L Rev 187 (1983)
(pointing to management abuse stemming from separation of ownership and control), but
also the law and economics analysis of corporate law, see, for example, Frank H. Easter-
brook, Managers' Discretion and Investors' Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9 Del J Corp
540 (1984) (noting various devices in corporate law and finance to control actions by manag-
ers who do not serve shareholder interests).
"' As we discuss at length below, see notes 53-79 and accompanying text, this problem
is analyzed in economic terms under the rubric of "agency costs."
[58:1
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class action, in which the relief is given to the plaintiff class mem-
bers, any relief recovered in a derivative action (net of expenses
including attorneys' fees) is returned to the corporation.
In federal court litigation, derivative actions are controlled
procedurally by Rule 23.1, which applies to derivative actions
"brought by one or more shareholders . . . to enforce a right of a
corporation . . . , the corporation . . . having failed to enforce a
right which may properly be asserted by it."'" The complaint must
state "the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action
the plaintiff desires from the directors ... and, if necessary, from
the shareholders . . . , and the reasons for the plaintiff's failure to
obtain the action or for not making the effort."' 6 Like the class
action plaintiff, the derivative plaintiff must "fairly and adequately
represent the interest of the shareholders," and any settlements
are subject to judicial approval.17 Similar rules apply for state
court derivative suits.'
Both the class action and the shareholder's derivative lawsuit
can thus be explained and rationalized in terms of modern eco-
nomic theory. This view does not mean, however, that such litiga-
tion is necessarily beneficial either to the putative plaintiffs or to
society. It is clear that class action and derivative suits do contrib-
ute to private enforcement of certain laws. But this begs the ques-
tion of whether the laws themselves are ones that ought to be en-
forced, or ought to be enforced by private litigation rather than,
for example, by some administrative agency. The role of class ac-
tion and derivative litigation in this broader societal setting is an
important topic for research,'" but is outside the scope of this pa-
per. The following discussion assumes that private enforcement of
the applicable substantive laws represents sound social policy, or





"S See, for example, Del Chanc Ct R 23.1.
,9 For one interesting study critical of the effect of derivative litigation, see Daniel R.
Fischel and Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corpo-
rate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 Cornell L Rev 261 (1986) (event study
finding that instigation of derivative litigation did not positively affect share prices). For an
argument that the private incentives to litigate in class and derivative cases may often be
inadequate in terms of social benefits, see Coffee, 86 Colum L Rev at 677-98 (cited in note
4).
1991]
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B. The Role of the Entrepreneurial Attorney in Class Action and
Shareholder's Derivative Suits
The role of the entrepreneurial attorney in class-and deriva-
tive litigation can best be understood in terms of the economic the-
ory of agency costs. 20 Accordingly, we first discuss agency cost the-
ory in general and apply that theory to the analysis of standard
litigation. We then contrast the nature of the agency problems in
traditional litigation with the special agency problems that arise in
class and derivative litigation.
1. The economic theory of agency and its application to stan-
dard litigation.
The attorney in litigation is, in theory and legal form, the
agent of the client.21 As agent, the attorney is charged with the
duty to advance the client's interests "zealously within the bounds
of the law."'22 Yet attorneys do not always fulfill this responsibility,
because their interests are rarely perfectly aligned with those of
the client. The client pays the bill; the lawyer does the work. Many
of the regulatory structures applicable to lawyers are designed to
ensure that lawyers act as faithful agents of clients and do not
abuse the client's trust.
The lawyer's role as agent of the client can be analyzed from
an economic perspective with modern tools of agency cost theory.
Although this theory has roots far back in the history of economic
thought, the modern analysis of agency costs stems from the work
of Ronald Coase23 and, more recently, of Michael Jensen and Wil-
liam Meckling.24 Jensen and Meckling define the agency relation-
20 Professor Coffee appears to be the first scholar expressly to apply agency cost theory
to class litigation. See Coffee, 62 Ind L J at 628-34 (cited in note 4); Coffee, 54 U Chi L Rev
at 883-89 (cited in note 4). Our debt to Coffee should be obvious. However, we extend his
analysis in several respects, including our discussion of bonding devices in the attorney-
client relationship, our elaboration of the incentive problems under various compensation
regimes, and our analysis of the differences between traditional litigation settings and class
and derivative suits. For an early, but insightful, discussion of agency problems in en-
trepreneurial litigation, see Dam, 4 J Legal Stud at 58-59 (cited in note 4).
21 See Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J Legal Stud 189
(1987).
22 American Bar Association, Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Model Code)
Canon 7, reprinted in Thomas D. Morgan and Ronald D. Rotunda, Selected Standards on
Professional Responsibility 1-69 (Foundation, 1989). See also note 30.
2 Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1 (1960).
24 Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Be-
havior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J Fin Econ 305 (1976). Although Jensen
and Meckling restrict their agency cost theory to analysis of corporate financial structure,
[58:1
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ship as "a contract under which one or more persons (the princi-
pal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service
on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making au-
thority to the agent. ' 25 In such cases, as Jensen and Meckling ob-
serve, the interests of the agent are likely to deviate from those of
the principal. This deviation of interests may not serve either prin-
cipal or agent ex ante, and both, accordingly, may expend re-
sources to overcome it. Jensen and Meckling identify two principal
means for reducing agency costs: monitoring by the principal and
bonding by the agent.26 To these we might add a third, namely
devices that align the incentives of the agent more closely with
those of the principal.
a) Monitoring. The effectiveness of monitoring depends
on the observability of the agent's performance. Monitoring costs
will be slight when the agent's performance can be readily ob-
served by the principal so that the principal can reliably and
cheaply measure the marginal product of the agent's actions.27 Two
strategies can be used singly or in combination to measure the
agent's performance. First, the performance can be observed di-
rectly by a principal capable of judging the marginal product of the
performance. Second, the marginal product can be determined by
the outcome of the agent's actions to the extent that the actions
uniquely determine the outcome. 28 But often neither of these con-
ditions holds: the principal cannot readily determine marginal
product by observing the agent's actions (either because the ac-
tions themselves are not readily observable or because the princi-
pal cannot evaluate the marginal product of the actions observed),
and the principal cannot reliably measure marginal product by
outcome because the agent's actions merely contribute to, but do
not determine, the observed outcome. In these situations monitor-
ing will be relatively more expensive and less effective. The princi-
pal may have to rely on some proxy for the agent's performance
that is relatively easy to observe but inexact. Observing such a
they recognize that the basic elements of the theory are applicable to a much broader range
of economic transactions. Id at 309. See also Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Agency,
in John W. Pratt and Richard J. Zeckhauser, eds, Principals and Agents: The Structure of
Business 37 (Harvard Business School Press, 1985).
25 Jensen and Meckling, 3 J Fin Econ at 308 (cited in note 24).
26 Id.
17 This assumes that the principal and agent have adopted appropriate contractual
terms such that the agent's compensation is tied to marginal product.
" Arrow, The Economics of Agency, in Pratt and Zeckhauser, eds, Principals and
Agents at 37 (cited in note 24).
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proxy, however, would be only partially effective at eliminating
shirking or abuse of trust by the agent.
In the traditional lawsuit, monitoring the lawyer is likely to be
costly and therefore incomplete. The client, as principal, cannot
easily observe the lawyer's efforts because much of the lawyer's
work is performed outside of the client's supervision. Even when
the client can observe the lawyer's work-for example, by review-
ing a draft of a brief or attending oral argument-the client typi-
cally lacks the expertise to determine whether the attorney is actu-
ally doing a good job on the client's behalf. And except in a few
unusual situations in which results turn entirely on the lawyer's
efforts-such as simple incorporations and other changes in legal
status that are granted as a matter of course provided proper ap-
plications are filed-the client cannot accurately measure the law-
yer's marginal product by outcome. Good lawyers lose cases and
bad lawyers win them. Although the client has some ability to
monitor the lawyer-the client can assess the attorney's reputation
before hiring her, can examine work product, and can request sec-
ond opinions from other attorneys-the attorney inevitably retains
a relatively large area of discretion in which shirking or abuse is
possible.
The legal regulatory system contains a variety of provisions
designed to reduce monitoring costs and thereby enhance the cli-
ent's ability to supervise her attorney. The most obvious examples
are the rules on admission to and retention of membership in the
bar itself. Because good standing in the bar carries with it assur-
ances regarding the lawyer's propensity to act as a competent and
faithful fiduciary, it provides a readily observable proxy for quali-
ties that the client might otherwise find quite difficult to measure
(such as whether the lawyer possesses an adequate knowledge of
the law, or whether the lawyer has behaved scrupulously toward
other clients in the past).9 Of course, the standards for admission
and retention of membership in the bar are quite inexact, are set
relatively low, and do not sort between quality levels above the
minimum floor. Good standing may not be a particularly informa-
tive proxy for competence or integrity. Nevertheless, it may have
some value.
29 See Hayne E. Leland, Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Qual-
ity Standards, 87 J Pol Econ 1328 (1979) (minimum quality standards can be economically
efficient in markets with large information asymmetries between buyer and seller, but qual-
ity standards are likely to be too high if set by the affected industry or profession itself).
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Other rules that reduce agency costs by enhancing monitoring
are found in the codes of attorney ethics. The lawyer is obligated
to keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the mat-
ter"e and to abide by the client's decisions on important matters
such as whether to accept an offer of settlement.31 These rules are
based on the theory that a client who is informed about the repre-
sentation and given the power to make the key decisions will be a
more effective monitor than one who is unaware of a matter or who
is unable to affect its prosecution. Client monitoring is further en-
hanced by the rule that the client may discharge her attorney at
any time.32
Finally, the costs of monitoring may be reduced by ethics rules
prohibiting conduct that can reliably be identified as contrary to
the interests of the client. The attorney is not permitted to charge
a vexatious or unreasonable fee,33 divulge the confidences or
secrets of the client,34 fail to exercise due diligence on the client's
behalf,3 5 or commingle funds with client accounts.3 6 These types of
behavior are considered so inherently harmful to the client's inter-
est that they can be prohibited outright by the regulatory system,
relieving the client of some of the responsibility for supervising the
attorney."
b) Bonding. Where monitoring costs are high, the optimal
strategy may be for the agent to engage in some form of bonding to
30 See Model Code EC 7-8, EC 9-2; American Bar Association, Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct (Model Rules) Rule 1.4, reprinted in Morgan and Rotunda, Selected Stan-
dards on Professional Responsibility at 82-177 (cited in note 22). Although there are sub-
stantive differences between the two provisions, the analysis of the attorney's obligation to
keep the client informed and to abide by the client's decisions on basic matters is similar
under both systems.
The Model Code and Model Rules are model statutes promulgated by the ABA for use
by state bar regulatory authorities. The Model Code was adopted in 1969, and the Model
Rules were adopted in 1983. See generally Charles W. Wolfson, Modern Legal Ethics 56-63
(West, 1985).
31 See Model Code EC 7-7; EC 7-8; Model Rule 1.2. But see Model Code DR 7-
101(b)(1) (a lawyer may, "where permissible, exercise his professional judgment to waive or
fall to assert a right or position of his client").
32 See Model Code DR 2-110(B)(4); Model Rule 1.16, Comment [4].
" Model Code DR 2-106(A); DR 2-106(B); Model Rule 1.5(a).
3 See Model Code Canon 4; DR 4-101; Model Rule 1.6; Model Rule 1.9(b).
35 See Model Code DR 6-101(A)(3); EC 6-4; Model Rule 1.3.
36 Model Code DR 9-102; Model Rule 1.15.
3, Of course, attorney breaches of these ethical obligations are unlikely to result in
sanctions unless the client discovers them. Thus, some monitoring by clients is required for
these prohibitions to have their desired effect. But see Model Code DR 1-103(A) (lawyer
possessing unprivileged knowledge of violation by another lawyer of disciplinary rules
"shall" report such knowledge to authority empowered to investigate and act on such
violations).
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assure the principal that the agent will carry out her duty to the
principal faithfully even in the absence of effective monitoring.
Such bonding can be by means of explicit contracts, as in the case
of bond covenants, 8 or by implicit structural features of the prin-
cipal-agent relationship.
Bonding mechanisms can readily be identified in the case of
legal services. First, lawyers enjoy an exclusive right to practice
law. The license to practice carries with it the ability to earn in-
come considerably in excess of what the attorney would be able to
earn by other uses of her time, both because the attorney receives
compensation for the relatively large opportunity and out-of-
pocket costs of legal education, and because the attorney probably
receives some monopoly rents flowing from the exclusion of non-
attorneys from the practice of law. 9 The attorney who engages in
egregious abuse of the client's trust risks losing these extra profits
as a result of suspension or disbarment. The attorney's interest in
maintaining the right to practice thus operates as a bonding device
to assure clients that the attorney will observe at least minimal
fiduciary standards.
Second, lawyers invest in reputation. They do so, for instance,
by scrupulously serving their clients over a long period of time, by
engaging in extensive public service activities, and by hiring the
best and the brightest law school graduates. If these costly activi-
ties are successful in establishing a reputation, the law firm will be
able to charge higher rates-thus obtaining an economic return
from its investment in reputation. At the same time, the firm that
has built up a reputation has a strong interest in maintaining that
reputation by continuing to observe high ethical and quality stan-
dards.4 ° Thus, reputation also acts as a bonding device-albeit an
88 See Clifford W. Smith, Jr. and Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An
Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J Fin Econ 117 (1979) (analyzing how bond covenants, i.e.,
contractual promises made by a corporation to the holders of its bonds, control agency
costs).
89 There are no reliable studies of the extent of such monopoly rents. Studies of other
licensed professions, however, have claimed to demonstrate the existence of monopoly prof-
its. See, for example, Keith B. Leffier, Physician Licensure: Competition and Monopoly in
American Medicine, 21 J L & Econ 165 (1978); Lawrence Shepard, Licensing Restrictions
and the Cost of Dental Care, 21 J L & Econ 187, 200 (1978) (where regulatory authorities
have constructed competitive barriers to practice, dentists have systematically raised fees by
12-15 percent).
48 The role served by reputation is enhanced by the fact that lawyers often obtain cli-
ents through referrals from other lawyers.
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imperfect one 4 1-that assures clients that agency costs will not be
excessive.42
c) Incentives. A third approach to reducing agency costs,
which may be conceptualized as a specialized form of bonding, is
to design incentive structures that'reduce the disparity of interest
between principal and agent.4s The need for monitoring decreases
as the interests of principal and agent coalesce. One obvious means
for improving the alignment of interests between principal and
agent is to pass some of the risk of the enterprise on to the agent.
The optimal amount of risk sharing will depend on the parties' rel-
ative degrees of risk-aversion as well as other factors.
44
Incentive structures in the attorney-client relationship act as
partial, but quite incomplete, substitutes for client monitoring and
attorney bonding. The standard hourly fee eliminates an incentive
the lawyer might have under other fee arrangements to work insuf-
ficient hours on the case. Yet the hourly fee also permits oppor-
tunism by attorneys. They may incur excessive hours, pad the
bill,4 5 or encourage clients to go to trial (and thus incur additional
fees) when settlement would be in the clients' best interests.46
The contingent fee partially aligns the interests of lawyer and
client by giving the lawyer an economic interest in the outcome of
the case, resulting in the sharing of risk that may benefit both par-
ties.47 Yet the contingent fee also gives the attorney an incentive to
pay insufficient attention to cases where the marginal return to the
attorney's time is low relative to other cases in the attorney's port-
"' Reputations are inexact, suffer from time lag effects, and are subject to being
"cashed in" by firms willing to sacrifice their reputations in exchange for increased short-
term profits.
42 See Janet Kiholm Smith and Steven R. Cox, The Pricing of Legal Services: A Con-
tractual Solution to the Problem of Bilateral Opportunism, 14 J Legal Stud 167, 169 (1985)
("[c]redible signals of reputation may reduce product or service quality uncertainty for pro-
spective clients").
42 See Milton Harris and Artur Raviv, Optimal Incentive Contracts with Imperfect
Information, 20 J Econ Theory 231 (1979).
" See Steven Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Rela-
tionship, 10 Bell J Econ 55 (1979) (if agent is risk-averse, her optimal fee depends to some
extent on the outcome, but never leaves the agent bearing all the risk).
11 See, for example, Kirchoff v Flynn, 786 F2d 320, 324 (7th Cir 1986); Smith and Cox,
14 J Legal Stud at 167-68 (cited in note 42); Charles W. Wolfram, The Second Set of Play-
ers: Lawyers, Fee Shifting, and the Limits of Professional Discipline, 47 L & Contemp
Probs 293, 302 (Winter 1984).
46 See Miller, 16 J Legal Stud at 203 (cited in note 21).
" See Kirchoff, 786 F2d at 325; Patricia Munch Danzon, Contingent Fees for Personal
Injury Litigation, 14 Bell J Econ 213 (1983) (contingent fees found to be superior to hourly
fees when the plaintiff is risk-averse and the attorney is risk-neutral); Murray L. Schwartz
and Daniel J.B. Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the Contingent Fee in Personal-Injury
Litigation, 22 Stan L Rev 1125, 1152 (1970) (contingent fee does not perfectly align inter-
ests of client and attorney, but does reduce risk).
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folio, and to settle early for a lower amount than the attorney
could obtain for the client by putting more time and effort into the
case.
48
The legal regulatory system also seeks to align the interests of
attorney and client. The lawyer's basic ethical obligation under
Canon 7 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility is to be
a "zealous" advocate of the client's interest (provided, of course,
that the lawyer remains within the bounds of the law).49 The obli-
gation of zeal in representing the client is, effectively, an obligation
to act as if the client's interests were those of the attorney. One
may, of course, question the efficacy of a mere hortatory principle,
especially one stated as a "canon." However, we believe that cul-
tural or institutional values do play a role in influencing behavior,
at least at the margin. Lawyers who have been socialized into the
ideals of a profession that values zealous service of the client's in-
terests are more likely to act in accordance with such ideals than
will individuals who have not been socialized in the same value
structure.
The ethics rules contain several provisions designed to align
interests of attorney and client that are backed with greater sanc-
tion than the ideal of Canon 7. Consider the rules generally prohib-
iting attorneys from representing clients with differing or conflict-
ing interests5 0 Similarly a lawyer is generally prohibited from
representing a client if her own interests could impair the repre-
sentation." The conflict-of-interest rules exclude from representa-
tion a class of attorneys especially likely to have interests that de-
viate substantially from the interests of their clients. Thus certain
egregious misalignments of attorney-client interests are ruled out.
48 See, for example, Chesny v Marek, 720 F2d 474, 477 (7th Cir 1983), rev'd on other
grounds, 473 US 1 (1985) (giving numerical example of an inappropriate settlement result-
ing from an economic conflict of interest); Kevin M. Clermont and John D. Currivan, Im-
proving on the Contingent Fee, 63 Cornell L Rev 529, 536 (1978).
"I Model Code Canon 7. The ideal of zealous advocacy in the Model Code is substan-
tially moderated in the Model Rules. See Model Rule 1.3 ("A lawyer shall act with reasona-
ble diligence and promptness in representing a client."); id, Comment [1] ("A lawyer should
act with... zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf [but] is not bound to press for every
advantage that might be realized for a client.").
50 See Model Code DR 5-105 (simultaneous conflicts); Model Rule 1.7 (same); Model
Rule 1.9 (conflicts with former clients); Model Rule 1.10 (imputed disqualification of lawyers
in firms).
51 See Model Code DR 5-101; DR 5-102 (generally requiring withdrawal when the law-
yer becomes a witness in litigation); DR 5-103 (disapproving attorney acquisition of an in-
terest in litigation); DR 5-104 (limiting business relationships between attorneys and cli-
ents); Model Rule 1.8 (same).
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d) Residual loss. These three devices for controlling the
misalignment of interests between principal and
agent-monitoring, bonding, and incentives-are themselves
costly. It would not be in the interest of either principal or agent to
eliminate all potential for behavior by the agent that does not
serve the principal's interests. Monitoring, bonding, and incentives
will be utilized only up to the point where the marginal cost of
overcoming the misalignment of interests between principal and
agent equals the marginal cost of the misalignment itself. Jensen
and Meckling observe, therefore, that there will always be a
residual loss inherent in the agency relationship.52 The problem for
the agency relationship is to design a structure for the relationship
that minimizes total agency costs, which are equal to the sum of
monitoring costs, bonding costs, incentive costs, and the residual
loss.
2. Application of agency cost theory to class and derivative
cases.
As applied to legal representation in general, the regulatory
system seems to have designed a moderately successful structure,
even though client monitoring and bonding remains costly and im-
perfect. Existing regulations fail their intended purposes, however,
in the context of large-scale, small-claim litigation.
The existing regulatory system cannot effectively deal with
agency costs that arise in class action and derivative litigation be-
cause plaintiffs in the class action and derivative context are often
completely incapable of monitoring the attorney.53 In addition,
standard bonding and incentive techniques are much less effective
in class and derivative litigation.
a) Monitoring. Members of the plaintiff class in a large
class action or shareholder's derivative suit often have claims so
small that the litigation is a matter of relative unimportance to
them.54 Even though the claims in the aggregate may be very large,
52 Jensen and Meckling, 3 J Fin Econ at 308 (cited in note 24).
53 The client's inability to monitor the attorney in class and derivative litigation is well-
understood. See, for example, Greenfield v Villager Industries, Inc., 483 F2d 824, 832 n 9
(3d Cir 1973); Cooper, Do the Merits Matter? at 83-86 (cited in note 3) ("[t]he client disap-
pears in securities class actions as a result of the same collective action problems that led to
the invention of class actions in the first place"); Dam, 4 J Legal Stud at 58-59 (cited in note
4); David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective
Means, 62 Ind L J 561, 582 n 86 (1987).
" Instructive in this regard is the response rate to notice of settlement in many class
cases. Even though the notice of settlement usually informs members of the plaintiff class
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the small size of the individual claims creates enormous free-rider
effects: no rational plaintiff would take on the role of litigation
monitor because she would incur all the costs of doing so but
would realize only her pro rata share of the benefits.
Indeed, even if plaintiffs wanted to monitor the litigation, they
would experience severe difficulties in doing so because they are
often entirely unaware that the litigation is pending until after a
settlement has been reached.5 5 Even where an individual class
member is aware of pending litigation, it is far from clear that she
could have much influence on the class attorney because the attor-
ney must act for the benefit of the class as a whole and therefore is
not obliged to follow the unilateral wishes of any individual class
member when those wishes deviate from the attorney's sense of
optimal litigation strategy.56
These collective action and free-rider effects allow the plain-
tiffs' attorney in class and derivative cases to operate with nearly
total freedom from traditional forms of client monitoring. More-
over, enhancing client monitoring by keeping clients informed and
deferring to their wishes on strategy is infeasible. The costs of
communicating with the dispersed plaintiff class are high to begin
with. Even if the class members are informed about a particular
litigation problem, organizing a procedure for making a decision
would be difficult and costly, especially if, as is usually the case in
litigation, the choice involved is not a simple bipolar decision in
which a simple majority vote procedure would suffice. And even if
a decision procedure for the class were devised and implemented,
the outcome of the class's deliberations would not necessarily be
optimal, given that class members with small stakes have little in-
centive to research the problem or to deliberate at any length.
b) Bonding. The inefficacy of client monitoring in class
and derivative suits is mirrored by a reduced role for bonding as a
device for overcoming agency costs in these contexts. Plaintiffs' at-
torneys are, to be sure, members of the bar who would lose their
livelihoods if they were excluded from the right to practice law.
However, in the absence of a client actively interested in the litiga-
tion, plaintiffs' attorneys have less cause to fear bar discipline for
that they have won money and need merely fill out a brief form to obtain it, many plaintiffs
never claim their share of the fund. See, for example, Zimmer Paper Products, Inc. v Berger
& Montague, 758 F2d 86 (3d Cir 1985) (12 percent response rate); Herbert B. Newberg,
Class Actions CS7-50 (McGraw-Hill, 1977 & Supp 1984).
5' See notes 82-100 and accompanying text.
58 See notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
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misconduct simply because no one is likely to refer them to the
disciplinary authorities if they misbehave. While a referral could
conceivably be made by a judge or defense attorney, these parties
do not have a direct personal stake in sanctioning a plaintiffs' at-
torney who has abused the trust of his or her clients. Indeed, the
interests of defense attorneys' clients are often served if the plain-
tiffs' attorney breaches a duty to her clients by, for example, set-
tling for a relatively low sum early in the litigation in order to ob-
tain a high fee per hour invested in the case. 57 Thus, despite the
putative obligation to report violations of the disciplinary rules,58
defense attorneys are unlikely to be reliable sources of information
regarding plaintiffs' attorneys' disciplinary violations.
The lack of client monitoring in the class and derivative con-
text also reduces the efficacy of reputational bonding, which, as
noted above, lowers agency costs in traditional litigation settings.
Because clients do not pick their attorneys in class and derivative
suits, plaintiffs' attorneys have little incentive to invest in reputa-
tions for probity and reliability in order to attract clients. The at-
torneys themselves are responsible for initiating the litigation and
do not rely on clients to come to them with cases. Plaintiffs' attor-
neys do have an incentive to build a reputation, but the parties
they wish to impress are not the clients. Rather, they have an in-
terest in being known among other plaintiffs' attorneys as persons
of ability, drive, perseverence, and long-range commitment to en-
gaging in class and derivative litigation. Such a reputation can
serve them in good stead in the competition among plaintiffs' at-
torneys for rights to pursue particular lawsuits.59 Plaintiffs' attor-
neys benefit from developing reputations among the defense bar
for toughness and perseverence, but also for willingness to "deal"
by negotiating settlements that minimize the costs to defense
counsels' clients.6 0 Thus, while some elements of plaintiffs' attor-
V Similarly, trial judges interested in clearing their dockets and keeping up with ardu-
ous trial schedules are unlikely to object to premature settlements. See notes 130-34 and
accompanying text.
88 See Model Code DR 1-103(A) (mandatory duty to disclose that another attorney has
violated a disciplinary rule if that information is unprivileged); Model Rule 8.3 ("A lawyer
having knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of the rules of professional
conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or
fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate professional authority.").
11 See Coffee, 86 Colum L Rev at 713 (cited in note 4); Coffee, 42 Md L Rev at 248-61
(cited in note 4).
11 See Herbert B. Newberg, 3 Class Actions § 5515.b at 456 (McGraw-Hill, 1977) (de-
fendant should consider the "reputation and experience of counsel for the class representa-
tive" in deciding whether to propose a settlement).
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neys' desired reputations-toughness, ability, and perseverence, for
example-may well correlate with service to clients, in other re-
spects the reputations desired by plaintiffs' attorneys are not coex-
tensive with client interests-for example, a reputation for a will-
ingness to "deal" with defense attorneys, even at the expense of
their own clients' best interests.
c) Incentives. Finally, consider incentive effects in class
and derivative litigation. The lack of monitoring and the relative
inefficacy of bonding in these settings would not be especially
problematic if the interests of plaintiffs' counsel were closely
aligned with those of their clients. Unfortunately, there is a sub-
stantial deviation of interests between attorney and client. The na-
ture of the conflict varies depending on the type of litigation in-
volved and the procedure used in the jurisdiction for determining
the attorney's fee. But at least under the existing regulatory sys-
tem, the conflict remains significant in all cases.61
In "common fund" cases, where the plaintiffs' attorney gener-
ates a fund for the benefit of the class, the majority of American
courts award fees out of the fund based on the lodestar calcula-
tion.s" Under this approach, the hours reasonably expended by the
lawyer are multiplied by the lawyer's reasonable hourly fee to cal-,
culate a lodestar. The lodestar is then adjusted by a multiplier to
account for a variety of factors including, most significantly, the
risk of the litigation. Attorneys in these cases thus have an incen-
tive to run up excessive hours, delay the litigation unnecessarily, or
even to exaggerate the number of hours expended in order to ob-
tain a larger fee. 3 Plaintiffs' attorneys may also wish to settle for a
relatively low sum on the eve of trial, knowing that in so doing
they obtain most of the benefits they can expect from the litigation
while eliminating their downside risk.64 These abuses are checked,
61 These conflicts could be substantially reduced or eliminated by an auction of the
claim. See notes 326-29 and accompanying text.
2 The seminal case on the lodestar approach is Lindy Bros. Builders v American Radi-
ator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F2d 161 (3d Cir 1973). See Robert T. Mowrey, Attor-
ney Fees in Securities Class Action and Derivative Suits, 3 J Corp L 267, 334-48 (1978);
Alexander Hammond, Stringent New Standards for Awards of Attorney's Fees, 32 Bus Law
523, 525-27 (1977).
"' For a case in which the court suspected the plaintiffs' attorneys of excessive work or
falsification of hours, see In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 98 FRD 48, 172, 177-78 (E
D Pa 1983), modified on other grounds, 751 F2d 562 (3d Cir 1984). Some courts are begin-
ning to question the lodestar method because of these dangers. See, for example, In re Ora-
cle Securities Litigation, 131 FRD 688, 689 (N D Cal 1990); In re Chrysler Motors Corp.
Overnight Evaluation Program Litigation, 736 F Supp 1007, 1015 (E D Mo 1990).
" See Coffee, 86 Colum L Rev at 717-18 (cited in note 4).
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to a degree, by the required judicial scrutiny of fee awards and
settlements in class and derivative litigation. 5 Nevertheless,
agency costs in cases where fees are calculated using the lodestar
method are no doubt substantial.
Further, plaintiffs' attorneys may sometimes substantially re-
duce their risk by reaching an understanding with defense counsel
early on about the contours of the eventual settlement. Then they
can expend a mutually acceptable number of additional hours on
the case, charging them against the settlement fund under the
lodestar calculation. The social disutility of this procedure is obvi-
ous; it represents an essentially meaningless exercise that ties up
the resources of plaintiffs' counsel, defense counsel, and others
such as witnesses who must submit to depositions that all parties
understand will never be used in court. The principal losers are
members of the plaintiff class who must pay over part of their re-
covery to counsel for work that serves no purpose other than to
justify an enhanced attorney's fee.
The other method of calculating attorneys' fees in common
fund cases, which has become more popular recently,66 is the "per-
centage" method, in which fees are awarded based on some fixed
percentage of the fund. There are obvious incentive problems with
this arrangement as well. First, plaintiffs' attorneys will earn wind-
fall profits, at the expense of the class members, in cases present-
ing large damages and low proof costs. More generally, it would
appear that the percentage method effectively guarantees that
5 See notes 124-83 and accompanying text. For an optimistic assessment of the value
of judicial scrutiny, see In the Matter of Superior Beverage/Glass Container Consolidiated
Pretrial, 1990 US Dist LEXIS 14756, *13 (N D Ill) (judge observed that fee padding under
the lodestar regime was unusual, and to the extent it occurs, "careful judges and their staffs
should be able to spot the worst, if not all, abuses").
66 See, for example, In re Oracle Securities Litigation, 131 FRD 688, 689 (N D Cal
1990) (lodestar approach is "now thoroughly discredited by experience"); In re Chrysler
Motors Corporation Overnight Evaluation Program Litigation, 736 F Supp 1007, 1009 (E D
Mo 1990); In re Union Carbide Corporation Consumer Products Business Securities Litiga-
tion, 724 F Supp 160, 170 (S D NY 1989). But see, for example, Superior Beverage/Glass
Container Consolidated Pretrial, 1990 US Dist LEXIS 14756 at *8 (rejecting as "overly
simplified and shortsighted" any rule for awarding fees on a straight percentage basis with-
out regard to hours billed).
The current rise of the percentage method represents something of a reprise, since prior
to the ascendency of the lodestar method in the 1970s the percentage method was the pre-
vailing method for calculating fees in common fund cases. See, for example, John P. Daw-
son, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88 Harv L Rev 849, 876
(1975); Douglas G. Cole, Counsel Fees in Stockholders' Derivative and Class Ac-
tions-Hornstein Revisited, 6 U Richmond L Rev 259, 283-85 (1972); George D. Hornstein,
Legal Therapeutics: The "Salvage" Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69 Harv L Rev 658, 664-
65 (1956).
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plaintiffs' attorneys will be systematically. compensated at a rate
higher than the rate they would demand in an efficiently function-
ing competitive market. To illustrate this point, consider the
thought process of a plaintiffs' attorney in deciding whether to
bring a given cause of action. The attorney operating in a percent-
age-of-the-recovery system will never bring an action when the ex-
pected opportunity costs to the attorney of bringing the suit (as
measured by the value the attorney places on his or her time) ex-
ceed the expected award of attorneys' fees (equal to the present
value of the expected recovery for the class multiplied by the fee
percentage used in the jurisdiction and further discounted by the
attorney's estimate of the probability of success in the litigation) .7
The plaintiffs' attorney faces a distribution of cases in which one
tail-representing cases where the expected payoff to the attorney
falls short of the attorney's expected costs-is cut off.68 On the
other hand, the attorney can be expected to bring all cases where
the expected payoff equals or exceeds the attorney's expected
costs.
Among the cases that are brought will be a wide range of cases
in which the expected payoff exceeds the attorney's expected costs.
Because the applicable fee percentage is not adjusted downward in
such cases-as it would be in an efficiently functioning market for
contingency fee representation 6e-these excess profits are not dissi-
pated by competition. In theory, a court could reduce a percentage
award downward in such cases, but such judicial reductions would
not necessarily be reliable, and would add an additional level of
complexity and cost to fee calculations. Thus, plaintiffs' attorneys
can be expected to reap systematic excess profits, of which windfall
cases are only the most noteworthy examples, under a percentage
method.70 These excess profits are earned at the expense of the
plaintiff class.
'7 We use the concept of opportunity costs in the technical economic sense as" including
a reasonable profit.
68 These cases, moreover, will never be brought even though members of the plaintiff
class have valid legal claims that would receive vindication if a higher percentage fee were
available. The auction approach we advocate in Part V would overcome this problem be-
cause the bidders could purchase the claims, or acquire the litigation rights, for whatever
they are worth.
69 Whether the market for contingency fee representation is in fact competitive is an-
other story. For an argument that contingent fees are generally not set competitively, see
Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the Prince of
Denmark?, 37 UCLA L Rev 29 (1989).
70 See In re Oracle Securities Litigation, 131 FRD 688, 696 (N D Cal 1990) (noting that
lawyers would receive "more in fees than they would have bargained for" if they were paid
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The second incentive problem in percentage-of-the-recovery
cases is settlement. Attorneys compensated on a percentage
method have an incentive to settle early for an amount lower than
what might be obtained by further efforts. 71 The attorney who puts
in relatively few hours to obtain an early settlement is likely to
earn a much greater compensation per hour of effort than an attor-
ney who expends greater efforts and litigates a case to the point
where the plaintiffs' recovery is maximized. 72 Again the plaintiff
class loses.
Consider now common benefit and fee-shifting cases. Common
benefit cases are typically shareholder's derivative suits in which
the plaintiffs' attorney does not generate a fund, but rather causes
the defendant to do something that confers a nonpecuniary benefit
on the corporation.7 3 Fee-shifting cases are brought under a statute
providing that prevailing plaintiffs in certain types of litigation
may obtain reimbursement for their reasonable attorneys' fees
from the defendant.74 In common benefit and fee-shifting cases the
attorneys' fee comes from the defendant rather than from the class
recovery.7 5 Unlike common fund cases, therefore, there is a
counter-party in common benefit and fee-shifting cases with an in-
centive to bargain over the fee in order to keep it within reason-
able limits.
This feature, however, does not effectively obviate the attor-
ney-client conflict. Defendants in common benefit and fee-shifting
cases typically wish to minimize the sum of three costs: the costs of
the relief on the merits, the costs of their own attorney's fees, and
the costs of the plaintiffs' attorney's fees. Defendants are typically
indifferent about how the total cost of litigation is distributed
among these elements. Plaintiffs' attorneys, on the other hand,
at a rate under the percentage-of-recovery method that is higher than what they would have
demanded in a competitive market).
71 See, for example, Chesny v Marek, 720 F2d 474, 477 (7th Cir 1983); Saylor v Linds-
ley, 456 F2d 896, 900-01 (2d Cir 1972); Dam, 4 J Legal Stud at 56-58 (cited in note 4).
712 See Miller, 16 J Legal Stud at 189 (cited in note 21) (emphasizing the analysis of the
settlement figure for the claim as a whole, including the attorneys' share and the client's
share).
7S See Mills v Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 US 375, 391-92 (1970).
7 See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical
Overview, 1982 Duke L J 651.
71 The corporation typically pays the fee in successful derivative litigation. This prac-
tice can be reconciled with the general American Rule on fees, under which each client pays
his or her own attorney, see Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v Wilderness Society, 421 US 240,
247 (1975), on the theory that victory in the litigation establishes that the plaintiffs' attor-
ney was actually representing the corporation after all, and thus it is appropriate to require
the corporation as "client" to pay the fee.
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have an interest in increasing their own fees, even at the expense
of a reduction in the relief afforded to the putative client. Thus the
conditions are present for a bargain under which the plaintiffs' at-
torneys agree to a lower overall settlement on the merits of the
litigation in exchange for a higher fee.
76
A related problem occurs when the defendant offers a rela-
tively generous settlement on the merits on condition that the
plaintiffs' attorney agrees to waive any fee request (or to accept a
low fee)." This conflict has led some courts and commentators to
call for a mandatory rule separating the fee negotiation from the
settlement on the merits in fee-shifting cases. 8 Whether such a
rule could be effectively enforced is open to question, however."9
Moreover, separating the fee negotiation from the merits determi-
nation raises the possibility that plaintiffs' attorneys who believe
that a favorable settlement will eventually be reached will string
out litigation well past the point where settlement first becomes
possible in order to justify a higher fee request. Splitting the fee
and merits negotiations is no panacea for the agency problems in
the common benefit and fee-shifting contexts.
The regulatory system incorporates a number of special fea-
tures designed to cope with the pervasive agency problems in class
7' See, for example, Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 537 (cited in note 8); Andrew
Rosenfield, An Empirical Test of Class-Action Settlement, 5 J Legal Stud 113, 117 (1976)
(empirical study suggesting that attorneys who settled class actions rather than taking them
to judgment received an average fee premium of $104,000); Wolfram, 47 L & Contemp
Probs at 299-302 (cited in note 45).
7 See Wolfram, 47 L & Contemp Probs at 300-01 (cited in note 45).
78 See, for example, Prandini v National Tea Co., 557 F2d 1015, 1021 (3d Cir 1977);
Comment, Settlement Offers Conditioned Upon Waiver of Attorneys' Fees: Policy, Legal,
and Ethical Considerations, 131 U Pa L Rev 793 (1983); Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts
in Class Actions, 34 Stan L Rev 1183, 1251 (1982); Wolfram, 47 L & Contemp Probs at 299-
302 (cited in note 45). But see Evans v Jeff D., 475 US 717, 738 n 30 (1986) (upholding
permissibility, under some circumstances, of simultaneous negotiation of fees and merits in
civil rights litigation). Compare Miller, 16 J Legal Stud at 206-09 (cited in note 21) (effects
of simultaneous fee and merits settlement negotiations are ambiguous).
7 Presumably a rule against simultaneous negotiation of fees and merits would be ef-
fective against settlement offers on the merits conditioned on the plaintiffs' attorney waiv-
ing or reducing her request for fees, given that the plaintiffs' attorney could be expected to
bring such offers to the attention of the court. However, generous fee offers coupled with
reduced merits relief would be more difficult to police: the plaintiffs' attorney and the de-
fendant could agree privately on such a settlement, with the defendant performing its part
of the bargain by settling (or not objecting to) the fee request after the merits relief is
presented to the court. Obviously in such cases the defendant might renege on the agree-
ment and object to the fee request. But if the parties are repeat players, such behavior
might well redound to the defendant's long-term detriment by precluding such deals in the
future. See Arthur R. Miller, Attorneys' Fees in Class Actions 222 (Federal Judicial Center,
1980); Wolfram, 47 L & Contemp Probs at 312 (cited in note 45).
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action and derivative suits. The next section discusses one way in
which the system has adjusted for these problems: by allocating
the authority to make decisions regarding the litigation to someone
other than plaintiffs' attorney.
II. REGULATIONS ALLOCATING LITIGATION AUTHORITY
Class action and derivative suits present obvious problems for
control of litigation on the plaintiffs' side. Four situations are of
special interest: (1) notice and opt-out rights in class action cases;
(2) rights by corporate managers to control derivative litigation; (3)
conflicts between representative plaintiffs and plaintiffs' attorneys;
and (4) judicial scrutiny of settlements and fee requests. For each
category, we discuss the existing rules, critique those rules, and
recommend changes that would better align the interests of attor-
ney and client.
A. Notice and Opt-Out Rights in Class Actions
As we have seen, the putative clients in class action and deriv-
ative litigation are unable to monitor the activities of their attor-
neys or to make any of the key litigation decisions.80 In place of
client control, Federal Rule 23(c)(2) requires that in (b)(3) class
actions the members of the class must receive "the best notice
practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to
all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.""'
The notice must inform the class members that they have the right
to opt out of the class, and that if they do not opt out they will be
bound by the judgment.8 2 The Supreme Court held in Eisen v Car-
lisle & Jacquelin that no matter how large the class, or how small
the average claim, individualized notice is required for all class
plaintiffs who can be identified with reasonable effort.
8 3
There is little to recommend the Eisen rule from the stand-
point of economic analysis. The pecuniary costs of notice in large
class actions can run well over half a million dollars.8 4 In addition,
80 See notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
81 FRCP 23(c)(2).
82 Id. Prior to its revision in 1966, the rule had provided that class members must opt
in to the action or be excluded.
.3 417 US 156, 173-77 (1974). See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v Sanders, 437 US 340
(1978) (representative plaintiff, and not defendant, should generally bear cost of notice);
Phillips Petroleum Co. v Shutts, 472 US 797 (1985) (notice required by due process).
84 In Eisen itself, the Court's ruling would have required that individualized notice be
mailed to approximately 2,250,000 individuals at a cost of $225,000. Eisen, 417 US at 166-
67. These were 1974 costs, however, when a first-class stamp was only six cents. Id at 167.
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the costs of identifying absent class members and preparing the
notice, as well as the opportunity costs to class members of inter-
preting the notice, can be substantial. These costs would be justifi-
able if they were outweighed by compensating benefits that might
exist in a case with substantial individual claims. In the large-scale,
small-claim class action, however, the benefits of notice appear
minimal at best. It is doubtful whether notice has any social utility
other than that of informing the class members of the claim. Most
plaintiffs are unlikely to place any significant value on such
information.
Upon receiving and reading notice of the suit, the typical
plaintiff in a large-scale, small-stakes class action has a choice be-
tween two courses of action. She can do nothing, in which case she
will receive a check in the mail if the suit is successful and will
incur no costs if the Suit fails. Or she can go to the trouble of opt-
ing out of the action, in which case she will receive nothing
whether or not the suit is successful.85 Such a decision is not hard
to make. Nearly 'everyone who understands the nature of this
choice will elect to do nothing and thereby remain part of the class
action. 6 Accordingly, notice has little realistic value to class mem-
bers in large-scale, small-stakes class actions.
We submit that in such cases the members of the plaintiff
class would ordinarily be far better off dispensing with notice.
Moreover, looking only at cases that are filed understates the dis-.
The costs of similar notice today would be considerably higher. See Mountain States Tele-
phone and Telegraph Co. v District Court, 12 Class Action Rep 305 (D Colo 1989) (notice to
more than one million potential class members would cost over $500,000 if mailed individu-
ally; court required notice to be inserted in defendant's billing envelopes at cost of approxi-
mately $300,000). See also P.D.Q. Inc., of Miami v Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 61 FRD
372, 377 (S D Fla 1973), aff'd as In re Nissan Antitrust Litigation, 577 F2d 910 (5th Cir
1978) (estimated notice costs of $300,000).
8 Of course, a class member could opt out and bring her own suit, but given the small
nature of most class claims, this option is completely infeasible for the average class plain-
tiff. See Note, Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 Harv L Rev 1318, 1558 (1976).
86 Statistics on opt-outs tend to substantiate this inference. See, for example, Steiner v
Fruehauf Corp., 121 FRD 304, 306 (E D Mich 1988), aff'd as Priddy v Edelman, 883 F2d
438 (6th Cir 1989) (out of "thousands" of notices mailed to class plaintiffs, only 15 opted
out); Fisher Brothers, Inc. v Mueller Brass Co., 630 F Supp 493, 498 (E D Pa 1985) (out of
37,000 plaintiffs to whom notices were mailed notice only 46 opted out); In re Cuisinart
Food Processor Antitrust Litigation, 38 Fed Rules Serv 2d 446, 454 (D Conn 1983) (out of
1.5 million putative class members, only 89 opted out specifically in order to avoid the res
judicata effect of the judgment; 825 opted out for other reasons). The relatively high opt-out
rate observed in Phillips Petroleum, 472 US at 801 (3,400 plaintiffs opted out of a class of
33,000 royalty holders of oil and gas leases) was probably due to the existence of a discrete
group of large claim holders in the plaintiff class who might benefit from individualized
litigation.
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advantages of notice to members of the class that it is ostensibly
designed to help. The predictable effect of Eisen is to prevent
many lawsuits from being filed in the first place because of the
added costs of notice . 7 Potential class plaintiffs in such actions
would unambiguously prefer to dispense with notice because doing
so is the only feasible means for obtaining any recovery at all.
The Court in Eisen need not have reached the result it did.
The plain language of Rule 23(c)(2) does require individualized no-
tice to all class members who can be identified with reasonable ef-
fort. This seems fairly compelling at first blush. Yet the Supreme
Court has not insisted on rigid adherence to plain language when
the result would be absurd.8 8 Moreover, Rule 23(c)(2) itself implies
that cost-benefit analysis should not be avoided altogether in the
administration of the notice requirement. Under the federal rules,
notice need only be sent to those class members who can be identi-
fied with "reasonable effort." The reasonable effort requirement
must refer to some type of pragmatic calculus as to when the mar-
ginal costs of identifying further class members exceed the mar-
ginal benefits of doing so. It would be anomalous indeed if the
drafters of the rule intended a cost-benefit analysis with respect to
the identification of class members, but insisted on rigid and even
self-defeating adherence to a notice requirement when it came to
actually mailing out notice to class members so identified. In short,
the Court in Eisen had the interpretive flexibility to read Rule
23(c)(2) in a practical and sensible way; regrettably, it failed to do
SO.
There are, to be sure, constitutional issues underlying the no-
tice requirement. Due process generally requires that persons sub-
ject to litigation receive notice "reasonably calculated, under all
the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objec-
tions." ' Dispensing with notice altogether in the class action con-
text, even with respect to class members who can be identified rel-
atively cheaply, would no doubt raise a serious constitutional
" See Report and Recommendations of the Special Committee on Class Action Im-
provements, 110 FRD 195, 208 (1986).
88 See, for example, Public Citizen v United States Dept. of Justice, 491 US 440, 109 S
Ct 2558, 2566-67 (1989); United Steelworkers of America v Weber, 443 US 193, 201-02
(1979); Philbrook v Glodgett, 421 US 707, 713-14 (1975).
89 Mullane v Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 US 306, 314 (1950) (invalidating
notice by publication to known beneficiaries of a common trust fund). See also Tulsa Pro-
fessional Collection Services, Inc. v Pope, 485 US 478 (1988); Mennonite Board of Missions
v Adams, 462 US 791 (1983).
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question. In Phillips Petroleum Co. v Shutts, the Court expressly
stated that notice-by which it apparently meant notice by
mail-is constitutionally required in large-scale, small-claim class
actions."e But, the result in Shutts appears questionable at best.
The Supreme Court has made quite clear that in the notice-of-liti-
gation context, as in other due process clause analysis, the relevant
analysis involves a balancing of costs and benefits.9 Cases in which
the Court has required actual notice have typically involved two
factors not present in large-scale, small-claim class actions. First,
the property rights at issue have typically been substantial in size
or importance to the party claiming the protections of the due pro-
cess clause.2 Second, Supreme Court cases prior to Shutts typi-
cally involved situations in which a party stood to forfeit the prop-
erty right if he did not receive notice of the proposed state
action. 3 It is not surprising, therefore, that in these cases the
Court held that mail service was "an inexpensive and efficient
mechanism that is reasonably calculated to provide actual
notice." '94
In the large-scale, small-claim class action context, by way of
contrast, the claims of the individual class members are very small.
Eisen itself is typical; the named plaintiff in that case asserted
damages of only $70.9' Because plaintiffs in these cases are typi-
cally unaware that they even have a claim against the defendant,
there is virtually no possibility that loss of the claim will cause
damages to the plaintiff that exceed the value of the claim itself.
The plaintiff's interest in receiving individualized notice is accord-
9o 472 US 797, 812 (1985) ("It]he plaintiff must receive notice plus an opportunity to be
heard and participate in the litigation, whether in person or through counsel"). Shutts was
a class action on behalf of approximately 33,000 plaintiffs with average claims of $100. Id at
801.
91 See especially Pope, 485 US at 489-90 (when assessing the propriety of actual notice
"consideration should be given to the practicalities of the situation" and to "the effect that
requiring actual notice may have on important state interests"; reliance on publication no-
tice alone is permissible if actual notice is unduly "burdensome or impracticable.").
'2 See, for example, Matter of Estate of Pope, 733 P2d 396, 397 (Okla 1987), rev'd as
Pope, 485 US 478 (debt owed by decedent to medical center for hospital expenses in excess
of $14,000); Mennonite Board, 462 US at 794 (real property sold at tax sale for $1,167).
,3 See, for example, Pope, 485 US at 481 (permanent cutoff of creditor's claim against
assets of decedent's estate); Mennonite Board, 462 US at 793-94 (permanent loss of lien
against real property); Greene v Lindsey, 456 US 444, 446-47 (1982) (permanent loss of right
to challenge eviction proceedings).
" Pope, 485 US at 490.
95 Eisen, 417 US at 161. Cases involving large numbers of small claims are legion. For a
recent example, see In re Anchor Securities Litigation, Fed Secur L Rptr (CCH) T 95,481 at
97,511 (E D NY and S D NY 1990) (settlement of $2.3 million had to be divided, after
deducting attorneys' fees award, among 17,595,000 shares).
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ingly considerably smaller in this context than in other situations.
Further, while class action plaintiffs who are not provided with no-
tice and who therefore do not have the opportunity to opt out may
lose the theoretical right not to be bound by the res judicata effect
of any eventual judgment, they also benefit substantially by gain-
ing the right to participate in the funds received by the plaintiff
class in any settlement or judgment. In the class action context,
the right forfeited by becoming party to the proceedings is a mat-
ter of only slight importance at best. The analysis suggests that
due process should not require individualized notice of small
claimants prior to judgment or settlement in this specialized class
action context.96
The continued viability of the large-scale class action after Ei-
sen is largely due to the fact that the notice requirement is rou-
tinely circumvented. Plaintiffs' counsel can avoid notice costs by
classifying the litigation as a (b)(2) class action97-where the party
opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, nmking injunctive or declaratory relief ap-
propriate with respect to the class as a whole-for which advance
notice of class certification is not usually required.98 And class ac-
tion certification is typically put off until the last possible minute,
often until the eve of triale9 or until the parties reach a settlement
on the merits. 110
Delaying certification benefits both the defendant and the
plaintiffs' attorney, and thus presents great appeal to the parties
who actually control the litigation. The plaintiffs' attorney benefits
by not having to pay the high up-front costs of notice, and by not
expending these costs subject to a risk of nonsuccess in the litiga-
" See Note, Civil Procedure-Class Actions-Amending Rule 23 in Response to Eisen
v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 53 NC L Rev 409, 416-17 (1974).
97 See note 10 and accompanying text. For cases recategorizing (b)(3) actions, see, for
example, Stoetzner v US Steel Corp., 897 F2d 115, 119 (3d Cir 1990); Wetzel v Liberty
Mutual Insurance Co., 508 F2d 239, 253 (3d Cir 1975).
" Notice is not required for (b)(2) class actions, but may be ordered by the judge as a
matter of discretion. See Mark C. Weber, Preclusion and Procedural Due Process in Rule
23(b) (2) Class Actions, 21 Mich J Ref 347, 388 (1988). However, judges rarely require notice
in (b)(2) cases. See Bryant G. Garth, Conflict and Dissent in Class Actions: A Suggested
Perspective, 77 Nw U L Rev 492, 514 (1982).
See, for example, Stoetzner, 897 F2d at 119.
100 See, for example, In re Bendectin Products Liability Litigation, 749 F2d 300, 302
(6th Cir 1984); Malchman v Davis, 706 F2d 426, 429-30 (2d Cir 1983); Weinberger v Ken-
drick, 698 F2d 61, 73 (2d Cir 1982); County of Suffolk v Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F
Supp 1422, 1424-25 (E D NY 1989), aft'd, 907 F2d 1295 (2d Cir 1990); Note, 89 Harv L Rev
at 1559 (cited in note 85) ("class interests may be advanced by delaying notice until a settle-
ment is imminent and the defendant may be willing to pay the costs [of notice]").
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tion.1' 1 Defendants benefit from putting off class action certifica-
tion for a number of reasons.
First, defendants are likely to strike a more favorable settle-
ment in advance of certification than afterwards. The reason is
that the plaintiffs' attorneys are presumably likely to settle for less
in advance of certification because doing so reduces their costs;
these savings will be shared with the defendants.
Second, defendants may want to hedge their bets during the
early phases of the litigation when they lack information about the
strength or weakness of the plaintiffs' case and of opposing coun-
sel. Defendants would prefer class certification of a case in which
the plaintiffs' attorney is either incompetent or willing to settle out
at a low figure. Defendants in such cases expect to pay only rela-
tively minor damages. Accordingly, they have an interest in al-
lowing the action to proceed on a class basis because certification
offers res judicata protection against further litigation on the
claim. On the other hand, defendants would prefer to avoid class
certification in cases where the plaintiffs' attorney is competent,
vigorous, and unwilling to settle on terms favorable to the defen-
dant. As the litigation progresses, defendants obtain a better sense
of the plaintiffs' attorney's competence and settlement strategy,
and thus are able to make a more informed estimate of the costs
and benefits of opposing the plaintiff's motion for class
certification.
Third, defendants may want to put off certification in order to
preserve the option of buying off the named plaintiff (or, more re-
alistically, attorney) with a favorable settlement.102 These benefits
to defendants of delaying the class certification decision often out-
weigh the advantages of forcing an early decision on certification
that could either strike out the class allegations or force the plain-
tiffs' attorney to pay the costs of notification.
Delay of class certification until a settlement is reached on the
merits remedies much of the harm inflicted by Eisen. Ordinarily in
101 In many states, the plaintiffs' attorney is formally required to insist on repayment of
class certification costs by the named class representative, but in practice the costs are vir-
tually always paid by the attorney alone. See notes 252-56 and accompanying text.
102 See Raymond A. Fylstra, Settlement of Class Action Cases Prior to Class Certifica-
tion, 69 Ill Bar J 24 (1980) (suggesting that in some cases the plaintiffs' attorney makes class
allegations in the complaint in order to "enhance his personal bargaining leverage intending
to blackmail the defendant"); Donald G. Kempf and Roger L. Taylor, Settling Class Ac-
tiors, 13 Litigation 26, 28 (1986); Note, 89 Harv L Rev at 1540 (cited in note 85) (represen-
tative plaintiff can increase leverage by filing a class suit and then dropping the class allega-
tions when her personal objectives have been met).
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class suits a mailing would be required for identifiable class mem-
bers in order to allow them to state their claims of damages. A
single mailing of checks is often not feasible because the amount of
damages may vary across class members depending, for example,
on how many shares of stock they purchased and what the market
price was at the time of their transactions. Thus, because two mail-
ings are often required in any event, sending notice together with a
description of the proposed settlement and a questionnaire about
damages does not represent a major inefficiency. In some cases,
however, where all plaintiffs are identically situated, the notice re-
quirement continues to impose significant inefficiencies by requir-
ing multiple mailings where one would suffice.
The fact, however, that Eisen is frequently circumvented is no
justification for continued adherence to the case. It would be pref-
erable to retain the Eisen requirement for class actions in which
cost of notice is small relative to the size of the claims, but to jetti-
son it for large-scale, small-claim class actions. 03 In such cases it
should be sufficient for the court to order publication notice and
individual notice for relatively large claims, but to defer individual
notice to small claimants until after judgment or settlement. If ap-
propriate, the only notice small claimants need receive is a letter
containing a check (or other relief such as vouchers, coupons, or
securities) and informing them of the results of the litigation.
10 Determination of whether a particular lawsuit falls within the category of a large-
scale, small-claim class action can appropriately be left to the discretion of the trial court. It
would not be difficult, however, to develop a serviceable definition by rule for purposes of
administering the notice requirement. For example, one could define the category as encom-
passing class actions in which at least 1,000 class members are alleged to suffer injuries
smaller than $250. Individual notice would not have to be sent to these individuals with
small claims. If, however, a subclass of plaintiffs with injuries exceeding $250 each can rea-
sonably be identified, then it would be appropriate for the court to order individualized
notice for these larger claimants. The use of subclasses for notice would be particularly use-
ful in the securities context, which often involves a large number of individual investors
with small claims and a relatively small number of institutional investors with larger claims.
Notifying such larger claimants would serve due process values, and would also facilitate
potential monitoring of the plaintiffs' attorney by sophisticated claimants with relatively
substantial stakes.
See also the 1977 proposal by the Justice Department's Office for Improvements in the
Administration of Justice, which would have established a special procedure for class aq-
tions in which the number of class members exceeds 200, each injury is not greater than
$300, and damages equal $60,000 or more in the aggregate. See Note, Notice Cost Problems
Under Rule 23(b)(3) and (c)(2) after Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 1979 Duke L J
882, 906 (citing Office for Improvements in the Administration of Justice, United States
Department of Justice, Effective Procedural Remedies for Unlawful Conduct Causing Mass
Economic Injuries (1977)).
1991]
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Chi. L. Rev.  33 1991
The University of Chicago Law Review
B. Control of Derivative Litigation
The preceding discussion has concerned only control of litiga-
tion by absent plaintiffs in the class action setting. Different but
analogous problems arise in shareholder's derivative litigation. The
differences stem from the distinctions already noted between de-
rivative and class action litigation.10 4 These differences between
class action and derivative suits generate different dynamics as to
control of the lawsuit by the absent client. In the derivative con-
text the problem is not that the client-the corporation-is unin-
terested and disorganized. To the contrary, the client is typically
both highly organized and very interested. Rather, the problem is
that the client is under the control of parties-namely corporate
managers-who are hostile to the litigation. If the client were al-
lowed free rein to control the lawsuit, the derivative action would
be vitiated as a corporate control mechanism: the corporate man-
agement would routinely cause the suits to be dismissed or com-
promised on terms favorable to them but not necessarily favorable
to the corporation or its shareholders.
In an attempt to alleviate this problem, the regulatory system
divides control of the litigation between the corporation and the
derivative plaintiffs' counsel. This allocation of control manifests
itself in rules governing director demand and special litigation
committees. These rules allow the corporate management to con-
trol the litigation when such control would be in the best interest
of the corporation. When management control ceases to be in the
corporation's interest, the rules permit the derivative plaintiffs' at-
torneys to take over. We believe that these rules work reasonably
well as a means of controlling the entrepreneurial attorney.
1. Director demand.
Under Delaware law, as under the law of virtually all the
states, a derivative suit plaintiff is required to make a demand on
directors that they cause the corporation to institute the lawsuit in
question unless such a demand would be futile.1 1 5 Demand is ex-
104 See notes 11-16 and accompanying text.
105 See Del Chanc Ct R 23.1. For an insightful analysis of the demand requirement, see
Comment, The Demand and Standing Requirements in Stockholder Derivative Suits, 44 U
Chi L Rev 168 (1976).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1, which requires particularized allegations as to
whether demand was made, is sometimes referred to as containing a demand "requirement"
but it clearly does not. Such a requirement would raise serious questions as to the rule's
constitutionality under the Erie doctrine, because director demand appears substantive for
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cused only where the directors have a personal interest in the liti-
gation that is adverse to the corporation. What follows is an evalu-
ation of the demand requirement as a device for controlling agency
costs in derivative suits.
a) Demand required cases. From the standpoint of eco-
nomic analysis, the demand requirement appears quite justifiable
as applied to cases in which the directors are not so personally in-
terested in the litigation as to make them unreliable champions of
the corporate interest. It seems obvious that corporate directors
are better situated than plaintiffs' attorneys to initiate and control
litigation to enforce corporate rights.
The directors have a greater stake in the corporation and ac-
cordingly are in most cases aligned in interest with the sharehold-
ers. Directors usually own some stock in their corporations and are
interested in preserving their reputational capital by not being as-
sociated with firms that perform poorly. Representative sharehold-
ers, on the other hand, may have only a minimal interest in the
corporation, especially if their shareholdings are small or part of a
highly diversified portfolio. Moreover, representative shareholders,
like named class plaintiffs, typically exercise virtually no control
over the activities of the plaintiffs' attorney. The real party in in-
terest is an attorney with no stake in the corporation at all other
than an interest in extracting a fee from it.
The directors possess far greater expertise to evaluate the cor-
poration and its affairs than do plaintiffs' attorneys. This expertise
can be used to analyze whether litigation would be in the corpora-
tion's best interest. It is not difficult to imagine cases in which,
while the corporation may have a potential right of action against
another person, the best interests of the shareholders would not be
served by immediate recourse to the courts. The potential defen-
dant may be involved in complex and long-term relationships with
the corporation-relationships that provide opportunities for ad-
justing disputes cheaply and effectively outside the formal legal
process. Litigation may harm the corporation because sensitive
business information will have to be disclosed in discovery. Litiga-
tion will tie up time and energies of corporate managers that might
better be spent on other tasks. There are many good reasons of
business judgment for a corporation not to bring suit even though
Erie purposes. The better view is that the rule simply states the type of allegations that
must be made in federal court to satisfy the court that the demand requirement arising
under some applicable substantive law has been satisfied.
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it may have a colorable right of action, or even though an outside
attorney considers the matter sufficiently promising to warrant
bringing the suit on a contingent basis.
Finally, the directors are chosen by shareholders, whereas the
plaintiffs' attorney is a volunteer. There is no reason to suppose
that the plaintiffs' attorney is the best person to conduct the litiga-
tion simply because she happened to identify it and indicated a
willingness to take it on. Thus, other things equal, it would appear
preferable to allow the directors to pick the attorney, rather than
permitting an attorney to acquire the right to litigate the corpora-
tion's claim simply by volunteering.
These reasons provide overwhelming support for a rule requir-
ing a plaintiffs' attorney to make a demand on the directors before
bringing a derivative suit in situations where the directors do not
face a conflict of interest in their decision. If the directors decide
to institute suit after receiving the demand, the action is taken
over by the corporation, which is presumably better situated to
bring the action than plaintiffs' counsel. If the directors refuse the
demand, this determination is ordinarily final unless the share-
holder can establish that directors did not act out of informed bus-
iness judgment.
10 6
The demand requirement does have costs. For example, the
rule deters the flow of beneficial information to corporate directors
because to the extent that they expect the corporation to take over
the litigation, outside attorneys are unlikely to research potential
corporate causes of action or to bring known claims to the atten-
tion of the directors. This cost is presumably relatively slight,
given that insiders are in the best position to research the corpora-
tion's rights. Furthermore, there will be cases in which the exis-
tence of a potential plaintiff waiting in the wings, as it were, will
benefit the corporation because directors can use the threat of liti-
gation in order to extract larger concessions from potential defen-
dants. Yet the existing regulatory system does not provide a relia-
ble means by which potential derivative plaintiffs can be
compensated for their services to the corporation in threatening
litigation; accordingly, such services are unlikely to be provided as
often as the corporation might wish. One useful reform might be to
1 Zapata Corp. v Maldonado, 430 A2d 779, 784 (Del 1981). For a different approach
to judicial review of the directors' refusal of demand in federal common law cases, see
Kamen v Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 908 F2d 1338,,1343-44 (7th Cir 1990), cert
granted, 111 S Ct 554 (1990) (no special deference owed to directors"decision in demand-
refused cases).
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allow potential deriviative plaintiffs to recover compensation for
the benefit of their services in such cases, but it would often be
difficult if not impossible to determine the value of the potential
plaintiff's contribution.
Despite these costs, however, the demand requirement appears
fairly well-crafted to maximize corporate welfare in cases where
the directors do not have a personal interest in the potential litiga-
tion that is possibly adverse to the interest of the corporation.
b) Demand excused cases. Where, however, the directors
are personally interested in and hostile to the litigation, they can-
not be relied on to serve the best interests of the corporation. The
demand requirement ceases to serve its intended purpose. The
classic case, as already noted, is that in which the directors or
other top corporate managers are the potential defendants in a suit
for breach of fiduciary duty. A rigid demand requirement would be
counterproductive because self-interested directors could use their
powers under the demand rule to derail the litigation, by, for ex-
ample, delaying their response to the demand, taking over the liti-
gation and then dismissing it, or compromising it on terms
favorable to their own interests.
Delaware corporate law, like that of other states, copes with
this situation in a relatively sensible fashion by excusing demand
when the plaintiffs' well-pleaded allegations, taken as true, raise a
reasonable doubt as to (1) the disinterestedness or independence of
a majority of the board, or (2) the directors' exercise of proper bus-
iness judgment in approving the challenged transaction. 107 Stated
as a general rule, this approach appears to be quite carefully
crafted to carve out a limited territory in which the benefits of di-
rector demand are outweighed by the possibility that interested di-
rectors will abuse their rights under the demand requirement to
the detriment of the corporation. In these situations, it is better for
the litigation to be turned over to the derivative plaintiffs' attorney
for zealous prosecution.
Much depends on the way in which the rule is implemented in
practice, however. The deferential "abuse of discretion" standard
of judicial review of decisions dismissing derivative complaints for
107 See Grobow v Perot, 539 A2d 180, 186 (Del 1988); Pogostin v Rice, 480 A2d 619, 624
(Del 1984); Aronson v Lewis, 473 A2d 805, 818 (Del 1984). As a procedural matter, demand
excused cases are handled by the provision in both FRCP 23.1 and Del Chanc Ct R 23.1
permitting the representative plaintiff to allege the steps "if any" she took to obtain the
action desired as well as the "reasons ... for not making the effort."
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failure to make demand'08 raises a possibility that chancery court
judges may sometimes manipulate the demand rules to dismiss
cases they .want to dispose of for other reasons.
2. Special litigation committees.
The demand requirement is the principal means for involving
the putative client-the corporation-in the fundamental litigation
decisions in a derivative suit. Even if demand is excused as futile,
however, corporate managers may seek to reenter a derivative law-
suit at a later date by constituting a special litigation committee of
presumptively impartial directors that may then seek to wrest con-
trol of the litigation away from plaintiffs' counsel.
In the classic case of Zapata Corp. v Maldonado,0 9 a deriva-
tive action for breach of fiduciary duty was brought against ten
officers or directors of the Zapata Corporation. Four years after the
suit was commenced, the director-defendants appointed two new
"outside" directors and constituted them as an "Independent In-
vestigation Committee" to investigate the lawsuit and determine
what action the corporation should take. The committee deter-
mined that the derivative action was inimical to the corporation's
best interest and should be dismissed. The Delaware Supreme
Court held that a corporate board retains a degree of power to
manage derivative litigation even if demand is excused as futile at
the outset of the litigation. The relevant inquiries for the trial
court are, first, whether the special committee acted independently
and whether its conclusions had reasonable factual basis, 1 0 and,
second, whether the court determines, in the exercise of its own
business judgment, that the corporation's motion to dismiss should
be granted."'
Zapata has something to recommend it, in that the court at-
tempted to devise a reasonable compromise that would maximize
the likelihood of outcomes beneficial to the corporation. If the con-
tinued conduct of a particular derivative lawsuit would indeed be
inimical to the best interests of the corporation, the policies under-
lying the derivative lawsuit would best be served by allowing dis-
missal of the action. An independent committee of the board of
108 See Grobow, 539 A2d at 186.
109 430 A2d 779 (Del 1981).
10 Id at 788.
"' Id at 789. See also Joy v North, 692 F2d 880, 892-93 (2d Cir 1982) (analyzing stan-
dards for applying the court's own business judgment).
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directors would appear to be a reasonable body in which to vest
that dismissal power.
The court in Zapata, however, was rightly sensitive to the pos-
sibility that sham committees of "outside" directors who were ac-
tually under the influence of corporate insiders could terminate a
derivative action that was in fact in the best interests of the corpo-
ration. The court attempted to deal with this danger by requiring
the trial court to exercise its own business judgment in reviewing
the actions of special committees, rather than deferring to the bus-
iness judgment of the committee, as would be the rule for other
types of corporate action. The virtue of the Delaware Supreme
Court's approach is that it does not rely on barren generalizations
or rigid applications of traditional litigation rules to the unique
context of derivative litigation. Rather, the court's allocation of lit-
igation authority between the directors and plaintiffs' attorneys at-
tempts a realistic accommodation of competing considerations in
light of the underlying economic rationale for derivative litigation,
as well as the agency problems that confront plaintiff-shareholders
and their attorneys.
However, the rule in Zapata suffers from several shortcom-
ings. First, the court did not articulate with any precision the sub-
stantive standard that a trial court should apply in exercising its
own business judgment. Thus, there is an unfortunate element of
indeterminacy in the Zapata test. Trial courts might find the
Zapata test a convenient means for disposing of cases on the mer-
its, even though conceptually the business judgment analysis
should not reflect the court's evaluation of the case on the merits
but rather whether the control of the litigation should be left in
the derivative plaintiffs' attorney's hands.
Second, the idea that a trial court can exercise "business judg-
ment" is anomalous. Trial judges are not businesspeople; they do
not possess the practical experience and exposure to the special
needs of the corporation that characterizes the business judgment
of corporate managers. The court's reference to "business judg-
ment" may well implicitly bias the analysis in favor of manage-
ment. The trial court will naturally feel an inclination to defer to
the views of corporate directors, who do exercise business judg-
ment in other contexts, as to whether the continuation of the liti-
gation would be in the best interest of the firm.
A more appropriate rule for evaluating the recommendations
of special litigation committees could easily be crafted using the
common jurisprudential devices of substantive standards and bur-
dens of proof. The appropriate substantive standard is whether the
benefits to the corporation of continuing the litigation exceed the
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costs of doing so.' 12 Observe that this standard is quite different
from an analysis of the merits of the litigation."3 In many cases
the standard could be met even though the corporation has a rela-
tively low probability of success on the merits. If, for example, the
corporation has only a 20 percent chance of victory, but stands t6
win a net judgment (after deducting the fees of the plaintiffs' at-
torney) of $10 million if it does win, then the approximate value of
the case to the corporation ex ante is $2 million. In such a case, the
derivative litigation should be dismissed only if the costs to the
corporation from continuing the litigation exceed $2 million. These
costs would not include attorneys' fees, the major component of
expenses in most standard litigation settings, because no fees will
be owed if the case fails and the fees in the event of success are
already included in the calculation.
Application of this substantive standard depends on difficult
questions of proof and complex factual inferences. Thus much
turns on the burden of proof. In our view, the burden should be on
corporate management to demonstrate that the costs of continuing
the litigation exceed the benefits. Even though the special litiga-
tion committee is ostensibly independent, it is clear that in many
cases the independent directors have close ties with the defendant
directors." 4 Further, by prosecuting the litigation, the plaintiffs'
attorney demonstrates in a highly reliable way that the suit has
favorable prospects for generating value for the corporation. The
fact pattern suggests a probability that the litigation is indeed in
112 See Joy, 692 F2d at 892. A court's investigation of these matters need not be limited
to an analysis of whether the procedures and maethodologies used by the special litigation
committee were appropriate. The question of whether litigation is in the corporation's best
interest would appear to be well within a court's analytical capacities. Indeed, a court is
probably better situated to make this investigation than a special litigation committee in
many cases. We disagree, therefore, with the New York approach to special litigation com-
mittees, which restricts-the judicial inquiry to matters of procedure and methodology. See
Auerbach v Bennett, 47 NY2d 619, 393 NE2d 994, 1002-03 (1979).
"I See Joy, 692 F2d at 892 (The point of the Zapata analysis is "not to render a deci-
sion on the merits, fashion the appropriate legal principles or resolve issues of credibility
.... The court's function is thus not unlike a lawyer's determining what a case is 'worth'
for purposes of settlement.").
114 See id at 888; Miller v Register and Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 NW2d 709, 716-18
(Iowa 1983); James D. Cox and Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological
Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 L & Contemp Probs 83,
103-04 (Summer 1985). Delaware Chancellor William Allen has recently recognized that
outside directors are often closely affiliated with management and therefore do not always
provide an effective check against abuse. See William T. Allen, Independent Directors In
MBO Transactions: Are They Fact or Fantasy?, 45 Bus Law 2055, 2056-58 (1990) (arguing,
however, that outside directors may operate as an effective check).
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the corporation's best interest. The burden of proof should be on
those parties seeking to demonstrate that it is not.
A final question concerns the payment of the costs of the inde-
pendent committee. These costs may be substantial, since the com-
mittee ordinarily retains highly qualified counsel to conduct an ex-
tensive investigation into the litigation.11 5 In our view, these costs
should not automatically be paid by the corporation. If the special
litigation committee operates as a tool of the defendant directors,
rather than an impartial fiduciary of the corporate interests, it
would be appropriate to require the defendants to pay the costs of
the committee in the event they are eventually held liable. Assess-
ment of the special litigation committee's costs, like other costs of
the litigation, should be committed to the discretion of the trial
court.
C. Conflicts Between Representative Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs'
Attorneys
A third situation in which control over litigation becomes
problematic arises when the named plaintiff actually asserts rights
to control the litigation rather than passively allowing her name to
be used as the "key to the courthouse door.
'" 116
Cases presenting overt conflict between the named plaintiff
and plaintiffs' counsel in both class actions and derivative suits are
relatively uncommon for obvious reasons. First, because the named
plaintiff has only a small stake in the outcome of the litigation, it
is usually not worthwhile for her to follow the litigation or go to
the trouble of challenging counsel. Second, the named plaintiff is
almost always chosen by the attorney.1 7 Plaintiffs' attorneys are
unlikely to use as a named plaintiff someone they know to be quar-
relsome, at least if they can find a more compliant person. Never-
theless, conflicts between the named plaintiff and plaintiffs' coun-
sel do arise, 8 and when they do the courts face the dilemma of
how to resolve them.
115 See, for example, Kaplan v Wyatt, 484 A2d 501, 511 (Del Chanc 1984), aff'd, 499
A2d 1184 (Del 1985) (special litigation committee interviewed more than 140 people world-
wide, and law firm retained by the committee expended between 2,000 and 5,000 hours of
attorney time and received compensation of approximately $500,000).
116 Saylor v Lindsley, 456 F2d 896, 900 (2d Cir 1972).
117 See Coffee, 86 Colum L Rev at 681 (cited in note 4).
118 See, for example, Reed v General Motors Corp., 703 F2d 170, 171 (5th Cir 1983) (23
out of 27 named plaintiffs and 40 percent of class objected to settlement agreement); Of-
ficers for Justice v Civil Service Comm'n, 688 F2d 615, 618, 623 (9th Cir 1982) (one of
eleven named plaintiffs objected to settlement through retained private counsel); Parker v
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In traditional litigation the issue would be simple. As noted
already, 119 the standard model views the lawyer as agent of the cli-
ent. The lawyer must defer to the client's wishes or withdraw from
the representation. There are no exceptions in the Model Code or
Model Rules for class action or derivative cases. Read literally, the
ethics codes require class action and derivative lawyers to defer to
the named plaintiff's wishes.
Such a literal reading, however, would be inappropriate in this
context. The client's control in traditional litigation settings is jus-
tified by the fact that the client is the best representative of her
own interests. In class and derivative litigation, however, the
named plaintiff cannot reliably be assumed to be the best repre-
sentative of the class's interest. Because the named plaintiff's in-
terest in the litigation is much smaller than that of the class as a
whole, the alignment between named plaintiff and class or corpora-
tion can easily be swamped by other factors. The named plaintiff
may have a personal interest in the litigation flowing from sources
as diverse as ideology, spite, vanity, or the wish to obtain a dispro-
portionate share of the settlement fund. Further, the named plain-
tiff is subject to possible influence from defense counsel or counsel
in the plaintiffs' consortium who are at odds with the named plain-
tiff's counsel. And the named plaintiff herself might extort benefits
from her counsel by threatening to dismiss the counsel or to make
inappropriate litigation decisions. Although the named plaintiff
must provide "adequate" representation of the class and must
have a claim that is "typical" of the class claims, these require-
ments are neither effective regulatory devices'20 nor effective
means of protecting the absent class members. These dangers sug-
gest strongly that absent class members would not be adequately
protected if the named plaintiff were given unilateral control over
the litigation.
On the other hand, a rule that would exclude the named plain-
tiff from any control rights in the event of disagreement with class
counsel would present countervailing considerations. Given the
named plaintiff's strong incentive to remain passive and allow
counsel to control the litigation, there is good reason for concern
about counsel's performance when the named plaintiff brings a dis-
Anderson, 667 F2d 1204, 1207 (5th Cir 1982); Pettway u American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576
F2d 1157, 1167 (5th Cir 1978).
11 See notes 21-52 and accompanying text.
120 We discuss the typicality and adequacy requirements at length at notes 250-92 and
accompanying text.
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pute to the attention of the court.121 In some circumstances class
counsel may be a less reliable advocate of the class's interests than
the named plaintiff. The most obvious case is where the attorney
stands to earn a substantial fee immediately by not appealing, but
must wait for payment and expend additional effort if an appeal is
taken. In such cases, at least where the appeal does not present
significant downside risks for the class, allowing class counsel uni-
laterally to cut off appeal rights for the class over the objections of
the named plaintiff does not adequately protect the interests of
absent class members.
These problems are illustrated by the leading case in this area,
Pettway v American Cast Iron Pipe Co.1 22 Pettway was an em-
ployment discrimination class action in which the named plaintiffs
and a number of class members wished to appeal the trial court's
judgment denying backpay to a substantial proportion of the
plaintiff class. The court articulated a sensible test for sorting out
the respective litigating powers of named plaintiff and plaintiffs'
attorney:
The proper exercise of the district court's discretion [in deter-
mining whether to substitute class counsel at the behest of the
named plaintiff] will depend on the facts and circumstances of
each case. Among the factors that should be considered by the
court are (1) the adequacy of representation of the named
plaintiffs, including any apparent or potential conflicts of in-
terest they might have with the remainder of the class, (2) the
extent to which other class members support or oppose the
[decision], and the extent to which [the action in question]
may be necessary to protect the interests of absent class mem-
bers, (3) the adequacy of representation provided by the class
attorney and any conflicts of interest between the class attor-
ney and the class, and (4) the reasonableness of the decision
. . . including an assessment of the possibility of success on
the merits.2 3
"I See Saylor, 456 F2d at 900 (emphasizing importance of consultation with named
plaintiff over important litigation decisions).
121 576 F2d 1157 (5th Cir 1978).
125 Id at 1178. With regard to the second factor, see Kincade v General Tire & Rubber
Co., 635 F2d 501, 504 (5th Cir 1981). The fourth factor suggests that courts should be wary
of allowing named plaintiffs to upset settlements on the merits if the court determines such
settlements to be substantively fair to the class. See, for example, Officers for Justice, 688
F2d at 615; McDonald v Chicago Milwaukee Corp., 565 F2d 416, 426 (7th Cir 1977); County
of Suffolk v Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F Supp 1428, 1437 (E D NY 1989).
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Applying this test, the court of appeals held-correctly, in our
view-that the appeal should be allowed even over the objection of
class counsel. The interest of the named plaintiffs in backpay was
substantial, and did not differ in any obvious way from the inter-
ests of other class members who had been denied backpay relief.
Many of class members objected to the attorney's decision. The
attorney had a clear conflict of interest; an appeal would require
additional attorney time and effort and (apparently) would delay
the receipt of attorney's fees. And the appeal presented substantial
potential benefits and little downside risk for the class members
who had been denied backpay. All of the factors bearing on alloca-
tion of litigating authority strongly pointed toward overriding class
counsel on the circumstances of that case.
As illustrated by the Pettway case, the existing regulatory sys-
tem contains a reasonable set of rules for allocating litigating au-
thority between named plaintiffs and plaintiffs' attorneys-rules
that are not subject to the defect of being forcibly assimilated with
the regulatory structure applicable in other litigation settings, in
which the client's decisions on basic strategy are final.
D. Judicial Review of Settlements and Fee Requests
So far we have discussed the allocation of decisionmaking au-
thority between the plaintiffs' attorney and (1) absent class mem-
bers in class actions, (2) the corporation in derivative suits, and (3)
named or representative plaintiffs in both types of actions. Now we
address the role of the trial court in reviewing settlements and re-
quests for attorneys' fees.
1. Judicial review of settlements.
Most class action and derivative litigation is settled prior to
judgment.2 4 When such litigation is settled, the problem of agency
costs appears in a particularly problematic form. As already dis-
cussed, the plaintiffs' attorney often faces a severe conflict of inter-
est in settling class and derivative litigation. In common fund cases
where the attorney earns a .percentage of the judgment, the attor-
ney has an incentive to settle early at a relatively low figure in
order to maximize her profit. 25 In common fund cases in which the
124 See Thomas M. Jones, An Empirical Examination of the Resolution of Shareholder
Derivative and Class Action Lawsuits, 60 BU L Rev 542, 544-45 (1980); Note, 89 Harv L
Rev at 1536 (cited in note 85).
121 See notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
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attorney is compensated according to the lodestar formula, the at-
torney has an incentive to delay reaching a settlement in order to
increase the hours upon which the compensation is calculated.
12 6
The attorney may also agree to an inappropriately low settlement
on the merits in exchange for the defendant's implicit or explicit
promise to allow the attorney to expend additional risk-free hours
in order to build up a fee. 27 In common benefit and fee-shifting
cases the attorney has an incentive both to delay settlement and to
agree to inappropriately low settlements in exchange for generous
negotiated attorney's fees. 28 The plaintiffs' attorney may also at-
tempt to direct a disproportionate share of the settlement fund to
the named plaintiff in order to compensate her for acting as repre-
sentative of the class or corporation.
129
The regulatory response to these conflicts is to require judicial
scrutiny of proposed settlements.3 0 Unfortunately, judicial ap-
proval appears to be highly imperfect as a protection for the plain-
tiffs' interests, for a several reasons.' 3 ' First, and most important,
the judge herself has a powerful interest in approving the settle-
ment. Judges' calendars are crowded with cases, and despite vari-
ous reform efforts,3 2 the workload only seems to increase.33 If the
2 See note 63 and accompanying text.
12M See notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
, See notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
See, for example, Holmes v Continental Can Co., 706 F2d 1144, 1146 (11th Cir 1983)
(half of class backpay award went to 8 named plaintiffs in class of 126; 39 other class mem-
bers objected to settlement); Franks v Kroger Co., 649 F2d 1216, 1225 (6th Cir 1981) (re-
versing a settlement in which the two named plaintiffs had received a total of $10,500 and
the plaintiffs' counsel received $47,000 in fees, while other class members received only em-
ployer's general agreement to treat its employees equally and a chance to present their indi-
vidual claims before a magistrate).
1I See FRCP 23(e) ("A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the
approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to
all members of the class in such manner as the court directs."); FRCP 23.1 (derivative ac-
tion "shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice
of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to shareholders or members in such
manner as the court directs").
21 See generally Coffee, 48 L & Contemp Probs at 26-27 (cited in note 4); Judith Res-
nik, Judging Consent, 1987 U Chi Legal F 43, 101; Wolfram, 47 L & Contemp Probs at 299
(cited in note 45); Note, Abuse in Plaintiff Class Action Settlements: The Need for a
Guardian During Pretrial Settlement Negotiations, 84 Mich L Rev 308, 310 (1985). For one
of the more dubious settlements on record, approved by an able federal district judge, see In
re Cuisinart Food Processor Antitrust Litigation, 38 Fed Rules Serv 2d 446, 449, 454-56 (D
Conn 1983) (antitrust defendant agreed in settlement to give members of the plaintiff class
coupons entitling them to purchase accessories directly from manufacturer at 50 percent
discount from retail price; court rejected arguments by objecting class members that the
settlement constituted marketing gimmick).
12 For discussion of whether caseload growth can be slowed by reducing court backlog,
see George L. Priest, Private Litigants and the Court Congestion Problem, 69 BU L Rev
527 (1989).
22 See Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 59-129 (Harvard,
1985); Report of the Subcommittee on the Role of the Federal Courts and Their Relation-
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judge approves the settlement, the result will be to remove a po-
tentially complex and time-consuming case from the judge's calen-
dar; if she rejects it she faces a substantial probability of further
litigation. A judge faces virtually no prospect of reversal for ap-
proving a settlement, whereas a decision rejecting a settlement
might well be appealed. Moreover, trial judges are heavily condi-
tioned by the ethos of their jobs to view settlements as desirable;
they routinely encourage settlement in other contexts.3 It would
be unrealistic to expect trial judges to shift gears suddenly and
view settlements with suspicion rather than approbation when
they arise in the class action or derivative contexts.
Second, trial courts may simply lack information to make an
informed evaluation of the fairness of the settlement. 13 5 Typically,
when a case is settled well in advance of trial, the only information
available to the judge is found in papers filed in court-pleadings,
briefs, and supporting materials filed on motions-and materials
submitted to the judge in connection with the settlement hearing.
Such evidence is likely to be highly incomplete and, in the case of
materials submitted to support the proposed settlement, biased in
favor of the settlement. 36 The matters on which the judge must
rule are also highly subjective and imprecise. Even if the judge had
adequate information on which to decide, it would be difficult to
make reliable estimates of the settlement value of a case.
Third, settlement hearings are typically pep rallies jointly
orchestrated by plaintiffs' counsel and defense counsel. Because
both parties desire that the settlement be approved, they have
every incentive to present it as entirely fair. Objectors to the set-
tlement, on the other hand, are uncommon; those who do object
are often either disgruntled plaintiffs' attorneys who have fallen
out with others in the plaintiffs' consortium, or naive class mem-
ship to the States, in 1 Federal Courts Study Committee: Working Papers and Subcommit-
tee Reports 23-39 (July 1, 1990) (documenting enormous workload growth in the federal
courts). The adverse psychological effect of these workload pressures on federal judges is
apparently quite strong. See id at 40-45, 88-91.
134 See FRCP 16(a)(5) (one objective of pretrial conferences is "facilitating the settle-
ment of the case") and accompanying Advisory Committee Note.
135 See Note, 84 Mich L Rev at 321 (cited in note 131) (courts lack information about
settlement value).
,36 See Note, 89 Harv L Rev at 1558 (cited in note 85) (judge's lack of information may
interfere with guardianship role). The judge could, of course, request additional information
from the parties, but doing so would simply impose additional burdens on the judge without
any assurance of a corresponding increase in the information available.
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bers who demonstrate their ignorance of the issues in dispute. The
deck is heavily stacked toward approval of the settlement.
Trial courts happily play along with the camaraderie. In ap-
proving settlement, courts often engage in paeans of praise for
counsel 37 or lambaste anyone rash enough to object to the settle-
ment.138 Not surprisingly, it is uncommon to find cases where trial
courts reject settlements that are presented to them by defense
counsel and plaintiffs' attorneys. Given that settlements are nearly
always approved, one might well question the efficacy of judicial
review of class action and derivative settlements.
One possible reform of the existing system, which has been
proposed by a few commentators, 3 9 would be to appoint a guard-
ian ad litem to represent the interests of the class during the set-
tlement process. The guardian would be expected to object to set-
tlements almost as a matter of course, or else to provide the court
with a statement of why, in the guardian's opinion, the settlement,
is fair to the plaintiff class. But guardians must be selected by
somebody. If the judges and lawyers are biased toward settlement
they are likely to select passive and compliant guardians. We be-
lieve, however, that the guardian proposal carries some promise, in
that the court will hear the views of a presumably able advocate on
behalf of absent class members, something that is almost entirely
missing under current practice. The guardian could have access to
discovery provided in the case, and would have the right to bring
additional information to the attention of the trial court. Even if
guardians did not succeed in increasing settlement amounts in
more than a fraction of cases, their very presence in the litigation
might encourage counsel to avoid settlements that are overly unfa-
137 See, for example, Mashburn v National Healthcare, Inc., 684 F Supp 660, 672 (M D
Ala 1988) (taking judicial notice, in approving proposed settlement, that plaintiffs' counsel
was "one of the most able and experienced trial lawyers in the State of Alabama");
Cuisinart, 38 Fed Rules Serv 2d at 453 (court trusted counsel's estimates of litigation costs
because of the "experience and competence of counsel, on which the court ha[d] commented
favorably on other occasions").
M See, for example, Holden v Burlington Northern, Inc., 665 F Supp 1398, 1431 (D
Minn 1987) ("Objectors['] proper concern for the class has unfortunately turned into an
unbecoming personal invective. Objecting counsel have been obstreperous, as well as profes-
sionally insulting to their colleagues. They have leveled vicious and wholly unwarranted at-
tacks upon their opposition. These assaults have neither enlightened the court nor enobled
those who have made them.").
"I See Note, 84 Mich L Rev at 310-11 (cited in note 131). See also Josef D. Cooper and
Tracy Kirkham, Class Action Conflicts, 7 Litigation 35, 36, 60 (Winter 1981) (suggesting
possible utility of guardianship but noting difficulties with the idea); Note, 89 Harv L Rev at
1561-66 (cited in note 85) (suggesting need for an "absentee advocate" to monitor negotia-
tions on behalf of class members not before the court).
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vorable to the plaintiff class, particularly if the guardian were
given an economic incentive to oppose the settlements. Guardians
might also have a salutary effect on judges by reducing their pro-
clivity to approve all settlements.
On the other hand, a guardianship is not costless. Someone
must pay the guardian's fee. The fee cannot be paid, at least ini-
tially, out of the settlement amount, because whether there will be
a settlement is exactly the question in dispute. Nor would it be
desirable to give the guardian a contingent interest in the settle-
ment fund, because this would create a perverse incentive for the
guardian to support settlements in order to assure a fee. The
problems of funding the guardianship procedure are serious, al-
though not insurmountable. More fundamentally, a guardianship
would be desirable only if the benefits of such a mechanism exceed
the costs, however those costs are paid. It is not obvious that a
guardian 'would have a sufficient 'impact on the litigation to war-
rant the expense. However, the proposal does seem sufficiently at-
tractive to justify an experiment with guardianship, perhaps in a
single judicial district for a limited time period, to evaluate
whether the benefits do in fact exceed the costs.140
2. Judicial review of fee requests.
In contrast to judicial review of settlements, where courts have
acted more or less as rubber stamps, fee requests by plaintiffs' at-
torneys have at times received far more exacting judicial scrutiny.
It would appear that the degree of scrutiny given fee requests
correlates closely with whether the request is presented to the
judge as part of a settlement on the merits. Judges rarely reject fee
petitions presented as part of a settlement. If they reject a fee set-
tlement, they may find themselves wading through affidavits and
time sheets in an effort to determine the appropriate fee them-
selves, something most trial judges would prefer to avoid. Worse, if
the fee agreement is presented as part of a comprehensive settle-
ment package, the trial judge risks upsetting the entire compro-
mise if she rejects the fee request. Far better to approve the fee
than to buy this kind of trouble. Moreover, fee petitions that are
presented as part of a settlement package have in theory been bar-
,1o Guardians have been appointed at the discretion of the trial courts in a few prior
cases, but to the best of our knowledge no systematic program has yet been implemented.
For cases using guardians on an ad hoc basis, see Haas v Pittsburgh National Bank, 77
FRD 382, 383-84 (W D Pa 1977); Miller v Mackey International, Inc., 70 FRD 533, 535 (S
D Fla 1976).
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gained out between the attorneys for the opposing sides; they have
the imprimatur of adversary testing. To be sure, the bargaining
process is not entirely at arm's length; experienced trial judges are
well aware of the possibility of tradeoff between attorneys' fees and
merits relief. Yet this agency cost is rarely sufficient to upset a ne-
gotiated settlement given the other advantages the negotiated fee
presents from the judge's point of view.
When the fee request has not been settled out, either because
the attorneys cannot agree on the fee or betause the fee is to be
taken out of a common fund as to which the defendant has no set-
tlement authority, judges often do reduce the fees requested by
plaintiffs' attorneys by substantial amounts.14' This more search-
ing judicial treatment appears to stem from several factors.
First, fee requests typically present the conflict between plain-
tiffs' attorney and client in the most vivid form. Especially in com-
mon fund cases, money awarded to the attorney comes directly out
of the fund that would otherwise go to the class or corporation.
Even in common benefit and fee-shifting cases the possibility of
tradeoff between attorneys' fees and merits relief is readily visible
to any experienced trial judge. The greater prominence of attor-
ney-client conflicts in this setting m~y partially account for the
heightened judicial scrutiny of fee requests.
Second, in common benefit and fee-shifting cases, the defend-
ant is sometimes present in court strenuously objecting to the re-
quested fee. Thus, some fee hearings are true adversary proceed-
ings rather than the cheerleading sessions typical of settlement
hearings. Predictably, judges are more likely to examine fee peti-
tions closely in such cases, and to pare down requests that look
excessive.
Third, trial courts have much less to lose by upsetting fee re-
quests than by rejecting settlements. Unlike rejections of settle-
ments, rejections of fee requests do not keep a potentially burden-
some case on the judge's calendar. Further, the prospects of appeal
are small, at least when the matter at issue is the judge's evalua-
tion of the reasonableness of the hours, the hourly rate, or the mul-
tiplier. These are quintessential discretionary judgments that are
141 See, for example, In re Continental Illinois Securities Litigation, 750 F Supp 868
(N D Ill 1990) (drastically cutting fees requested by counsel in major securities litigation);
Fox v Glickman Corp., 253 F Supp 1005, 1013-15 (S D NY 1966) (slashing requested fees
and chastising counsel for burdening court with disagreements among plaintiffs' attorneys);
Robert T. Mowrey, Attorney Fees in Securities Class Action and Derivative Suits, 3 J Corp
Law 267, 292 (1978) ("inability of all attorneys to ... agree solidly on the size of the fee
award has a potentially detrimental effect on the fee application").
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reviewed on appeal on an abuse of discretion standard.'42 An ap-
peal will put off the moment when the plaintiffs' attorneys can re-
ceive compensation for their services. Since the trial court typically
gives the plaintiffs' attorney something, albeit a lower amount than
was requested, the rational strategy for plaintiffs' attorneys is usu-
ally to accept what they are given.
Fourth, trial courts possibly have something to gain from occa-
sionally exercising their authority to reduce fee requests. The trial
court's broad discretion to determine the amount of the fee award
gives the judge enormous potential leverage with plaintiffs' counsel
to control the conduct of the litigation and to deter conduct by
plaintiffs' counsel that the trial court dislikes. A trial judge can
maintain a reputation for toughness with the plaintiffs' bar by oc-
casionally knocking down fee requests.
At least under the current system in which lawyers cannot
"own" the claims, judicial review of fee requests would appear to
be necessary because of the lawyer-client conflicts described above.
Yet in addition to the general problems with judicial review of fee
awards noted above, there are problems inherent in the methods
by which those fees are calculated.
a) Lodestar method. The lodestar method for calculating
fees requires the judge to multiply the reasonable number of hours
expended by the reasonable hourly fee and then to adjust this
"lodestar" amount, as appropriate, to account for special factors
such as the risk of nonsuccess in the litigation.
143
If. a judge. is to engage in a bona fide effort to determine a
proper lodestar fee, she must first determine the reasonable hours
expended. This task involves an initial determination of how many
hours were actually expended. The judge can rely to some extent
on attorney time sheets, which the Supreme Court has declared to
be virtually essential if a plaintiffs' attorney is to receive compen-
sation in fee-shifting cases."' But preparing time sheets is burden-
some for attorneys, as is evaluating them for judges. 45 And time
142 See, for example, United States v Mississippi, 1991 WL 281 (5th Cir); Seaman v
Vaughan, 1991 WL 281 (11th Cir); Von Clark v Butler, 916 F2d 255, 258 (5th Cir 1990);
State of Illinois v Sangamo Construction, 657 F2d 855, 858 (7th Cir 1981); Ellis v Flying
Tiger Corp., 504 F2d 1004 (7th Cir 1972).
143 The lodestar calculation is described at note 62 and accompanying text.
144 See Hensley v Eckerhart, 461 US 424, 433 (1983).
145 For one judge's description of the wearying task, see Continental Illinois, 750 F
Supp 868, 878 (N D 11 1990) ("I have examined each of the hundreds of pages of time
entries submitted in support of the 41,955 hours of attorney and paralegal time claimed in
the petition. I have also examined the 16-volume set of appendices containing copies of
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sheets can easily be prepared after the fact on the basis of the law-
yer's imaginative reconstruction of events.'46 The determination of
the hours actually expended is itself not entirely reliable.
Next, the judge must determine how many hours were reason-
able to expend under the circumstances. To do so, presumably, the
judge must familiarize herself with the history of the case and
place herself in the position of plaintiffs' counsel at each critical
step in the litigation. This reconstruction is obviously a difficult
undertaking. The judge must determine the reasonableness of the
hours expended in light of the unique structural features of plain-:
tiffs' class and derivative litigation, in which the work is typically
conducted by a consortium of lawyers and law firms under the gen-
eral guidance and direction of lead counsel.147 The loose structure
of plaintiffs' class and derivative litigation suggests the need for a
relatively large amount of time spent in coordination and monitor-
ing activities. 4 " Such work does not necessarily represent an ineffi-
ciency; it may well avoid even greater expenditure of hours as a
result of duplication of effort or lack of coordination. Yet courts
are ill-equipped to determine whether the level of coordination and
monitoring activities undertaken by lead counsel is appropriate
under the circumstances.
The judge's evaluation of the reasonableness of the hours is
subject to the bias of hindsight. Avenues of research or litigation
strategy that did not pan out might look considerably less sensible
after the fact than they did at the time. And judges, no less than
the rest of us, undoubtedly often underestimate the amount of
time it will take to perform a given task-especially when the task
involved is to be performed by others. Judges often disallow hours
with what might be seen as less than full-scale analysis of the is-
sue. 49 At other times they approve without question fee requests
every pleading or memorandum on which more than 20 hours time was spent. It may be
that only an exercise of this kind can convince one of the futility of attempting to decide
what amount of time was necessarily spent on a case of this breadth and duration.").
M See, for example, Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee 104 (April 2,
1990); A. Miller, Attorney's Fees in Class Actions 269 (cited in note 79) (working of exces-
sive hours and inflation of time sheets reported to be common abuses in class action
litigation).
17 See Coffee, 42 Md L Rev at 248-52 (cited in note 4).
148 See, for example, In re Anchor Securities Litigation, Fed Sec L Rptr (CCH)
95,481 at 97,511 (E D NY and S D NY 1990) ("the fact that there were seven different law
firms involved required some duplication of effort for different lawyers to become familiar
with the lawsuit and for communication between firms").
14 See, for example, Harman v Lyphomed, Inc., 734 F Supp 294 (N D Ill 1990); In re
AIA Industries Inc. Securities Litigation, 1988 US Dist LEXIS 2952, *7 (E D Pa).
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which seem extraordinarily high, at least at first blush.150 Plain-
tiffs' attorneys have little means for predicting how many of their
hours the judge will allow, other than guesses based on the trial
judge's reputation as "tough" or "lenient" on fees.' The assess-
ment of the reasonable hours,, in short, is exceedingly inexact and
often apparently arbitrary in operation.
Similar, although perhaps less severe, difficulties attend the
determination of the reasonable hourly rate. There is no readily
determinable, publicly announced market rate for lawyers that a
judge can examine to fix the value of a plaintiffs' attorney's ser-
vices. To determine hourly rates, the judge must evaluate how
much lawyers of similar experience and skill charge in the commu-
nity. Yet the typical judicial inquiry into these matters is superfi-
cial at best. Usually the plaintiffs' attorney will submit affidavits
from a few lawyers in town as to what their hourly rates are. Those
friendly affidavits are not statistically significant, and no doubt
state the affiant's public hourly rate without consideration of the
possibility of negotiated fees at lower rates. It is, moreover, quite
difficult to compare lawyers, evaluating whether one attorney pos-
sesses experience and skill similar to another-especially when the
attorney providing the affidavit is used to working on an hourly
basis while the plaintiffs' attorney operates principally under con-
tingent fee arrangements. The upshot is that judges evaluating rea-
sonable hourly rates utilize only the roughest of proxies for the ac-
tual market value of an attorneys' services.
Finally, as if the inquiry to this point were not difficult
enough, there is the possibility of a multiplier. If the reasonable
hours and reasonable hourly rates are hard to measure, the multi-
plier calculation is all but standardless. Most jurisdictions accept
risk as a factor for consideration,152 but the determination of the
150 The reader can draw her own conclusions from the fees in In re Cuisinart Food
Processor Antitrust Litigation, 38 Fed Rules Serv 2d 446, 450-52 (D Conn 1983) (approving
escrow fund of more than $700,000 for fees when attorneys had apparently done little more
than file a complaint piggybacking on government enforcement actions, engage in some dis-
covery, and negotiate a settlement).
"I Judge Weinstein, for example, while favorably inclined toward class action litigation
in general, has developed a reputation for being bearish on fees. At present writing, mem-
bers of the plaintiffs' bar are scrambling to avoid nationwide certification of asbestos per-
sonal-injury litigation before Judge Weinstein, apparently because of his reputation on fees.
See Stephen Labaton, Judicial Struggle in Asbestos Cases, NY Times D2 (August 6, 1990).
552 The Supreme Court somewhat ambiguously approved the use of risk enhancement
in Pennsylvania v Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 US 711 (1987).
Justice White's plurality opinion in that case approved the use of risk multipliers only
under stringent restrictions including a maximum one-third enhancement. See id at 723-31.
Justice O'Connor's opinion concurring in the result suggested a two-part test that first asks
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level of risk is done exceedingly impressionistically. The trial
court's assessment of risk, based on presumably ample experience
at the bench and bar, is certainly worthy of respect. But trial
courts are not particularly well-suited to determining the degree of
risk ex ante in a lawsuit. As in the case of the reasonable hours
inquiry, they are subject to possible hindsight bias, in that once a
case is successful it appears less risky than may have been the case
at the outset. 153 Trial courts may also experience what we might
call subjective bias; their assessment of the riskiness of the litiga-
tion may be colored by their knowledge of their own contempora-
neous assessment of the lawsuit. The trial judge, for example, may
have decided early on in the litigation that the plaintiff was virtu-
ally certain to win significant relief. At issue, however, is not what
the trial court believed, but what the plaintiffs' attorney reasona-
bly believed. Because the plaintiffs' attorney will not know at the
time how the trial court views the case, the trial court's contempo-
raneous evaluation is not particularly relevant to the risk analysis.
Further confusing the risk analysis, some trial courts conclude
that if a particular case attracted numerous attorneys, the case
could not have been particularly risky ex ante. 54 This is a fallacy,
however, because the number of attorneys in a case is a function of
their reasonable expectations-including their expectations of ob-
taining a risk multiplier if the suit is successful.
The ex ante perspective evokes another fundamental objection
to the use of a single multiplier in calculating the fee award. Ap-
plying a single risk factor to all the hours expended on the lawsuit
is a rough measure, at best, of the true riskiness of the attorneys'
activities. During the course of the litigation the attorney will con-
stantly readjust her assessment of the probability of success on the
merits and the likelihood of settlement, based on the success or
failure of motions, the results of discovery, and the behavior of the
whether the relevant legal market adds a premium for contingency, and, second, whether in
the absence of an enhancement for risk the plaintiff would have faced substantial difficulty
in finding counsel. Id at 731-34 (O'Connor concurring). At least one lower court has followed
her opinion. King v Palmer, 906 F2d 762, 765 (DC Cir 1990).
'63 See Kirchoff v Flynn, 786 F2d 320, 325 (7th Cir 1986) (noting the "inequities of
retrospective rate setting").
'" For example, In re Continental Illinois Securities Litigation, 750 F Supp 868,
895-96 (N D Ill 1990); Anchor Securities, Fed Sec L Rptr (CCH) 1 95,481 at 97,511; Harman
v Lyphomed, Inc., 734 F Supp 294, 298 (N D Ill 1990). For cases that get the analysis right,
see In re Oracle Securities Litigation, 131 FRD 688, 693 (N D Cal 1990) (suggesting that
uncertainty about compensation affects not only the litigation at hand but also incentives to
litigate in future comparable cases); In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 84 FRD 245,
275-76 (N D Ill 1979) (same).
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defendant's attorney. In theory, the multiplier should be adjusted
to account for the risk of the litigation at the particular time the
hour is spent.
The multiplier, and in particular the risk adjustment, are ex-
traordinarily uncertain in application. Not surprisingly, the cases
are all over the map. Courts in some cases award multipliers as
high as three or more; 55 in other cases they deny multipliers at all
even though the plaintiffs' attorney's only hope of fees depended
on the success of the litigation. No study of which we are aware
has identified any consistent pattern in the use of risk multipli-
ers.'56 Accordingly, as presently administered, the risk multiplier is
little short of a wild card in the already uncertain game of assess-
ing fees under the lodestar calculation.
5 7
A final problem in this area is that of judicial scrutiny of fee-
sharing agreements among plaintiffs' attorneys. 58 The leading case
here is In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation.'59 The
court in Agent Orange invalidated an arrangement, which had
been freely and voluntarily agreed to by all the plaintiffs' counsel,
under which those attorneys who advanced funds to support the
litigation would be reimbursed threefold out of the attorneys' fees
award if the litigation were successful. The principal grounds for
decision were (1) that this agreement distorted the award of fees
under the lodestar calculation by awarding counsel who had ad-
vanced funds excessive hourly compensation relative to counsel
who had not supported the litigation and (2) that the arrangement
gave investor-attorneys impermissible incentives to settle early at
too low a figure. 60 The court ruled, further, that all future fee-
splitting agreements of this type must be disclosed immediately to
155 See, for example, In re Oak Industries Securities Litigation, 12 Class Action Rep
536 (S D Cal 1986) (multiplier of 4.04); Trustee of the Florence Katz Trust v La Petite
Academy, Inc., 12 Class Action Rep 539 (E D Pa 1989) (multiplier of 3.47).
156 The Federal Courts Study Committee has recently suggested that federal courts
might handle the risk of loss by adopting "a uniform enhancement factor or a schedule of
factors for different types of cases." Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee at 104
(cited in note 146). While such a uniform treatment would provide consistency and predict-
ability, it would sacrifice accuracy because it would treat many cases alike that in fact are
different.
157 See In re Union Carbide Consumer Products Business Securities Litigation, 724 F
Supp 160, 170 (S D NY 1989) (fixing fees according to the lodestar calculation "often
seem[s] to take on the character of so much Mumbo Jumbo").
158 We here consider the impact of such fee-sharing agreements on the lodestar calcula-
tion. See notes 314-17 and accompanying text for discussion of the ethical problems with
fee-sharing agreements.
159 818 F2d 216 (2d Cir 1987).
0 Id at 224, 225-26.
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the trial court.161 Such agreements will be readily available to chal-
lenge by defense counsel in future cases.
The decision in Agent Orange is unfortunate, 1 2 especially
given Judge Weinstein's able opinion at the trial level, upholding
the agreement as being necessary in light of the practical needs for
effective representation of class rights.' Judge Weinstein is
clearly correct that the fee-splitting agreement should have been
upheld. It was, after all, freely agreed to at arm's length by well-
informed and competent parties. There is every reason to suppose
that a threefold return on the funds invested was a reasonable
compensation in light of the risks involved in the litigation. The
noninvestor attorneys who came in after the fact were attempting
to upset an agreement that had their full assent ex ante. The fact
that the agreement was unpalatable to these attorneys ex post
should be entirely irrelevant. To be sure, the attorneys did allocate
the lodestar award amongst themselves, but this hardly seems
problematic. The purpose of lodestar fees is to compensate attor-
neys and induce private enforcement of the law; this purpose was
fully satisfied by the allocation to which the attorneys had
agreed.
1 6 4
The only rationale with even surface plausibility for upsetting
the fee allocation agreement is that it compromised the interests of
the absent class members, but it did not. On the contrary, it served
their interests by providing a means by which the expensive and
risky litigation could be continued. The court mistakenly con-
cluded that the agreement created excessive settlement incentives.
The enhanced settlement incentives it gave to the investing attor-
neys were offset by a concomitant decrease in the settlement in-
centives for the noninvestor attorneys, including the lead counsel.
Arguably such an arrangement was far preferable, from the stand-
point of the absent class members, to an arrangement under which
all members of the plaintiffs' consortium have roughly equivalent
settlement incentives. The likely effect of the Agent Orange deci-
261 Id at 226.
162 For a caustic critique of the appeals court's decision, see Coffee, 54 U Chi L Rev at
902-04 (cited in note 4).
163 In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 611 F Supp 1452, 1461-62 (E D
NY 1985), rev'd, 818 F2d 216 (2d Cir 1987).
' See, for example, Venegas v Mitchell, 110 S Ct 1679 (1990) (the Civil Rights Attor-
neys Fees Awards Act, 42 USC § 1988 (1982), which provides authority to the court to
award a "reasonable" attorneys fee, does not invalidate a contigency fee agreement between
a plaintiff and an attorney under which the attorney's compensation exceeds the statutory
award).
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sion in future cases will be to induce plaintiffs' consortia either to
exaggerate the investor-attorneys' hours or to assign these individ-
uals work that others could perform more efficiently, in order to
justify giving them extra compensation that the court can
accept.165
Accordingly, judicial scrutiny of fee-sharing arrangements
within the plaintiffs' consortium should be minimal.'66 Unless
there are exceptionally good reasons to upset such an arrangement,
the trial court should accept it as written. 67 Indeed, we would sug-
gest that the fee-sharing arrangements among plaintiffs' counsel
should be of no concern whatever to the court and, in the absence
of unusual factors, should not even be disclosed. Agent Orange
should not be followed in future cases.
Even if the Agent Orange case were to be dispatched to an
unmarked grave, however, the problems with the lodestar calcula-
tion itself remain. Here, there are a number of possible mecha-
nisms to reduce the uncertainty of the calculus. First, the fear of
excessive fee requests in common fund cases might be handled by
the appointment of a guardian ad litem to protect the absent class
members or corporation. 16 8 A guardianship would offer many of the
same benefits-and pose many of the same problems-as a guardi-
anship to protect absent parties in settlements, as discussed above.
Guardians have been appointed in a few cases, although the prac-
tice appears to be uncommon.19
Existing .legal practice reflects several strategies for reducing
the burden of fee calculations. The Supreme Court has warned
that the fee determination should not become a collateral trial.1
7 0
The message, apparently, is that the factfinder should not be as
careful in fee determinations as it is in determining damages or
other matters going to the merits of the litigation. And at least one
"I For an earlier, and equally poorly reasoned, decision with the same general tenor as
Agent Orange, see Lewis v Teleprompter Corp., 88 FRD 11, 17, 21-22, 24 (S D NY 1988)
(rejecting 10 percent finder's fee to attorney for supplying named plaintiff, which had been
freely agreed to by other attorneys).
1. See Coffee, 54 U Chi L Rev at 903 (cited in note 4) (advocating a "rule of judicial
benign neglect" in such cases).
"" This appears to be the rule in other jurisdictions. See, for example, Valente v Pep-
sico, Inc., Fed Sec L Rptr (CCH) 96,921, at 95,863 (D Del 1979); In re Ampicillin Anti-
trust Litigation, 81 FRD 395, 400 (D DC 1978).
168 See A. Miller, Attorneys' Fees in Class Actions at 230-34 (cited in note 79); New-
berg, Class Actions at CS13-9 (cited in note 54).
189 For two cases in which the court did appoint a guardian, see Haas v Pittsburgh
National Bank, 77 FRD 382, 383 (W D Pa 1977); Miller v Mackey International, Inc., 70
FRD 533, 535 (S D Fla 1976).
170 Hensley v Eckerhart, 461 US 424, 437 (1983).
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judge has experimented with time-saving methods for determining
a reasonable fee, such as sampling techniques into the reasonable-
ness of the hours or the use of uniform blended hourly rates.'' Yet
the use of second-class procedures for fee determinations, while it
may reduce the burden on courts and litigants, simultaneously ag-
gravates the already marked uncertainty in the fee calculation.
There is no immediately obvious reason why the courts should give
short shrift to fee calculations as compared with other judicial re-
sponsibilities. At issue in the fee calculation are legal rights no less
important than other rights stemming from the disposition of the
case on the merits or from the damages calculation.
One possible way of avoiding many of the problems associated
with the calculation would be to increase the use of expert testi-
mony at attorney fees hearings. Apart from the added cost, it is
unclear why expert witnesses are rarely utilized in this context.
1 2
An expert witness would more reliably determine the reasonable
hourly fee than, for example, a judge who may rely on a few affida-
vits and memories of a law practice long-abandoned. Similarly, ex-
perts might be more capable than judges of assessing the reasona-
bleness of hours expended-especially when the judge's past
experience may have been in large firm practice with its very dif-
ferent patterns of supervision and control of litigation. Experts
would provide useful information about the riskiness of the litiga-
tion ex ante. Of course, the contribution of an expert can vary de-
pending on the witness's integrity, judgment, and knowledge. But
regardless of the utility of expert witnesses generally, there is no
reason to suppose that an expert witness would be any less useful
in the attorneys' fee context than in many other litigation settings.
An alternative method for reducing the burden of fee calcula-
tions, with potentially less downside in terms of loss of factfinding
reliability, would be for the trial court to appoint a special master
for the purpose of assessing the fee. 17 3 The master would have au-
71 See Harman v Lyphomed, Inc., 734 F Supp 294, 298 (N D Ill 1990).
172 But see, for example, Ramos v Lamm, 632 F Supp 376, 387 (D Colo 1986). For an
unusual case in which the court appointed its own expert witness, see M. Berenson Co. v
Faneuil Hall Marketplace, Inc., 671 F Supp 819, 825 (D Mass 1987).
173 The use of special masters is governed at the federal level by FRCP 53. Although
appointment of a master is ordinarily "the exception and not the rule" even as to nonjury
issues such as the calculation of attorneys' fees, FRCP 53(b), an appointment for assessing
fees might be supported as involving a "matter of account" or as being analogous to a "diffi-
cult computation of damages." Id. Alternatively, the court could encourage the interested
parties to consent to the appointment of a master, in which case special justifications for the
reference are not required. Id.
The use of special taxing masters is recommended, at least for larger courts, in the
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thority to require the production of evidence such as time sheets
and could examine affidavits or take testimony.174 The master's
findings would be controlling unless clearly erroneous175 and if
stipulated to by the parties in advance would be final except as to
matters of law. 176 Although the special master's time would itself
be costly, 77 the costs could be justified if part of the burdensome
factual inquiry could be passed to an individual whose time is pre-
sumably less valuable than that of a trial court judge. Special mas-
ters might prove particularly useful if individuals could be used on
a repeat basis and thus developed expertise in fee calculations.
Special masters with expertise in fee awards would resemble the
taxing masters charged with awarding attorneys' fees in the United
Kingdom. Although courts have not experimented extensively with
special fee masters to date, 78 the idea holds sufficient potential to
warrant further study.
A special master would not resolve all the problems in the
lodestar calculation, however. The hourly rate, hourly fee, and
multiplier determinations would not necessarily be more certain if
performed by a special master than by a judge, although a master
might take more time on the task and, if appointed .on a repeat
basis, might possess somewhat greater expertise. Further, there are
significant diseconomies in the use of masters, in that the reasona-
ble hours and multiplier determinations depend heavily on the
substance and history of the litigation. In jurisdictions (most
prominently the federal courts) in which the judge typically over-
sees the litigation from the start, the judge would have a store of
knowledge about the lawsuit that the master could not easily emu-
late. Referring the fee determination to a special master would also
reduce the trial court's control over plaintiffs' attorneys, who
would no longer fear retribution (or hope for reward) from the trial
judge in the setting of fees.
Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee at 104-05 (cited in note 146). See also A.
Miller, Attorney's Fees in Class Actions at 234-36 (cited in note 79) (use of masters on fee




177 The costs would be paid out of the fund or by the parties as the court directs. See
FRCP 53(a).
178 But see In re Flight Transportation Corporation Securities Litigation, 685 F Supp
1092, 1094 (D Minn 1987) (in complex securities fraud litigation, court appointed a "Fee
Review Committee" to audit the number of hours expended by each of 28 plaintiffs' firms
and each firm's hourly rates; committee's efforts resulted in "substantial reductions in the
original lodestar figure each firm had requested in their respective petitions").
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b) Percentage method. The percentage method, although
not perfect, is potentially a better way of calculating fees. As we
have already noted, 179 an alternative to the lodestar approach in
common fund cases is to compensate the attorney with some fixed
percentage of the recovery. If the lodestar resembles a standard
hourly fee (albeit with significant differences), the percentage
method resembles the ordinary contingent fee. Regardless of the
merits of the case or the hours spent on the litigation, the plain-
tiffs' attorney under a percentage system receives a fixed propor-
tion of the fund generated on the client's behalf.
The percentage method has several potential advantages over
the lodestar method.18 0 First, and perhaps most importantly, it is
easy to calculate: simply take the total award to the class or corpo-
ration, multiply it by the applicable percentage, and award that
amount to the attorney. Compared to the arcane lodestar calcula-
tion, the advantages of the percentage approach are nearly self-
evident. Similarly, the percentage method offers a bright-line rule
and establishes reasonable expectations on the part of plaintiffs'
attorneys as to their expected recovery. It thus provides some re-
duction in the risk of litigation, which might at the margin induce
additional private enforcement of the law. And the percentage ap-
proach obviates the dangers that plaintiffs' attorneys will over-liti-
gate cases where they have a high probability of suc-
cess-especially cases where the defendant has essentially agreed
to a settlement in advance of the work. For these and other rea-
sons, a suitably designed percentage fee may be preferable to the
currently dominant lodestar methodology. The recent mini-trend
back to percentage fees 81 is thus a potentially constructive
development.
Nonetheless, the percentage method is also subject to serious
deficiencies. First, as we have already demonstrated, 182 the per-
centage method results in systematic excess profits for plaintiffs'
attorneys-returns beyond what the attorney would earn in an effi-
ciently functioning market. The reason is that attorneys will take
only cases for which the ex ante returns are equal to or greater
179 See notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
0SO Percentage fees are recommended for common fund cases in Court Awarded Attor-
ney Fees: Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, 108 FRD 237, 255 (1985). The Federal
Courts Study Committee advises "further study" of a percentage-of-the-recovery method in
light of the "lodestar method's problems." Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee
at 105 (cited in note 146).
181 See note 66 and accompanying text.
181 See notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
1991]
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Chi. L. Rev.  59 1991
The University of Chicago Law Review
than the opportunity costs of their time, and there is no market
adjustment of the applicable compensation percentage to equili-
brate supply and demand. Some of these excess returns would pre-
sumably be dissipated through the transactions costs of organizing
larger plaintiffs' consortiums; others would be captured by plain-
tiffs' attorneys, especially those with sufficient influence at the
plaintiffs' bar to obtain frequent appointments as lead counsel. In"
either event, there is an element of welfare loss to society under
the percentage system.
Second, the percentage method results in fewer cases being
brought than would be brought in a well-functioning private mar-
ket for-attorney services. The standard economic model of litiga-
tion predicts that plaintiffs will bring suit whenever their expected
return from the litigation exceeds their expected costs.183 In tradi-
tional litigation settings, it would be rational for plaintiffs to sue
even when, for example, their expected attorney fees represent a
very high percentage of their expected recovery. The percentage
method thus cuts off a large number of cases that the plaintiff
would rationally prosecute in standard settings. For example, as-
sume that in a jurisdiction with a 25-percent-of-the-recovery rule a
given litigation is expected to generate a fund of $1,000,000 with
costs 'to the plaintiffs' attorney of bringing the litigation of
$500,000. This litigation would not be brought because the attor-
ney expects fees of only $250,000. If, on the other hand, the plain-
tiff were an invididual rather than a class or corporation under the
control of hostile management, the litigation would be brought be-
cause it would generate an expected profit to the plaintiff of
$500,000.
It may seem perverse at first glance to encourage the prosecu-
tion of disputes where the transactions costs of obtaining relief are
such a high percentage of the ultimate recovery. One might easily
surmise that society would be better served if the defendant were
allowed to keep the $1,000,000, even if wrongfully obtained, on the
theory that the defendant will put that sum to more socially bene-
ficial uses than the drafting of briefs or the analysis and storage of
millions of documents. On the other hand, there is no guarantee
that this will be the case.
183 For articulation of the standard model, see Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 21.5
at 522-28 (cited in note 8); John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J Legal Stud
279 (1973); William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J L & Econ 61
(1971); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Ad-
ministration, 2 J Legal Stud 399 (1973).
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Moreover, litigation rules must be assessed in light of their
probable effect on primary conduct. If defendants know that they
can probably keep their wrongful gains, then more individuals will
be induced to engage in socially undesirable actions. Thus, the so-
cial wealth effects of litigation with very high transactions costs are
not easy to calculate even in theory. Meanwhile, the percentage
method cuts off much litigation that would serve the economic in-
terests of the putative clients. Such a rule may be necessary to pro-
tect against even larger wealth transfers from clients to attorneys,
but the effect of cutting off bona fide claims seems at least a cause
of legitimate concern about the social utility of the percentage
method.
Although we prefer the percentage method to the lodestar cal-
culation, it has several drawbacks. Accordingly, alternative ar-
rangements-such as the auction procedure we describe in Part V
of this Article-appear worthy of serious consideration and
experimentation.
III. REGULATION OF THE NAMED PLAINTIFF
So far we have discussed the allocation of litigation authority
among various interested parties. Now we address the regulations
restricting the powers and qualifications of one of those parties,
the named plaintiff. We focus on this topic because the status of
this named plaintiff presents the conflict between the reality of
class and derivative litigation and the traditional image of litiga-
tion in the starkest possible light. The general thrust of the regula-
tory system as applied to named plaintiffs has been to treat these
individuals as if they are not significantly different from plaintiffs
in ordinary litigation. We conclude that named plaintiffs are-or
should be-largely irrelevant in large-scale, small-claim cases and
should be eliminated. Plaintiffs' attorneys should be allowed to file
"Jane Doe" or "Richard Roe" complaints on behalf of unnamed,
absent class members or shareholders.
The regulations governing the persons who are allowed to be
named or representative plaintiffs in class and derivative litigation
arise under four different sources of legal rules: the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (and analogous state procedural codes), the
codes of professional responsibility, Article III of the Constitution,
and the due process clause. From a functional point of view, how-
ever, the regulation of named plaintiffs can be described by two
general rules: first, that the claim of the named plaintiff must be
typical of the claims of absent class members or other sharehold-
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ers; and second, that the named plaintiff must be capable of pro-
viding adequate representation of the class or corporation.
There is some conceptual and factual overlap between the
typicality and adequacy requirements. In theory, they serve the
common purpose of protecting absent class members or sharehold-
ers. Although Rule 23 lists them as separate and independent re-
quirements that the named plaintiff must satisfy,18 4 typicality and
adequacy are sometimes conflated in a general and amorphous in-
quiry into the adequacy of representation.'85 Some courts and com-
mentators have argued that the concepts do not have independent
meaning, at least as applied in the administration of Rule 23.186
Yet the requirements are conceptually distinct: 87 typicality refers
to the nature of the representative plaintiff's interest in the litiga-
tion and requires a relatively close fit between the representative
plaintiff's interest and the interest of absent parties; 8 8 adequacy
refers to the ability and willingness of the named plaintiff to act as
a competent champion of the class or corporation in the lawsuit.
We will criticize both the typicality and adequacy require-
ments as presently administered in large-scale, small-claim class
action and derivative suits. The requirements are often in conflict
with one another. A plaintiff whose claim is typical of the other
class members or shareholders will often not be able to represent
those absent plaintiffs adequately, and a plaintiff who can provide
' See FRCP 23(a)(3), (a)(4). FRCP 23.1, governing derivative litigation, states that an
action shall- not be maintained "if it appears that the plaintiff does not fairly and ade-
quately represent the interests of the shareholders .... " There is no analogous typicality
requirement in Rule 23.1 itself, but courts insist on typicality in applying the requirement in
Rule 23.1 that the named plaintiff "fairly and adequately" represent the shareholders. See,
for example, Davis v Corned, Inc., 619 F2d 588, 597-98 (6th Cir 1980) (named plaintiff in
derivative suit challenging sale of corporate property was not a proper representative be-
cause he wanted to acquire the property in question for himself); Baron v Strawbridge &
Clothier, 646 F Supp 690, 695 (E D Pa 1986) (named plaintiff involved in attempted hostile
takeover of corporation was not a proper representative). In addition, as we discuss at notes
223-28 and accompanying text, derivative plaintiffs must ordinarily establish that they were
shareholders at the time of the alleged wrong to the corporation; this is evidently a partial
typicality requirement.
I'l See, for example, Schatzman v Talley, 91 FRD 270, 273 (N D Ga 1981); James W.
Moore and John E. Kennedy, 3B Federal Practice 1 23.06-2 at 23-169 (Matthew Bender, 2d
ed 1987).
188 See, for example, Comment, Class Actions, Typicality, and Rule 10b-5: Will the
Typical Representative Please Stand Up?, 36 Emory L J 649, 652 (1987); Comment, Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(3) Typicality Requirement: The Superfluous Prerequi-
site to Maintaining a Class Action, 42 Ohio St L J 797 (1981) (independent significance
should not be given to the typicality requirement).
187 See, for example, Herbert B. Newberg, 1 Class Actions § 3.13 at 164-65 (McGraw-
Hill, 2d ed 1985).
188 See Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 Harv L Rev 356, 387 n 120 (1967).
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adequate representation will often have a claim that is not strictly
typical of the other class members or shareholders. Even when the
typicality and adequacy requirements can be reconciled, they often
fail to serve their intended purposes and frequently result in per-
verse outcomes. Accordingly, we call for comprehensive revision,
and in some cases the elimination, of the regulations governing the
representative or named plaintiff in class and derivative suits.
A. General Defects of the Rules
There are two general regulatory defects that apply in almost
all typicality and adequacy settings. Because these are cross-cut-
ting considerations, we analyze them before turning to more par-
ticular problems under the typicality and adequacy rules.
1. Enforcement by defendants.
The enforcement responsibility for the typicality and ade-
quacy rules lies principally with the defendant, an actor with in-
centives that are often diametrically opposed to those of the
client whose interests are supposedly being protected. The defen-
dant has little interest in ensuring that the repre-
sentative plaintiff's claims typify the claims of the class or corpora-
tion, or that the representative plaintiff acts to ensure that the cor-
poration or absent class members will be adequately repre-
sented.189 Indeed, the only situation in which the defendant could
be expected to act as a faithful champion of the plaintiffs' interests
on the issues of typicality and adequacy is when the party seeking
representative status seeks to act in a way that would harm both
the defendant and the other class members or shareholders. For
example, if the representative plaintiff actually intends the litiga-
tion to force management to agree to a merger that is unfair to a
corporation's shareholders, the defendant management and the
company's shareholders will share an interest in cutting off the liti-
gation. It seems safe to say, however, that cases in which the de-
fendant and the class or corporation share a common interest ad-
verse to the interests of the party seeking representative status will
be quite rare.
189 See Sanderson v Winner, 507 F2d 477, 480 (10th Cir 1974); Umbriac v American
Snacks, Inc., 388 F Supp 265, 275 (E D Pa 1975) ("defendants, who naturally have no inter-
est in the successful prosecution of the class suit against them, are called upon to interpose
arguments in opposition to class determinations verbally grounded upon a concern for the
'best' representation for the class while the implicit, but nonetheless real, objective of their
vigorous legal assaults is to insure 'no' representation for the class").
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In the more frequent cases where the defendant's interests are
not aligned with those of the class or corporation, the defendant
cannot be expected to serve the class or corporation's interests
when challenging the typicality or adequacy of representation.190
Instead, the defendant is likely to act strategically to serve its own
interests and harm those of the class. 91 First, the defendant may
attempt to use the typicality and adequacy rules as a means for
influencing the choice of plaintiffs' counsel. The defendant is un-
likely to challenge the named plaintiff's typicality or adequacy,
even when such a challenge might be successful, if the defendant
believes that counsel representing this particular individual is
someone who is likely to cut a favorable deal in settlement. On the
other hand, the defendant may challenge typicality or adequacy,
even when such a challenge is likely to fail, if the defendant be-
lieves counsel for the representative plaintiff to be vigorous and
tough-minded in settlement negotiations, or if the defendant be-
lieves that the representative plaintiff is indeed likely to act as an
effective monitor of the plaintiffs' attorney.
92
The defendant's role in enforcement could generate the per-
verse result of actually reducing the level of typicality and ade-
quacy of representation below what would otherwise exist. For ex-
ample, the defendant is unlikely to challenge typicality when the
plaintiff's claims are in fact atypical. The defendant may some-
times benefit if the named plaintiff has interests in the litigation
that are not shared by the class as a whole, because the defendant
may find a means for settling the case cheaply on terms that favor
the named plaintiff over the other class members or shareholders.
Conversely, the truly typical named plaintiff is one whose claims
are indistinguishable from the claims of other class members or
shareholders; such an individual is likely to be deterred from act-
See Eggleston v Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union, 657 F2d 890, 895 (7th
Cir 1981) (allowing defendant to police the class representative's adequacy is like "permit-
ting a fox ... to take charge of the chicken house"). '
1 See Susan Getzendanner, Class Certification Discovery, 15 Litigation 25 (Fall 1988)
("As defense counsel in a certification war, you want global, all-out class discovery even if
there is only a modest chance of defeating certification .... [O]ften, you can knock out the
class representative. In that case, the battle may go ahead, but the plaintiffs will not have
their chosen standard bearer."). For a nice example of an all-out attack on the representa-
tive plaintiffs, see In re Consumers Power Co. Securities Litigation, 105 FRD 583, 602-07 (E
D Mich 1985) (various named plaintiffs challenged on grounds that they were too closely
related to the class attorney, too old, too sick, too different from the typical class member,
too incompetent, too busy, too dishonest, and too much under someone else's influence).
191 Although often overlooked, this problem has been understood for many years. See
Zechariah Chaffee, Jr., Some Problems of Equity 237-38 (Mich Law School Press, 1950) ("It
is a strange situation where one side picks out the generals for the enemy's army.").
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ing as a representative plaintiff in the first place if she fears being
grilled in a deposition as to the nature of her interest in the litiga-
tion, 93 especially if she has nothing to gain from the litigation
other than her pro rata share of the recovery.' Plaintiffs who are
willing to endure the rigors of a deposition as to their typicality
are, virtually by that fact alone, not typical.
By the same token, defendants often have little incentive to
challenge the adequacy of named plaintiffs who in fact are inade-
quate representatives of the class or corporation. Other things be-
ing equal, the quality of representation of the class or corporation
will be lower with an inadequate representative plaintiff than with
an adequate one. Because defendants are in an adversary relation-
ship with the class or corporate plaintiff, they can be expected to
be pleased when the named plaintiff is an inadequate representa-
tive. Certainly they are not going to bring this matter to the atten-
tion of the court with a request that the named plaintiff be re-
placed, at least not unless they believe that they can gain some
strategic benefit from doing so.
'1- One former federal judge observes that defense counsel depose named plaintiffs as
often and as vigorously as possible "because such inquiries can apply intense pressure on
the plaintiffs. The more uncomfortable the named plaintiffs become, the less interest they
may have in a suit where their own recoveries are likely to be modest." Getzendanner, 15
Litigation at 26 (cited in note 191). See also Cooper and Kirkham, 7 Litigation at 35-36
(cited in note 139). For cases in which the named plaintiff was evidently subject to such a
grilling, see Weinstein v American Biomaterials Corp., 123 FRD 442, 445 (S D NY 1988)
(transcript of named plaintiff's deposition came to 170 pages); Goldwater v Alston & Bird,
116 FRD 342, 353 & n 40 (S D Ill 1987) (deposition of named plaintiff by "at least a half
dozen highly experienced, antagonistic attorneys" took three days and resulted in a 600-
page transcript).
191 Plaintiffs' attorneys undoubtedly provide some kind of payment to the representa-
tive plaintiffs in some cases to compensate them for their services. There is no way to mea-
sure the prevalence of this practice, as it is almost never publicly disclosed. Recently, how-
ever, several courts have awarded bonuses or other extra compensation to named plaintiffs
to compensate them for their services to the class or corporation, a development we view as
salutary because it tends to reduce the de facto dominance of the established firms. See, for
example, In re Dun & Bradstreet Credit Services Customer Litigation, 130 FRD 366, 374 (S
D Ohio 1990) (two named plaintiffs received bonuses of $55,000, and three others $35,000
each); In re First Jersey Securities, Inc. Securities Litigation, 12 Class Action Rep 536 (E
D Pa 1989) ($25,000 bonus for named plaintiff); Fossett Corp. v Gearhart, 12 Class Action
Rep 470 (N D Tex 1989) ($10,000 bonuses for each of two named plaintiffs). But see
Weseley v Spear, Leeds & Kellogg, Fed Secur L Rptr (CCH) 94,403 at 92,616 (E D NY
1989) (denying requested $5,000 bonus for named plaintiff on ground that if named plain-
tiffs expected bonuses they might be "tempted to accept suboptimal settlements").
If the rules on large-scale, small-claim class and derivative litigation were reformed as
we suggest, however, to eliminate the requirement of an actual named plaintiff, see notes
219, 248-49 and accompanying text, it would not be necessary to compensate named plain-
tiffs at all.
1991]
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Chi. L. Rev.  65 1991
66 The University of Chicago Law Review [58:1
Although a weak mechanism, enforcement by defendants
might be justifiable as the only feasible regulatory approach, if it
were not for the fact that the court itself is much better situated to
enforce these requirements. The court is not subject to the egre-
gious built-in conflict of interest that impeaches enforcement by
defendants. To be sure, courts already have power, in theory, to
enforce the typicality and adequacy requirements. In practice,
however, the courts tend to play a passive role, focusing on ques-
tions of typicality and adequacy only when they are specifically
raised by defendants. As long as defendants retain the primary role
in enforcement, courts are unlikely to provide adequate protection
to absent class members or corporate shareholders.
As a general matter, therefore, it appears sensible to redesign
the regulatory structure in order to reduce or eliminate the defen-
dant's role in "protecting" the plaintiffs' interests. Instead, as dis-
cussed below, the role of the courts in this area should be
expanded.
2. Reduction in the supply of representative plaintiffs.
A second major cross-cutting problem with the typicality and
adequacy rules is that they exclude a substantial number of indi-
viduals from the pool of potential class or derivative plaintiffs.
This weeding out of potential plaintiffs has three negative effects:
it increases the transactions costs of litigation, it reduces the sup-
ply of attorneys able to perform legal services for the class or cor-
poration, and it destroys the viability of a class of lawsuits that
would be brought if the aggrieved person were an individual rather
than a group or a corporation under hostile management.
Consider first the problem of transactions costs. Representa-
tive plaintiffs do not seek out attorneys to represent them in class
action or derivative litigation. The attorney usually finds the plain-
tiff. 99 The inevitable consequence is an increase in the costs to at-
torneys of obtaining a suitable plaintiff. The attorney must search
harder for plaintiffs when suits arise, must spend more time main-
taining contacts with potential sources of plaintiffs, and must work
harder at convincing potential representatives to agree to act on
behalf of the class or corporation. Many of these costs represent
deadweight social losses that should be avoided if possible. 9 6 Fur-
195 See Coffee, 86 Colum L Rev at 681 (cited in note 4).
196 In the case of the typicality requirement, the problem of increased transactions costs
is especially prominent in the derivative litigation context. The attorney must conduct a
3earch in each case for some unrelated party who happens to have held stock at the time of
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ther, the typicality and adequacy requirements increase transac-
tions costs by providing opportunities for discovery as well as fer-
tile breeding grounds for legal disputes that require the attention
of judges and attorneys alike.
A second defect of strict typicality and adequacy rules is that
insofar as they reduce the supply of representative plaintiffs, they
also reduce the supply of attorneys willing and able to bring class
and derivative litigation. If the attorney wishes to enter this busi-
ness, she must have a reliable source of plaintiffs. Attorneys who
lack such a reliable source cannot participate even though they
may be fully competent and willing to do so. The typicality and
adequacy rules therefore create a barrier to entry into the plain-
tiffs' bar, reducing competition from new entrants and enhancing
the stature and influence of the established firms in the market.
This phenomenon appears to be particularly pronounced in the
case of securities fraud litigation, where some of the larger firms
probably maintain extensive contacts with private investors and
securities brokers willing to act as or to identify plaintiffs. 19
7
In most markets, the elimination of potential competition and
the creation of barriers to entry would appear per se undesirable.
the alleged wrong, and must then convince the party to act as derivative plaintiff. The costs
of such a search will often be significant. See notes 226-28 and accompanying text.
The principal costs of the adequacy requirement are felt in the class action area. This is
so because of the the rule in many states that the representative plaintiff must bear the
costs of class notice in the event the class is certified but the litigation proves unsuccessful.
Because notice costs can run upwards of $1,000,000, few class representatives-in fact, prob-
ably none other than the attorney herself-would willingly shoulder this burden. Although
in reality a majority of courts have allowed plaintiffs to circumvent the requirement to a
significant degree, financial adequacy raises the attorney's search costs because the attorney
must find a plaintiff with at least the appearance of a highly solid financial footing.
917 The largest plaintiffs' securities firm is Milberg Weiss Bershad Specthrie & Lerach
of New York. Other major players in this field are Abbey & Ellis (New York); Stull, Stull
and Brody (New York); Berger & Montague (Philadelphia); Much, Shelist, Freed,
Denbenberg, Ament & Eiger (Chicago); and Wolf, Popper, Ross, Wolf & Jones (New York).
(Based on personal conversations with attorneys in the area.)
A good recent example of how these firms spar for control of securities class action
litigation, with an unusual outcome, is In re Oracle Securities Litigation, 131 FRD 688, 690-
91 (N D Cal 1990). Within a week after the defendant corporation announced disappointing
earnings, 14 class action complaints were filed against the corporation by more than 25 of
the leading plaintiffs' securities firms in the country. Almost immediately Berger & Monta-
gue and Milberg, Weiss called an organizational meeting for all other plaintiffs' firms. Fif-
teen firms attended and elected Berger & Montague and Milberg Weiss as co-lead counsel.
Two firms that had boycotted the organizational meeting challenged the motion to desig-
nate Berger & Montague and Milberg Weiss as lead counsel. The result was an old-fash-
ioned shootout in which the competing teams lavished praise on themselves and denigrated
their adversaries. When the court insisted that they resolve their dispute by competitive
bidding, the combatants quickly gained an appreciation of their opponents' qualifications
and filed a joint petition for designation as lead counsel.
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The market for plaintiffs' attorneys, however, is somewhat un-
usual. Because fees are set by courts, rather than markets, and
awarded on either a lodestar or percentage basis, the addition of
new competition would not necessarily drive down the price of the
service. Nevertheless, there remain good reasons to be concerned
about the concentration of the market for plaintiffs' attorneys, es-
pecially in the securities fraud context. If entry into this market
were less costly, the influence of repeat-player attorneys at the
plaintiffs' bar would presumably be reduced. New entrants might
find themselves increasingly able to gain stature and prestige
among their colleagues-and therefore better situated to reap the
economic benefits of lead counsel or steering committee appoint-
ments-by virtue of their legal skills and dedication. Thus a reduc-
tion of barriers to entry might well increase the level of quality
competition among plaintiffs' attorneys, presumably to the benefit
of both clients and the litigation system.19 Further, the entry of
new counsel would likely enhance the monitoring of lead counsel
by others in the plaintiffs' group, thus reducing agency costs.
These advantages are significantly undermined if the typicality
and adequacy requirements are administered with excessive
stringency.
It should be evident that if the supply of available plaintiffs is
reduced by strict typicality and adequacy requirements, at the
margin certain cases will not be brought. Opponents of class action
and derivative litigation may argue that this is a beneficial result,
given the social disutility of this sort of litigation. As explained
above, an analysis of the costs and benefits of class and derivative
litigation within the overall economic system is outside the scope
of this study.199 We operate on the premise that because the rele-
vant political authorities have determined to create class and de-
rivative procedures, there is good reason to suppose that these
mechanisms ought to be available to enforce violations of the law.
If there are problems with this type of litigation, it would be far
more appropriate to address them directly rather than policing
them indirectly through a series of inexact and conceptually flawed
proxies such as the typicality and adequacy requirements.
X"' In other words, if plaintiffs' attorneys did 'not compete on the basis of price, they
would probably compete along other vectors, such as service.
'" See note 19.
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B. Typicality
We turn now to particular problem areas under the typicality
requirement broadly defined. Questions of typicality arise in three
principal settings: (1) cases in which class certification or deriva-
tive status is challenged on the ground that the representative
plaintiff has interests that differ impermissibly from the interests
of other class members or shareholders; (2) derivative lawsuits in
which the representative plaintiff fails or arguably fails the re-
quirement of contemporaneous ownership; and (3) cases in which
the claims of the representative plaintiff, although initially suffi-
cient to satisfy the typicality requirement, become atypical (or dis-
appear) at some later point of the litigation. The issues presented
by the typicality requirement implicate not only the applicable
federal rules, but also principles of justiciability arising (in part)
under Article III of the Constitution, and concerns for fairness to
absent parties arising under the due process clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments.
1. Obtaining class or derivative status.
Defendants in class action and shareholder's derivative litiga-
tion often challenge the representative plaintiff on the ground that
her claim is not typical of the class or shareholders. The relief re-
quested is usually an order denying class certification or striking
the derivative allegations in the complaint. If the relief is granted,
the action can proceed only as an individual action. In the context
of derivative litigation, the action must be dismissed altogether if
the claims of the representative plaintiff are derivative rather than
direct.
This regulatory structure, in our view, is unsatisfactory, at
least as applied to large-scale, small-claim cases. As presently ad-
ministered, the rules fail to distinguish cases in which the identity
of the plaintiff poses real dangers to the absent class members or
corporation from cases in which this danger is illusory. Consider in
this regard the run-of-the-mill typicality challenge in which the de-
fendant complains that the named plaintiff enjoys an inappropri-
ately close relationship with plaintiffs' counsel. The defendant may
complain, for example, that the representative plaintiff is a mem-
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ber200 or employee20 '1 of counsel's law firm, a family member 20 2 or
close business associate2 1 of the class counsel, or an individual
who, although not formally tied to class counsel, has a longstand-
ing relationship and willingness to act as representative plaintiff.0 4
Occasionally the attorney herself seeks to act as representative
plaintiff.20 5 Courts often accept these challenges and reject the
named plaintiff as atypical.
Close connections between class representative and class coun-
sel are alleged to create two principal dangers to the putative cli-
ent. First, the representative plaintiff is likely to act as a poor
monitor of plaintiffs' counsel if there is an overly close relationship
between them.206 Thus, the representative plaintiff is unlikely to
check the tendency of plaintiffs' counsel to favor her own interests
over those of the class or corporation in key matters such as settle-
ment. Second, under the law of jurisdictions, the representative
plaintiff is liable to pay the costs of the litigation if the case is
unsuccessful. 07 The representative plaintiff is therefore likely to
be more risk-averse than other class members or shareholders with
respect to the outcome of the litigation, and may prefer the cer-
tainty of settlement-even at a relatively low amount-over the
uncertain prospect of going to trial, even if the expected value of
the trial outcome exceeds the settlement value. A representative
plaintiff who is closely connected to the plaintiffs' attorney may
200 See, for example, Susman v Lincoln American Corp., 561 F2d 86, 94 (7th Cir 1977);
Turoff v May Co., 531 F2d 1357, 1360 (6th Cir 1976); In re AM International, Inc. Securi-
ties Litigation, 108 FRD 190, 197-98 (S D NY 1985); Stull v Baker, Fed Sec L Rptr (CCH) 1
94,227 at 94,929 (S D NY 1973).
20I See, for example, Shroder v Suburban Coastal Corp., 729 F2d 1371, 1375 (11th Cir
1984) (representative plaintiff primarily employed by class counsel's firm); Wellman v Dick-
inson, 79 FRD 341 (S D NY 1978) (representative plaintiff was once associate in class coun-
sel's firm).
202 See, for example, Turoff, 531 F2d at 1360 (6th Cir 1976) (wife); Zlotnick v TIE
Communications, Inc., 123 FRD 189, 193 (E D Pa 1988) (father); AM International, 108
FRD at 197-98 (brother); In re Consumers Power Co. Securities Litigation, 105 FRD 583,
602 (E D Mich 1985) (father-in-law).
203 See, for example, Grossman v Waste Management, Inc., 100 FRD 781, 790 (N D Ill
1984) (named plaintiff had past fee-sharing relationships with class counsel); Flamm v Eber-
stadt, 72 FRD 187, 190 (N D Ill 1976), aff'd as Susman, 561 F2d 86 (court took notice that
plaintiffs' attorney had prior business dealings with a named plaintiff).
204 See, for example, Katz v Comdisco, Inc., 117 FRD 403, 410 (N D Ill 1987) (plaintiff
had previously acted as representative plaintiff in 16 class actions with plaintiffs' attorney);
Kirby v Cullinet Software, Inc., 116 FRD 303, 310 (D Mass 1987).
200 See, for example, Bachman v Pertschuk, 437 F Supp 973, 974 (D DC 1977); Holland
v Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 75 FRD 743, 745 (N D Ohio 1975); Shields v Valley Na-
tional Bank, 56 FRD 448, 449 (D Ariz 1971).
20 See, for example, Kirby, 116 FRD at 309 (named plaintiff who was father of attor-
ney "could be unduly influenced by the possible benefit his son receives in attorneys fees,
even if father does not financially benefit from the fees himself").
207 See notes 253-55 and accompanying text.
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exercise undue influence on the attorney to induce her to settle for
an inappropriately low figure.
20 8
These supposed dangers, however, should not cause particular
concern, at least in the case of large-scale, small-claim class action
or derivative lawsuits. In such cases, the notion that the represen-
tative plaintiff exercises any significant leverage over the plaintiffs'
attorney is dubious at best. The plaintiffs' attorney dominates the
litigation regardless of whether the representative plaintiff is a
complete stranger or the attorney's brother-in-law. The second ar-
gument-that the client would prefer settlement to avoid litigation
costs-is even more unlikely. As we observe below, representative
plaintiffs never actually pay litigation costs; it is a patent fiction to
claim otherwise. The attorney pays the costs, and it is the attor-
ney's incentives that control the outcome. To be sure, the potential
liability for costs may cause the attorney to be risk-averse; but this
will be true whether or not the representative plaintiff has some
close relationship with the attorney. Accordingly, in large-scale,
small-claim lawsuits, the relationship between plaintiffs' counsel
and the representative plaintiff should make no difference
whatever in the protection of class members or shareholders.
When the attorney herself attempts to act as class representa-
tive, courts may reject the representation on the ground that there
is too great a danger the attorney will become a witness in the
case.209 This consideration, however, should not be disqualifying.
There is ordinarily no bona fide reason why the class representa-
tive should become a witness in large-scale, small-claim litigation.
(Class members are often deposed under the existing system, but
only for information as to their adequacy and typicality and not as
to their knowledge of the facts underlying the issues in the case.)
The class representative is a figurehead, and her testimony is-or
should be-irrelevant to the factfinding process. Thus, even if the
problems of an attorney acting as witness would require disqualifi-
cation in traditional litigation,210 a different rule should apply in
the unique context of large-scale, small-claim litigation.
Nearly identical considerations arise when the alleged lack of
typicality stems, not from a preexisting relationship between
named plaintiff and plaintiffs' counsel, but rather from some spe-
cial sophistication or financial qualification of the representative.
"I See Note, 84 Mich L Rev at 313 (cited in note 131) (named plaintiff has an incentive
to settle in order to avoid liability for expenses if the case is unsuccessful at trial).
203 See, for example, Susman, 561 F2d at 91; Kriger v European Health Spa, Inc., 56
FRD 104, 105 (E D Wis 1972).
'10 See Model Code DR 5-102; Model Rule 3.7.
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In securities fraud litigation, for example, defendants have argued
successfully that a sophisticated investor could not be a represen-
tative plaintiff because the individual's financial acumen made it
unlikely that she would be misled by the alleged misrepresenta-
tions or omissions. 211 But it is difficult to justify such a result on
the basis of any alleged dangers to the class or corporation from
having a financially sophisticated representative. Excluding such
investors as representative plaintiffs, on the other hand, is likely to
harm the interests of the class members br the corporation. After
all, only a financially sophisticated investor is likely to recognize
the statements that might give rise to liability under the securities
laws. Sophisticated investors are much less easily deterred from
acting as representative plaintiffs by the threat of depositions. If
such investors are not permitted to act as representative plaintiffs,
the litigation may not go forward at all, or if it does, the class
members or shareholders may be less well-represented by their at-
torneys than if sophisticated investors were routinely permitted to
act as class representatives.
The sophisticated investor cases are a subclass of a broader
category of cases in which the typicality of the representative
plaintiff is challenged on the ground that she is subject to defenses
not available against the-class as a whole.212 In general, we believe
that the courts err when they .dismiss large-scale, small-claim class
actions on the ground of unique defenses, so long as the represen-
tative plaintiff is indeed a figurehead and not an individual exer-
cising any real control over the litigation. If the representative
plaintiff is a figurehead, the existence of special defenses should be
completely irrelevant because the attorney is extremely unlikely to
alter the representation to the detriment of other class members in
this case. If, on the other hand, the representative plaintiff is not a
figurehead, but rather exercises, or could exercise, substantial in-
fluence over the attorney, the courts would do well to make a more
2" See, for example, Irvin E. Schermer Trust v Sun Equities Corp., 116 FRD 332, 337
(D Minn 1987) (named plaintiffs were too sophisticated because one was a former prosecu-
tor and a securities fraud attorney and the other a law firm founder who had managed a
complex securities portfolio); Zandman v Joseph, 102 FRD 924, 930-31 (N D Ind 1984)
(sophisticated investor who did not rely on market in making trades was not a typical plain-
tiff in fraud-on-the-market case). But see Kennedy v Tallant, 710 F2d 711, 717 (11th Cir
1983) ("The degree of investment experience of sophistication of each of the class members
is irrelevant."); Feder v Harrington, 52 FRD 178, 182 (S D NY 1970) (same).
212 See, for example, Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 903 F2d 176, 180 (2d Cir 1990); Warren v Reserve Fund, Inc., 728 F2d 741, 747
(5th Cir 1984); J.H. Cohn & Co. v American Appraisal Associates, Inc., 628 F2d 994, 998-99
(7th Cir 1980).
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discriminating inquiry into the ways in which individualized de-
fenses might affect the representation of the class as a whole.21 3
Rejection of the named plaintiff would not be necessary even in
this setting if the defenses were so separate from the underlying
determination of liability that representation of the named plain-
tiff would not substantially threaten the interests of other class
members. However, the trial court should have discretion to dis-
qualify a named plaintiff if zealous representation on the named
plaintiff's special defense could impair the interests of the class in
obtaining as large a recovery as possible. These matters can only
be evaluated by the trial court on a case-by-case basis.
In other cases named plaintiffs have been rejected because
their claims were so large that the court determined that they were
able to pursue the litigation as an individual rather than as a class
action. 211 It is difficult to understand what benefit is conferred on
the absent class members by excluding representative plaintiffs
with relatively large claims. Such individuals would presumably be
the most motivated to bring the litigation in the first place because
they have the most at stake. If they are excluded, the chance that
the action will be brought at all is reduced because plaintiffs' coun-
sel must then search for a substitute representative. Excluding
large-stake class representatives appears perversely calculated to
eliminate whatever monitoring of the plaintiffs' attorney's actions
might be feasible in the class action and derivative setting; large-
stake plaintiffs may have sufficiently large interest in the litigation
to warrant active supervision of the attorney. Similarly, if large
stakeholders are excluded from representation, they will have less
incentive to monitor the conduct of potential defendants initially,
thus potentially increasing the incidence of socially undesirable
conduct. Other things being equal, therefore, sophistication or dis-
proportionate stakes should not support disqualifying named
plaintiffs on typicality grounds.
2'13 Whether the named plaintiff is situated to control the litigation can be evaluated on
the basis of objective factors, such as the size of the named plaintiff's claim or other indica-
tions of the named plaintiff's personal interest in the litigation or relation with the attorney.
Compare Kirby, 116 FRD at 310 ("In cases where a familial relationship with counsel raises
questions about the adequacy of the plaintiff, the degree of concern and involvement
demonstrated by the representative becomes especially important.").
214 See, for example, Stoudt v E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 121 FRD 36, 38 (S D NY 1988)
(rejecting representative status for plaintiff who sought more than $60,000 in damages, with
the observation that "[Rule 23] was not designed to permit large claimants, who are fully
capable of proceeding on their own, to strengthen their bargaining position by threatening
their adversaries with the prospect of class-wide relief and large attorney fee awards");
Steinmetz v Bache & Co., Inc., 71 FRD 202, 205-06 (S D NY 1976).
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Defendants may also seek to disqualify the named plaintiff on
the ground that she is a "professional" litigant in class or deriva-
tive suits. The existence of such professional plaintiffs is a matter
of common knowledge. For example, one plaintiff, Harry Lewis,
has been a named representative in over one hundred cases. 15 De-
fendants may attempt to obtain discovery showing that the named
plaintiff has an extensive history of involvement in class action or
derivative litigation. The goal is either to disqualify the named
plaintiff, or perhaps more commonly, to cast the named plaintiff
and plaintiffs' counsel in a negative light before the judge.216
Interestingly, courts have little difficulty upholding the repre-
sentative status of such professional plaintiffs, apparently bowing
in this case to the realities of class and derivative litigation.2 7 This
clearly seems a correct result; there is no reason to suppose that
the representation of the plaintiff class or corporation will be im-
paired in any wa because the named plaintiff is a repeat player.
However, we do note that allowing repeat players to act as repre-
sentative plaintiffs further accentuates the already-great advan-
tages that established plaintiffs' attorneys have over new entrants
in this market. Professional plaintiffs are often in the "stables" of
existing firms. While we have no difficulty with the rule allowing
professional plaintiffs to act as class or shareholder representa-
tives, it should be accompanied by other reforms that would open
up the plaintiffs' market to new service providers.
A final class of problematic cases are those in which the
named plaintiff is simply not a member of the class of persons on
whose behalf suit is brought. The Supreme Court has held that the
requisites for a class action under Rule 23 are not satisfied if the
named plaintiff is not a member of the class.21 s On its face, this
215 See Lewis v Anderson, 453 A2d 474, 475 n 1 (Del Chanc 1982), aff'd, 477 A2d 1040
(Del 1984); Coffee, 54 U Chi L Rev at 885 n 17 (cited in note 4); Deborah A. DeMott,
Limiting Directors' Liability, 66 Wash U L Q 295 (1988).
218 See Kaufmann v Credithrift Financial, Inc., 465 NE2d 207, 210 (Ind App 1984)
(although class representative's status as "professional plaintiff" would not be disqualifying,
trial court allowed discovery of past involvement in class litigation on ground that answers
might lead to discovery of relevant information).
217 See, for example, Koenig v Benson, 117 FRD 330, 336 (E D NY 1987) (named plain-
tiff's "litigious nature" insufficient to deny certification); Steiner v Ideal Basic Industries,
Inc., 127 FRD 192, 194-95 (D Colo 1987) (same plaintiff as in Koenig, who had filed fifteen
to twenty lawsuits, was adequate, as was another plaintiff who had fied so many lawsuits
that he could not remember how many were pending); Zandman v Joseph, 102 FRD 924,
933 (N D Ind 1984).
21 See General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v Falcon, 457 US 147, 157-61 (1982)
(Mexican-American who claimed he was discriminated against in promotion decision could
not represent class of Mexican-Americans who were not discriminated against in hiring deci-
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appears to be a reasonable construction of the Rule 23(a)(3) re-
quirement that the claims of the representative party be typical of
the claims of the class. From a functional and pragmatic perspec-
tive, however, it is not at all clear that the rule should be so rigidly
interpreted, at least in the large-scale, small-claim context. Given
that the named plaintiffs are usually figureheads, the requirement
of typicality serves little purpose other than to deter litigation. It
would seem quite consistent with the purposes of Rule 23 to allow
"Jane Doe" or "Richard Roe" complaints on behalf of unnamed
absent class members. In the large-scale, small-claim context, these
individuals can be considered perfectly appropriate "representative
parties" whose claims are no doubt typical of the claims of the
other absent class members. 19
Where the named plaintiff's typicality is challenged on the
ground that the group of persons of which the named plaintiff is a
member has interests that conflict with the interests of others
within the purported class, the courts play an important role in
protecting the interests of absent class members against being in-
adequately represented by class counsel.220 For example, in Gilpin
v American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employ-
ees,22 1 a nonunion employee brought suit as class representative
against a union and certain employers challenging a union agency
fee paycheck deduction. The Seventh Circuit upheld the trial
court's refusal to certify a class action, observing that the putative
class was comprised of two different groups with potentially diver-
gent aims: those who were hostile to unions in general on ideologi-
cal grounds, and those who bore no particular animus toward un-
ions but who wanted to free-ride for their representation services
on the contributions of union members. Because the named plain-
tiffs were in the former category, they could not adequately re-
present all nonunion employees. Gilpin is only one of a number of
cases in which courts appropriately either narrow or refuse to cer-
sion); East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v Rodriguez, 431 US 395, 463-64 (1977) (Mex-
ican-American city drivers could not represent class of Mexican-Americans allegedly denied
transfers to more desirable line-driver jobs when named plaintiffs were not qualified for
line-driver positions).
219 We argue below that such complaints would also be consistent with the policies un-
derlying doctrines of justiciability. See notes 248-49 and accompanying text.
210 For an account of the problems with intra-class conflicts, see Garth, Conflict and
Dissent in Class Actions: A Suggested Perspective, 77 Nw U L Rev 492 (1982) (cited in
note 98); Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 Stan L Rev 1183 (1982).
221 875 F2d 1310-13 (7th Cir 1989). "
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" tify a class on the ground that the representative plaintiff has in-
terests that diverge from those of other class members.
222
These cases, however, need not be conceived of as typicality
cases per se. The underlying problem is not that the named plain-
tiff has interests that do not typify the interests of all class mem-
bers. The divergence in interests between the named plaintiff and
other class members is rather a function of a more fundamental
problem, namely the divergence in interests among members of the
class. Rather than focusing on typicality, which directs undue at-
tention to the nature of the named plaintiff, courts should examine
this more basic issue directly and ask whether the class itself is
well-formed given the existence of divergent strains within it. If
the conflicts of interest within the plaintiff class are significant, the
court may narrow the class or split it into subclasses, as appropri-
ate. But it can manage the litigation in this fashion without
lengthy consideration of whether the named plaintiff's claim is
typical of the absent class members. This observation underscores
the need for reform of the procedural rules for class and derivative
suits.
2. The contemporaneous ownership rule in derivative suits.
A second typicality rule is the so-called "contemporaneous
ownership" requirement in derivative litigation. In general, to
qualify as a representative plaintiff in a derivative suit, an individ-
ual must not only own stock at the time the suit is brought but
must also have owned the stock at the time of the alleged wrong to
222 See, for example, United Independent Flight Officers, Inc. v United Air Lines, Inc.,
756 F2d 1262, 1284 (7th Cir 1985) (upholding trial court's refusal to certify a class of airline
pilots in suit challenging amendments to pension plan, on ground that differences among
class members concerning their economic interests in the plan "represent a substantial con-
flict going to the subject matter of the litigation"); Phillips v Klassen, 502 F2d 362, 367 (DC
Cir 1974) (upholding trial court's refusal to certify a class of postal employees challenging
early retirement plan, observing that there were likely to be divergent views among class
members as to whether the plan benefited or harmed them). Conflict between the named
plaintiff and other class members can readily be determined if a high percentage of the class
indicates opposition to the representation. See, for example, Bailey v Ryan Stevedoring Co.,
Inc., 528 F2d 551, 553 (5th Cir 1976) (204 of 230 class members rejected the class
representative).
One interesting line of cases concerns class representatives who have a personal ven-
detta against the defendant. The general rule in such cases is that while "a plaintiff's small
personal animus is insufficient to render an otherwise qualified class representative inappro-
priate, an unduly antagonistic litigant, or a litigant who bears a grudge against the defend-
ant is not an appropriate class representative." Kamerman v Ockap Corp., 112 FRD 195,
197 (S D NY 1986). This rule seems appropriate, at least when the named plaintiff's level of
personal animus against the defendant, either alone or in combination with other factors,
indicates that the named plaintiff is in a position to exercise substantial control over the
plaintiffs' attorney.
76 [58:1
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Chi. L. Rev.  76 1991
Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role
the corporation.223 This rule can only be justified as a typicality
requirement; it tends to require that the interests of the represen-
tative plaintiff be aligned with those of the corporation during all
relevant periods of the controversy.
The rationale for the contemporaneous ownership rule, how-
ever, appears questionable at best. No discernible harm to the cor-
poration can arise simply from the fact that a given plaintiff may
not have owned the stock at the time of the alleged harm. Such a
plaintiff has the same interest after the fact as all other sharehold-
ers, including those who happen to have held their stock for a
longer period. And since the representative plaintiff's principal role
is to act as key to the courthouse door, there would appear to be
little harm to the corporation even if some element of conflict
could be established.
The most plausible current justification 224 for the contempora-
neous ownership rule would appear to be a concern with avoiding
litigation that might harm the corporation, either because the liti-
gation itself is not in the corporation's best interests, or because
the possibility that such litigation would be brought will impose
wealth-reducing costs on the corporation. These costs might occur
in the form of higher insurance premiums or increased compensa-
tion for corporate officers to reimburse them for the risk of suit, for
example. The greatest danger, according to this view, is the non-
meritorious "strike suit" brought by entrepreneurial attorneys
solely for settlement value. The justification for the contemporane-
ous ownership rule, then, is that it deters strike suits by discourag-
ing attorneys from purchasing shares themselves or causing some-
one they know to purchase shares in order to act as representative
plaintiff-in other words, it discourages them from "manufacturing
plaintiffs in order to initiate strike suit litigation."
113 See FRCP 23.1(1). It seems odd that a contemporaneous ownership requirement for
derivative suits arising under state law would be framed as a federal rule of civil procedure,
since the plaintiff's right to bring suit would seem to be a matter of substance rather than
procedure. See 28 USC § 2072(b) (1983) (federal rules of civil procedure "shall not abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right"); 28 USC § 1652 (state laws provide rules of deci-
sion in federal litigation in cases where they apply). As a practical matter, however, the rules
under state law appear similar. See, for example, Del Chanc Ct R 23.1.
22 The original justification for the rule in federal courts was apparently a fear of collu-
sive diversity jurisdiction. See Hawes v Oakland, 104 US 450, 452-53 (1882). This rationale
is obviously inapplicable to state court jurisdiction, and appears to have little merit for fed-
eral court derivative litigation given that plaintiffs' attorneys can search for representative
plaintiffs with suitable citizenship even under a contemporaneous ownership rule; the only
difference is that the search costs will be higher.
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This argument, however, is not particularly plausible. Al-
though a theoretical model exists in which suits are brought solely
for their nuisance settlement value,2 2 5 the frequency of strike suits
in derivative and class litigation remains an open question. Most
observers agree that strike suit litigation is relatively uncommon.2 6
Defendants in class action and derivative litigation are typical re-
peat players, in that they are vulnerable to frequent lawsuits
brought by entrepreneurial attorneys. It would not appear particu-
larly desirable for such defendants (or their insurers, as the case
may be) to settle cases for their nuisance value, because doing so
would predictably establish a reputation as an easy mark and thus
generate even more frivolous litigation. Conversely, a defendant
that vigorously contests derivative or class action litigation, even
when meritorious, is likely to gain a reputation as a party that de-
rivative attorneys take on at their peril. Moreover; a plaintiffs' at-
torney who brings a strike suit incurs substantial risk; she must
fund and staff the litigation subject to a high probability of non-
success at the end. The true strike suit, where it occurs, is unlikely
to be overly costly for defendants because the plaintiff would be
likely to settle at a very low figure.
To the extent that the strike suit is a problem in derivative
cases, the contemporaneous ownership rule appears to be a poorly
designed regulatory tool for handling the difficulty. It is overinclu-
sive: bona fide derivative suits may be deterred if the plaintiffs'
attorney must identify a contemporaneous shareholder. It is also
underinclusive: to the extent strike suits are possible, the contem-
poraneous ownership rule does not prevent them. A plaintiffs' at-
torney wishing to engage in a strike suit simply has to expend ad-
ditional resources to identify a contemporaneous shareholder.
These additional expenses might deter some strike suits, but so
would any other means for increasing the costs of class and deriva-
tive litigation. If the goal is to increase costs, it would seem more
efficient to impose some sort of direct tax on the plaintiffs' attor-
neys,221 7 because doing so avoids the socially inefficient transactions
costs of searching for an appropriate representative plaintiff.
22 D. Rosenberg and S. Shavell, A Model in Which Suits are Brought for Their Nui-
sance Value, 5 Intl Rev L & Econ 3 (1985).
226 See, for example, Note, The Rule 23(b)(3) Class Action: An Empirical Study, 62
Georgetown L J 1123, 1136-37 (1974); Newberg, 3 Class Actions § 15.29 at 246 (cited in note
187).
221 Indeed, in some states a de facto tax may be applied to class and derivative litiga-
tion in the form of statutes providing that the plaintiff may be required to post a bond if
her financial stake in the corporation is below some minimum threshold. As of 1988 such
statutes were in effect in 14 states. Lewis D. Solomon, Donald E. Schwartz, and Jeffrey D.
Bauman, Corporations: Law and Policy 892 (West, 2d ed 1988). Even where they are in
effect the statutes play little current role in contemporary litigation. See Note, Security for
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Further, if the goal is to deter frivolous litigation, the most
direct approach would be to sanction litigation when it is frivolous.
Sanctions are now widely available under Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows the trial court to fine attor-
neys who file pleadings that are not well-grounded in law or fact.128
Although not without problems of its own, Rule 11 appears to pro-
vide a potentially more carefully tailored regulatory response to
the problem of frivolous litigation or strike suits than does the
blunt instrument of the contemporaneous ownership rule.
The principal effect of the contemporaneous ownership rule,
like that of the typicality rules discussed earlier, is to place artifi-
cial restrictions on the availability of plaintiffs' counsel. Plaintiffs'
counsel with good access to potential plaintiffs are benefited dis-
proportionately, and thus enhance their position of power and in-
fluence within the plaintiffs' bar. As in the case of the general typi-
cality rules, the putative "client" is the loser.
3. Justiciability considerations.
Typicality rules also have a constitutional dimension. A
named plaintiff whose claim does not represent the claims of the
class may not have the power to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal
court. If the named plaintiff has not suffered the type of harm al-
leged in the complaint, she may not be able to establish a "case or
controversy" as required under Article 111.229 Alternatively, the
court might determine for prudential reasons not to adjudicate a
claim even if a constitutional case or controversy is present.230 Jus-
ticiability considerations can play a role at the outset of the litiga-
tion, when the question is one of standing, or during the pendency
of a lawsuit, when the claim of the representative plaintiff, al-
though not that of the class, may become moot.
The Supreme Court set forth principles for class action stand-
ing in O'Shea v Littleton,2 31 a suit for injunctive relief against mu-
nicipal officials for alleged racial discrimination in the performance
Expenses in Shareholders' Derivative Suits, 4 Colum J L & Soc Probs 50, 65 (1968). These
statutes are inapplicable in federal question actions. See Fielding v Allen, 181 F2d 163, 168
(2d Cir 1950).
218 FRCP 11.
229 US Const, Art HI, § 2, cl 1.
210 See, for example, Singleton v Wulff, 428 US 106, 112-16 (1976) (justiciability rules
embody additional, self-imposed restraints on the exercise of judicial power in addition to
the constitutional minima).
231 414 US 488 (1974).
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of their official duties. The Court held that the complaint should
have been dismissed for failure to establish a case or controversy
under Article III because none of the named plaintiffs experienced
any real or immediate threat of injury from the actions charged in
the complaint. 32 Thus, because "none of the named plaintiffs pur-
porting to represent a class [had established] the requisite of a
case or controversy with the defendants, none [could] seek relief
on behalf of ... the class. 233
The rule in O'Shea fails to take account of the realities of
class action litigation. The complaint in that case had set forth nu-
merous allegations of wrongdoing by the defendant municipal offi-
cials, allegations that were fully sufficient to establish injury in fact
to some members of the class, even if not to the named plaintiffs.
There was, further, obvious adversariness and concrete controversy
between the class as represented by their attorneys (who evidently
were in control of the litigation) and the defendants. Thus, all the
requisites for Article III standing-injury ir fact, adversariness,
and concrete presentation of issues-were established in every
functional sense.
The principal consequence of O'Shea is to deter civil rights
and other litigation by making it more difficult for counsel to iden-
tify representative plaintiffs. If the goal of public policy is to re-
duce the level of such litigation, however (a matter on which we
take no position), it would appear far better for the legal system to
attack the problem directly-by, for example, altering substantive
rules or enhancing burdens of proof-rather than by imposing an
arbitrary filter that screens out litigation on the basis of whether
plaintiffs' counsel has been able to persuade a suitable individual
to file as class representative. The Court would have been better
advised to allow the litigation to continue, on the theory that the
named plaintiffs were mere figureheads in any event.
In contrast with its standing cases, the Supreme Court's ap-
proach to mootness in class actions has been quite sensible, al-
though the Court has failed to carry the analysis to its appropriate
conclusion. In Deposit Guaranty National Bank v Roper,234 the
district court denied class certification, required the named plain-
tiffs, over their objection, to accept defendant's tender of their in-
dividual damages, and then dismissed the complaint. The Supreme
Court held that the named plaintiffs were entitled to appeal the
2 2 Id at 497-98.
23 Id at 494.
2-4 445 US 326 (1980).
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adverse certification ruling notwithstanding the apparent mootness
of their individual claims, on the ground that the named plaintiffs
had a continuing personal stake in class certification in order to
"shift part of the costs of litigation to those who will share in its
benefits if the class is certified and ultimately prevails.12 5 A com-
panion case, United States Parole Commission v Geraghty,23 6 was
a class action brought on behalf of potential federal parolees. The
district court denied class certification and ruled for the defendant
on the merits; the named plaintiff appealed the denial of class cer-
tification but was released from prison while the appeal was pend-
ing. The Supreme Court again held that the mootness of the indi-
vidual claim did not vitiate the appeal because the named plaintiff
retained a "personal stake" in obtaining class certification that
survived the claim for relief on the merits.3 7
Geraghty and Roper carry mootness analysis beyond anything
the Supreme Court has ever endorsed in traditional litigation set-
tings. In both cases the named plaintiff's claim for relief on the
merits had rather clearly been mooted out. Nor did these cases fit
easily into the traditional mootness exception for cases "capable of
repetition yet evading review. '238 The Court in Geraghty was quite
explicit that it was adjusting traditional mootness notions in order
to accommodate "nontraditional forms of litigation, such as the
class action. 239 As Justice Powell observed in dissent, if the case
were viewed in the light of standard mootness doctrine, it clearly
"lack[ed] a plaintiff with the minimal personal stake that is a con-
stitutional prerequisite to the jurisdiction of an Art. III court.
'240
In our view, the results in Geraghty and Roper are correct. A
contrary rule would give class action defendants a tool to under-
mine the class action by buying off the named plaintiff, either by
voluntary settlements or by giving the named plaintiff relief that
the plaintiff cannot refuse. For example, in Geraghty, the federal
government indicated that it was no longer willing to entertain the
plaintiff as a guest in its correctional facilities, and in Roper the
trial court crammed a settlement down the throats of unwilling
class representatives. The opportunities for abuse in this situation
285 Id at 336.
236 445 US 388 (1980).
237 Id at 404.
28 In earlier cases the Court had suggested that class action mootness could be ana-
lyzed under this traditional doctrine. See, for example, Sosna v Iowa, 419 US 393, 397-403
(1975).
239 445 US at 402.
2 0 Id at 424 (Powell dissenting).
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are patent. Second, these cases did not present a realistic threat to
the policies underlying Article III: whether or not the named plain-
tiffs claim had become moot, there remained a concrete, live con-
troversy in both cases with clearly framed issues for adjudication.
The fact that the named plaintiffs may have lost a personal stake
was hardly relevant as a realistic or functional matter given that
these cases were controlled by plaintiffs' attorneys throughout. The
departure of the named plaintiffs did not significantly change any-
thing in the lawsuit. The decisions in Geraghty and Roper are con-
sistent with the policies underlying both the class action rule and
Article III, and take due account of the economic realities of class
action litigation.241
Unfortunately, the Court in both cases found it necessary to
force the result into traditional doctrinal categories by explaining
that the named plaintiff maintained a personal stake in the litiga-
tion despite the mootness of the substantive claims. Here the
Court indulged in analytically unsound fictions. Consider the argu-
ment in Roper that the named plaintiff had an interest in ob-
taining reimbursement for the costs of the litigation. The idea that
the named plaintiffs, whose claims, inclusive of interest and court
costs, amounted to $889.42 and $423.54,242 would willingly shoulder
the costs of a class action with 90,000 claims243 seems far-fetched.
Although the plaintiffs asserted to the Court that they had a "con-
tinuing obligation" to pay the fees and expenses of the litigation,244
they did not say whether they intended to fulfill their obligation if
the action were unsuccessful.
Even more absurd is the majority's assertion in Geraghty that
the named plaintiff, a former federal prisoner, had a live personal
stake in obtaining class certification. The Court pointed to no affi-
davit or other representation in the record as to why vindicating a
purely procedural "right" might have been important to the named
plaintiff when the plaintiff had nothing to gain from the litigation
on the merits. The Court suggested obliquely that the named
plaintiff might obtain "certain benefits" from the class nature of
241 See Richard K. Greenstein, Bridging the Mootness Gap in Federal Court Class Ac-
tions, 35 Stan L Rev 897, 925 (1983) ("In a class action suit, the function of the named
plaintiff, with respect to the claims of the class, is to represent the interests of putative class
members, not to supply the injury needed to satisfy the case-or-controveisy requirement of
article III. This latter function is served by the class allegations themselves.").
242 Roper, 445 US at 329.
243 Id at 328.
244 Id at 334 n 6.
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the action.24 Neither the court nor the sources it cited indicated
what those benefits might be.246 Perhaps the Court was implying
that the named plaintiff hoped to obtain payoffs from class counsel
for agreeing to front the litigation, but this hardly seems a justifi-
cation for recognizing Article III standing in obtaining class certifi-
cation. Moreover, the Court did not point to the potential disad-
vantages to the named plaintiff of class status: the probability that
the named plaintiff would have to submit to an inquisition into her
adequacy and typicality as class representative,241 and, crediting
for the moment the Court's fiction of client repayment, the liabil-
ity for the costs of the litigation, including class notice, if the suit
were not successful.
These fictions might have been necessary in order to hold a
majority, 4 " but their implications are unfortunate. They suggest
an unnecessarily restrictive view of justiciability in class action and
derivative litigation. Given the unique nature of class and deriva-
tive litigation, it should not be necessary to demand a representa-
tive plaintiff who fulfills traditional Article III requirements for in-
jury in fact and a stake in the outcome. Both standing and
mootness analysis rather require that the policies underlying Arti-
cle III be served. In our view these policies are quite adequately
served so long as (1) there exist some individual class members
who have a concrete stake in the outcome sufficient to satisfy
traditional justiciability requirements, and (2) class or derivative
counsel who effectively control the litigation have framed the is-
sues so as to create the requisite degree of adversary testing and
protection against collusive litigation.
It should not be necessary from the standpoint of jus-
ticiability, in other words, that there be any named plaintiff at all.
Because the named plaintiff is a mere figurehead who adds little or
nothing to the conduct of the litigation in the large-scale, small-
claim setting, a talismanic focus on the nature of the named plain-
tiff as the key to justiciability appears misguided. A "Jane Doe" or
"Richard Roe" complaint, asserting rights on behalf of as-yet un-
identified class members, should be fully sufficient to satisfy jus-
"I Geraghty, 445 US at 403.
244 See Jonathan M. Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer
Class Actions and the Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47 S Cal L Rev 842, 894-95 (1974);
William Simon, Class Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 FRD 375 (1972),
cited in Geraghty, 445 US at 403 n 9.
See notes 281-83 and accompanying text.
248 Geraghty was a 5-4 decision. Four of the five majority Justices are still on the Court;
the fifth, Justice Brennan, resigned in July, 1990.
1991]
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Chi. L. Rev.  83 1991
The University of Chicago Law Review
ticiability concerns when (1) the well-pleaded allegations establish
the existence of some putative class members who would have
standing if they brought suit individually; and (2) the court is sat-
isfied that class counsel will present the issues in an appropriately
adversary fashion.249
C. Adequacy
We now address the question of the adequacy of the named
plaintiff. Unlike typicality, which goes to the closeness of fit be-
tween the named plaintiff's claim and those of absent class mem-
bers or corpbrate shareholders, the adequacy rule requires that the
named plaintiff provide "adequate"-that is, reasonably skillful,
sufficiently financed, and appropriately zealous-representation of
absent class members or the corporation.
The adequacy requirement is grounded most immediately in
the applicable federal rules, which require as a precondition to the
maintenance of class or derivative litigation that the named plain-
tiff be an adequate representative of the class or corporation. 50
Due process concerns, however, underlie the requirements; a plain-
tiff cannot be constitutionally bound by the res judicata effect of a
decree when the interests of absent class members have not been
adequately protected.25'
We argue that, at least as presently administered, the ade-
quacy requirement is among the least sensible and most perverse
of all the regulations governing entrepreneurial litigation. The ab-
surdity of the adequacy requirement as presently administered is
heightened when it is considered in conjunction with the typicality
rules because there is considerable tension between these two sets
of principles. Read for all they are worth, these two bodies of doc-
trine create something of a Catch-22: if a representative plaintiff is
29 See, for example, Harry Kalven, Jr. and Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary
Function of the Class Suit, 8 U Chi L Rev 684, 718 n 98 (1941) ("the requirement of the
initial client [seems] anachronistic; the class is the real client and the situation does not
readily adjust to orthodox notions of the lawyer-client relationship"); Note, Class Standing
and the Class Representative, 94 Harv L Rev 1637, 1638 (1981).
252 See FRCP 23(a)(4); 23.1.
251 Hansberry v Lee, 311 US 32, 42-46 (1940) (granting relief from judgment when rep-
resentative plaintiffs had interests adverse to the interests of class members not before the
court); Gonzales v Cassidy, 474 F2d 67, 75 (5th Cir 1973) (granting relief from the judgment
when representative plaintiff failed to appeal ruling granting relief to the representative
plaintiff alone and denying relief to other class members). See Comment, The Importance
of Being Adequate: Due Process Requirements in Class Actions Under Federal Rule 23,
123 U Pa L Rev 1217, 1219 (1975).
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typical, she is, virtually for that reason alone, not adequate, and a
plaintiff who satisfies the adequacy rules is generally not typical.
The adequacy requirement assumes importance with respect
to two principal questions: (1) will the litigation be adequately
supported financially; and (2) will the legal representation be rea-
sonably competent.
1. Financial support of the litigation.
Defendants sometimes attempt to take the deposition of the
representative plaintiff for the purpose of discovering whether the
plaintiff will be able to support the litigation financially.2 52 Under-
lying this discovery is the theory that the representative plaintiff
pays the costs of the litigation if the suit is unsuccessful. This allo-
cation of responsibility between named plaintiff and attorney flows
from the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, applicable in
approximately half the states, which allows an attorney to advance
the client the expenses of litigation "provided the client remains
ultimately liable for such expenses."2 53 These expenses include
"court costs, expenses of investigating, expenses of medical exami-
nation, and costs of obtaining and presenting evidence." '254 Most
importantly, in the class action context the representative plaintiff
is liable for the costs of notice.255 Thus, in theory at least, the
named plaintiff may ultimately be liable for notice costs running
into the hundreds of thousands of dollars in the event that the
litigation is unsuccessful.
To the extent it is actually enforced, the rule that the named
plaintiff must have sufficient resources to support the litigation, in-
cluding the costs of class notice, would appear to be utterly with-
out merit, at least as applied to the large-scale, small-claim class
action or derivative suit. A stringent financial adequacy require-
ment in this context would greatly reduce the number of cases that
"' See generally Note, Discovery of Plaintiffs' Financial Situation in Federal Class
Actions: Heading 'em Off at the Passbook, 30 Hastings L J 449 (1978); Comment, Class
Certification: Relevance of Plaintiff's Finances and Fee Arrangements With Counsel, 40 U
Pitt L Rev 70 (1978).
255 Model Code DR 5-103(B). Under the more recently promulgated Model Rules, the
plaintiff need not be ultimately liable for expenses. See Rule 1.8(e)(1).
24 Id.
It' Eisen v Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 US 156, 178-79 (1974) ("The usual rule is that a
plaintiff must initially bear the cost of notice to the class.... [T]he plaintiff must pay for
the cost of notice as part of the ordinary burden of financing his own suit."). Eisen stands
for the proposition that ordinarily the plaintiff, not the defendant, is liable for notice costs;
it does not itself speak to the issue of whether the plaintiff's attorney can advance notice
costs to the plaintiff with repayment contingent on success. The latter issue is governed by
the applicable ethics rules.
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are brought. Few representative plaintiffs would be foolish enough
to agree to bear the high expenses of class or derivative litigation
in the event of nonsuccess when their expected recovery from the
lawsuit is much lower than their expected costs. If financial ade-
quacy were truly taken seriously, the large-scale, small-claim class
action would wither on the vine.
The financial adequacy rule is based on a palpable fiction.
Everyone understands that attorneys support the litigation, and
that if the case is unsuccessful the attorney will not ask for reim-
bursement of costs from the representative plaintiff.2 5 The only
difference, in this regard, between an ethical plaintiffs' attorney
and an unethical one is that the ethical attorney might actually
send the client a bill to provide a paper record of compliance with
DR 5-105(B). Along with the bill might be a conspicuous wink or
suggestion that the client file the bill in the waste basket. Attorney
payment of costs in large-scale, small-claim class and derivative lit-
igation is inevitable given the economic structure of class and de-
rivative litigation. The inquiry into the adequacy of the represen-
tative plaintiff's finances is a preposterous charade.
Neither does the financial adequacy requirement protect ab-
sent class members or the corporation. The Model Code suggests
that allowing the attorney to pay the costs will impair her profes-
sional judgment. 57 The Model Code does not, however, spell out
how the attorney's professional judgment might be impaired. Per-
haps the reason is that the attorney might be more inclined to set-
tle a case on relatively unfavorable terms to the client in order to
assure the repayment of costs. This theory is not completely im-
plausible because the inherent conflict of interest between attorney
and client over the matter of settlement is conceptually more acute
when costs, rather than fees, are at issue. Costs are typically de-
ducted from the settlement fund first, with the remainder allo-
cated between lawyer and client according to the applicable proce-
dure for determining attorney fees. The attorney who has
advanced costs subject to a risk of nonsuccess would much prefer
to settle out at a low sum in order to assure that the costs will be
568 See, for example, Janet E. Findlater, The Proposed Revision of DR 5-103(B): Chain-
perty and Class Actions, 36 Bus Law 1667, 1670, 1672 n 27 (1981); Theresa A. Gabaldon,
Free Riders and the Greedy Gadfly: Examining Aspects of Shareholder Litigation as an
Exercise in Integrating Ethical Regulation and Laws of General Applicability, 73 Minn L
Rev 425, 441 (1988) (contingent costs arrangements are "virtually an essential concomitant
of section 16(b) enforcement"); Mark Lynch, Ethical Rules in Flux: Advancing Costs of
Litigation, 7 Litigation 19, 20 (Winter 1981).
157 See note 253 and accompanying text.
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repaid. In a broader context, however, the theory underlying the
ban on attorney advances of litigation costs with repayment con-
tingent on success appears questionable at best. The attorney op-
erating on a contingent fee basis has a far greater conflict of inter-
est with the client based simply on the fee allocation. If conflicts of
this sort are to be permitted, it is difficult to see why the relatively
minor conflict over contingent costs should be banned, especially
when requiring the client to pay the costs is likely to prevent many
suits from ever being brought.
Allowing the defendant to delve into the representative plain-
tiff's finances also represents an obvious intrusion on privacy.
Courts have sometimes allowed a defendant to discover tax returns
and other personal financial information that the plaintiff might
prefer to keep private.s The defendant might also ask the repre-
sentative plaintiff whether she is obligated and intends to repay
the attorney for costs in the event the litigation is unsuccessful.25 9
The representative plaintiff may then have to perjure herself by
stating that she does indeed intend to repay the attorney.
Finally, to the extent it is enforced vigorously, a financial ade-
quacy rule will dramatically reduce the supply of attorneys able to
conduct derivative litigation. The attorney must now identify a
representative plaintiff who is not only a valid class representative
or derivative shareholder, in the sense of having a suitable claim,
but who in addition has considerable personal wealth, a relatively
underdeveloped sense of personal privacy, the toughness of mind
to withstand adversary grilling at a deposition, and, possibly, the
willingness to perjure herself for the benefit of the other class
members and the plaintiffs' attorney. Such individuals are surely
uncommon. Any representative plaintiff who meets the conditions
for financial adequacy is thereby rendered suspect as a typical
"' See, for example, Rodriguez v Banco Central, 102 FRD 897, 902 (D Puerto Rico
1984); Gordon v Hunt, 98 FRD 573, 579 (S D NY 1983); Strong v Arkansas Blue Cross and
Blue Shield, Inc., 87 FRD 496, 510 (E D Ark 1980); Rode v Emery Air Freight Corp., 76
FRD 229, 233 (W D Pa 1977) (financial data is relevant to the adequacy of representation
because of the danger that attorney may use the threat of fund revocation to "coerce the
representative plaintiff into complying with his attorney's position"). But see Sanderson v
Winner, 507 F2d 477, 478 (10th Cir 1974) (district court improperly allowed discovery of
named plaintiff's "[c]urrent financial statements, income tax returns for the years 1972 and
1973, and any other writings or documents reflecting plaintiffs' ability to finance the ex-
penses that may be involved in this purported class action litigation").
159 See Sanderson, 507 F2d at 478 (district court allowed discovery of "[a]ny agree-
ments plaintiffs have made, collectively or individually, among themselves, with their attor-
neys of record herein and with any other persons, pertaining to (a) the financing of the costs
of this litigation, and (b) the payment of attorneys' fees that might be incurred").
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class member because she is likely to have special financial inter-
ests in the litigation and a much higher level of financial sophisti-
cation than is typical of the plaintiff group generally.
Often the court will profess itself satisfied with the named
plaintiff's representations as to assets and earning power, even
though, as we have noted, there is reason to be highly suspicious of
the named plaintiff's intent to repay class counsel in the event of
nonsuccess. 6 0 In a number of cases, however, courts have imposed
perverse and unwarranted results on the plaintiff class on the os-
tensible ground that they needed to be protected against the attor-
ney paying the litigation costs. For example, in In re Mid-Atlantic
Toyota Antitrust Litigation,2 61 the defendant was allowed to in-
quire by way of interrogatories as to whether the representative
plaintiffs were willing and able to finance the costs of the litigation
as a class action. Apparently unwilling to perjure themselves, the
plaintiffs stated that their law firms were advancing the costs of
the litigation, and that they understood the law firms followed a
policy of not seeking reimbursement from the class representatives
in the event of nonsuccess.6 2 The court denied class certification
on the ground that "[i]f the client is not financially responsible,
the attorneys have free rein over the prosecution of the action."2 3
Thus the court protected the absent class members by effectively
denying them the opportunity of any recovery at all.264
260 For cases where the court accepted the plaintiff's assertion that she would assume
ultimate responsibility for legal costs despite lack of current resources, see County of Suf-
folk v Long Island Lighting- Company, 710 F Supp 1407, 1413 (E D NY 1989); Gordon v
Hunt, 98 FRD 573, 579 (S D NY 1983).
261 93 FRD 485 (D Md 1982), afi'd as Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v Mid-Atlantic
Toyota Distributors, Inc., 704 F2d 125 (4th Cir 1983).
262 93 FRD at 489.
263 Id at 490. See also Klusman v Bucks County Court of Common Pleas, 564 A2d 526,
532-33 (Pa Commw 1989), aff'd per curiam, 574 A2d 604 (Pa 1990) (named plaintiffs were
not adequate class representatives because fee arrangement excused them liability for costs
if the suit were unsuccessful).
24 See also Palmer v BRG of Georgia, Inc., 874 F2d 1417, 1420-21 (11th Cir 1989) (trial
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to certify class because named plaintiffs stated
that they were only capable of assuming the cost of mailing notice to approximately 280
absent class members); Lim v Citizens Savings and Loan Assn., 430 F Supp 802, 812-13 (N
D Cal 1976) (decision to deny class certification supported in part by named plaintiff's re-
fusal to indicate the nature of the fee arrangement); Held v Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 64
FRD 346, 350 (S D Tex 1974); Ralston v Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 61 FRD 427, 433-34 (W D
Mo 1973).
In at least one other case the court used the inadequacy of financing as a reason for
drastically limiting the scope of the plaintiff class. See P.D.Q. Inc. of Miami v Nissan Motor
Corp., 61 FRD 372 (S D Fla 1973), aff'd as In re Nissan Antitrust Litigation, 577 F2d 910
(5th Cir 1978) (based on named plaintiffs' depositions, court concluded that they could not
pay more than a few thousand dollars to support the litigation, and accordingly rejected
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Fortunately, many trial courts have administered the ade-
quacy rule in a more sensible fashion, even at the expense of con-
ceptual tension between the stated rule and the rule administered
by the courts. For example, in Sayre v Abraham Lincoln Federal
Savings & Loan Ass'n, defendants asked the named plaintiffs at
depositions to disclose information on "the extent of their financial
assets, their understanding of how the costs of prosecuting [the]
suit [were] to be met, and their understanding of their arrange-
ment with their counsel for meeting these costs."26 5 Observing that
"to deny a class whenever plaintiffs' counsel advances significant
funds to plaintiffs of little or modest means would be to defeat the
very purposes which class actions were designed to achieve, 266 the
court granted a protective order against the discovery. The deci-
sion in Sayre is not easily reconciled with the theory that the
plaintiffs would be ultimately liable for costs or with the general
rule of discovery that the defendant can obtain access to "any mat-
ter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved
in the pending action .... ,,267 It is, however, an eminently sensible
result from the standpoint of the true economic realities involved
in large-scale, small-claim class and derivative litigation.26 8
Other courts have crafted rules of substance, as opposed to
discovery, that tend to mitigate the perverse results of a stringent
financial adequacy requirement. In the Southern District of New
York, for example, the primary arena for much class action securi-
ties litigation, the named plaintiff satisfies her burden on financial
adequacy by testifying in deposition that counsel is advancing the
costs, and that there are no factors present such as pending bank-
ruptcy or financial distress that cast doubt on plaintiff's ability to
reimburse her attorney.26 9 This approach finesses the requirement
nationwide class action certification, permitting only narrowly defined subclasses for which
the court deemed the plaintiffs to have adequate financing).
26- 65 FRD 379, 380-81 (E D Pa 1974).
266 Id at 385.
267 FRCP 26(b)(1).
' For other cases denying discovery into the representative plaintiff's finances, see
Sanderson v Winner, 507 F2d 477 (10th Cir 1974); In re Alcoholic Beverages Litigation, 95
FRD 321, 326 (E D NY 1982); In re McDonnell Douglas Corp. Securities Litigation, 92
FRD 761, 762 (E D Mo 1981); Klein v Checker Motors Corp., 87 FRD 5, 6 (N D Ill 1979).
269 See Stern v Carter, 82 AD2d 321, 441 NYS2d 717, 730 (1981) ("unless a court di-
rects otherwise, based on sufficient independent evidence raised by defendant as to a plain-
tiff's inability to finance a class action either personally or through other sources, a defend-
ant in a pretrial deposition of plaintiff should be limited to general questions in that
regard"). See also Genden v Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 114 FRD 48, 53
(S D NY 1987); Greene v Emersons Ltd., 86 FRD 47, 63 (S D NY 1980); Kamens v Horizon
Corp., 81 FRD 444, 446 (S D NY 1979). This rule does not always protect the named plain-
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of financial adequacy by establishing as a rule of law that the
plaintiff satisfies the adequacy burden if she is not in financial dis-
tress when the attorney is advancing the costs. Again, the approach
is heavily flavored by fiction because the plaintiff's financial posi-
tion, distressed or flush, is essentially irrelevant to the adequacy of
representation in large-scale, small-claim class and derivative liti-
gation. However, the dubiety of the fiction may be justified by the
soundness of the result.
Although these partial responses, which today represent the
clear majority opinion among the federal and state courts,270 miti-
gate the worst aspects of the financial adequacy rule, it would be
far better, in our view, for the regulatory system to abandon the
whole skein of fictions and adopt a sensible and pragmatic ap-
proach to the problem of financial adequacy in the case of large-
scale, small-claim class actions. The courts should forthrightly ac-
knowledge that the financial resources of the named plaintiff in
such cases are irrelevant.27 1 The attorney pays the litigation ex-
penses and does not seek reimbursement if the suit is unsuccess-
ful.272 What matters, therefore, is not the financial resources of the
named plaintiff, but the financial resources of the attorney.
Thus, if the named plaintiff states under oath that counsel is
advancing the costs of the litigation, the trial court should prohibit
any further inquiry into the financial adequacy of the named
plaintiff. Rather, the trial court should investigate the financial re-
sources of the plaintiffs' attorney. Such an inquiry should be con-
ducted by the trial court, and not by defense counsel, both because
the defendant has no legitimate interest in ensuring that the plain-
tiffs' attorneys' resources are adequate, and because of the serious
dangers of abuse that would arise if opposing counsel could depose
tiff against deposition into her financial status, however. See, for example, Moll v U.S. Life
Title Insurance Co. of New York, 113 FRD 625, 632 (S D NY 1987) (allowing discovery into
named plaintiff's financial status because defendant had raised questions regarding her abil-
ity to pay for the litigation).
270 See Getzendanner, 15 Litigation at 28 (cited in note 191) ("there may be some vital-
ity left to financial inquisitions, but not much").
271 For a case that comes close to doing so, see Harris v General Development Corp.,
127 FRD 655, 662 (N D Ill 1989) (refusing to deny class certification even though plaintiffs
would not be liable for expenses in the event of nonsuccess because "a contrary ruling under
these circumstances would prevent plaintiffs of modest means from pursuing a class
action").
272 See County of Suffolk v Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F Supp 1407, 1413 (E D NY
1989) ("We recognize that, were the suit unsuccessful and no fund recovered, it would be
most unusual for the attorney for a class to seek to recover legal fees and expenses from a
few, relatively poor, named class representatives. This is the reality of class litigation. It
should not be ignored by the courts.").
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plaintiffs' attorneys as to their resources. It would be appropriate
for such an inquiry to be conducted ex parte, on plaintiffs' coun-
sel's motion, if the trial court determines that disclosure to the de-
fendant of the plaintiffs' attorneys' financial resources could be
prejudicial to the class's or corporation's chances in the litigation.
Alternatively, the trial court should be prepared to accept a bond
posted by plaintiffs' counsel to provide assurance of financial
adequacy.
73
2. Competence of representation.
A second area of obvious importance to the adequacy analysis
is that the legal representation of the class or corporation must be
"adequate." Even if the lawsuit is generously financed, the absent
class members would hardly receive due process if they were bound
by a decree obtained against them as a result of egregiously incom-
petent legal representation. 4 In class and derivative settings the
challenge to the competence of representation is most often made
by the defendant in opposition to plaintiff's motion for class certi-
fication. The theory typically is that the representative plaintiff is
not sufficiently sophisticated in legal matters to monitor the plain-
tiffs' attorney and ensure that the class or corporation receives ad-
equate legal representation.
From the defendant's point of view, the utility of this strategy
has long been limited by the Supreme Court's leading precedent in
the area, Surowitz v Hilton Hotels Corp.275 The defendants estab-
lished on deposition that the derivative plaintiff, a "Polish immi-
grant with a very limited English vocabulary and practically no
formal education, ' 271 did "not understand the complaint at all, []
could not explain the statements made in the complaint, [] had a
very small degree of knowledge as to what the lawsuit was about, []
did not know any of the defendants by name, [] did not know the
nature of their alleged misconduct, and in fact ... had merely re-
lied on what her son-in-law had explained to her about the facts in
the case. '277 The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground
that it had been falsely verified,278 but the Supreme Court held
See, for example, Stern v Carter, 82 AD2d 321, 441 NYS2d 717, 731 (1981).
' , There are obvious analogies in the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assis-
tance of counsel. See, for example, United States v Cronic, 466 US 648, 653 (1984).
.76 383 US 363 (1966).
'" Id at 368.
27 Id at 366.
178 The federal rule then applicable to derivative litigation, Rule 23(b), required that
the complaint be "verified by oath" and contain specified averments. See 383 US at 365 n 4.
Current Rule 23.1 continues to require a verified complaint.
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that the named plaintiff's ignorance should not have barred the
litigation, since it was evidently not a strike suit and the named
plaintiff was exactly the type of small investor most in need of
protection.
Despite its apparently strong facts, Surowitz has not fore-
closed inquiry into the plaintiff's sophistication. First, the plaintiff
in Surowitz had relied on the financial advice of her son-in-law, a
Mr. Brilliant, who had graduated from Harvard Law School, pos-
sessed a master's degree from Columbia University, and "wore a
Phi Beta Kappa key."27 9 Whatever intellectual or educational defi-
ciencies might have characterized the named plaintiff were appar-
ently more than offset by her wise decision to follow the instruc-
tions of her outstanding son-in-law. Second, the applicable federal
rule at the time of the Surowitz decision did not contain an ade-
quacy requirement; the case was decided on the ground of verifica-
tion. Technically Surowitz has no bearing on the current adequacy
requirement of Rule 23.1, which became effective after that
decision.280
Defendants continue to depose the representative plaintiff for
the ostensible purpose of determining whether that individual has
sufficient intellectual capacity and legal acumen to supervise class
or derivative counsel. 281 The Supreme Court added a certain credi-
bility to this line of inquiry in East Texas Motor Freight System,
Inc. v Rodriguez,8 2 where the Court held that a class action should
not have been certified because (among other things) the named
plaintiffs had failed to protect the absent class members by moving
for class certification prior to trial. This error, in the Court's view,
"surely bears strongly on the adequacy of the representation that
those class members might expect to receive. ' '283 The implication
27, 383 US at 368.
280 It is perhaps noteworthy, however, that the Supreme Court approved proposed Rule
23.1 on February 28, 1966 (effective July 1, 1966), a mere week before the Surowitz case was
handed down on March 7, 1966.
281 See, for example, Rothenberg v Security Management Co., Inc., 667 F2d 958, 962
(11th Cir 1982) (defendant took a "series of exhaustive depositions" of representative plain-
tiff and inquired repeatedly into her knowledge of the factual basis and legal issues in the
complaint); Gordon v Hunt, 98 FRD 573, 579 (S D NY 1983); Greenspan v Brassler, 78
FRD 130, 133-34 (S D NY 1978); Kaufmann v Credithrift Financial, Inc., 465 NE2d 207,
209, 210-11 (Ind App 1984).
282 431 US 395 (1977).
283 Id at 405. But see Robert Alan Insurance Agency v Girard Bank, 107 FRD 271, 273-
74 (E D Pa 1985) (holding named plaintiff to be an adequate class representative despite
failure to file motion for class certification within time deadlines set by local rule on the
ground that the error was due to counsel's negligence).
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appears to be that a named plaintiff, to be "adequate," must be
competent to make informed decisions such as whether or not to
seek class certification prior to trial; and the plaintiff's qualifica-
tions in this regard would appear, at least as a matter of logic, to
be appropriate subjects for inquiry through deposition or other
discovery technique. While courts generally refuse to deny class
certification on the ground that the named plaintiff lacks the abil-
ity to monitor the attorney,284 there remains a significant thread of
doctrine, with some Supreme Court support, indicating that at
least some minimal monitoring skills on the part of the named
plaintiff may be required in order to establish the individual's ade-
quacy as class or derivative representative.285
This thread of doctrine is bizarre, at least as applied to the
large-scale, small-claim class or derivative suit. As we have noted
repeatedly, the named plaintiff simply is not equipped to monitor
the activities of the plaintiffs' counsel; any claim that named plain-
tiffs do monitor counsel in such cases is purest confabulation. This
is true whether the named plaintiff is one of low educational level
and legal sophistication, like Mrs. Surowitz, or the holder of ad-
vanced degrees and a Phi Beta Kappa key, like Mr. Brilliant.
In large-scale, small-claim litigation, the courts should forth-
rightly acknowledge that the named plaintiff is a figurehead and
should accordingly prohibit any inquiry by the defendant into the
2'4 See, for example, Kirkpatrick v J.C. Bradford & Co., 827 F2d 718, 727 (11th Cir
1987) ("adequate class representation generally does not require that the named plaintiffs
demonstrate to any particular degree that individually they will pursue with vigor the legal
claims of the class"); Klein v A.G. Becker Paribas, Inc., 109 FRD 646, 651 (S D NY 1986)
("recent trend in this district is to assess the adequacy of the representative's attorney
rather than the personal qualification of the named plaintiff"); Wolfson v Riley, 94 FRD
243, 245 (N D Ohio 1981) (class representative need not be "knowledgeable, intelligent, or
possess[] a firm understanding of the legal or factual basis on which a class action can be
maintained"); Simon v Westinghouse Electric Corp., 73 FRD 480, 485-86 (E D Pa 1977)
("Although the plaintiffs have demonstrated in deposition that they do not possess a thor-
ough knowledge of all aspects of their claims, a detailed knowledge on the part of non-
lawyers of what acts might create liability under section 10b-5 cannot be expected and is not
required of a class representative.").
281 See, for example, Rothenberg v Security Management Co., Inc., 667 F2d 958, 962
(11th Cir 1982) (derivative plaintiff who "lacked any understanding of the nature of the
derivative suit and displayed an unwillingness to learn" was not an adequate representa-
tive); Wright v Stone Container Corp., 524 F2d 1058 (8th Cir 1975) (certification denied in
part on the ground that representative plaintiff had failed to join union as a defendant when
under the facts and prevailing law union potentially bore some responsibility for the alleged
unlawful employment practices); Weinstein v American Biomaterials Corp., 123 FRD 442,
466 (S D NY 1988); Efros v Nationwide Corp., 98 FRD 703, 708 (S D Ohio 1983); Massen-
gill v Board of Education, 88 FRD 181, 186 (N D Ill 1980); Helfand v Cenco, Inc., 80 FRD
1, 7 (N D Ill 1977).
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named plaintiff's intellect, educational achievements, or under-
standing of the case. Allowing such inquiry merely serves to harass
and invade the named plaintiff's privacy and to reduce artificially
the supply of representative plaintiffs, further concentrating and
limiting the availability of legal services by plaintiffs' attorneys. In-
deed, because the named plaintiff is a figurehead, the adequacy of
representation would not be harmed if plaintiffs' attorneys could
file "Jane Doe" or "Richard Roe" complaints on behalf of a ficti-
tious absent class member without supplying an actual carcass for
grilling over the hot coals of a deposition.
The relevant inquiry should not be the intellectual ability and
legal acumen of the named plaintiff, but rather the vigor, skill, and
experience of the plaintiffs' attorney.286 A number of courts have
recognized this fact and have acknowledged their responsibility to
police the competence of plaintiffs' counsel.28 7 Courts also occa-
sionally police attorney competence with the threat of judicial
sanctions.2"" For the most part, however, the courts have not been
willing to undertake any real scrutiny into the plaintiffs' attorney's
286 See William E. Haudek, The Settlement and Dismissal of Stockholders' Ac-
tions-Part II: The Settlement, 23 Sw L J 765, 767-68 (1969). A case like East Texas Motor
Freight, 457 US at 147 (see text at notes 218-19) should probably be understood as a dis-
guised comment on the plaintiffs' attorney's competence given the obvious fiction involved
in assuming that the named plaintiffs could be expected to understand the need to seek
class certification.
287 See, for example, Fendler v Westgate-California Corp., 527 F2d 1168, 1170 (9th Cir
1975); In re Joint Eastern and Southern Districts Asbestos Litigation, 132 FRD 332 (E D
NY and S D NY 1990); County of Suffolk v Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F Supp 1407,
1419 (E D NY 1989), aff'd, 907 F2d 1295 (2d Cir 1990); Harman v Lyphomed, Inc., 122 FRD
522, 528 (N D Ill 1988); Mechigian v Art Capital Corp., 612 F Supp 1421, 1433 (S D NY
1985); Weinberg v Lear Fan Corp., 102 FRD 269, 272 (S D NY 1984).
For obvious reasons, courts scrutinize the competence of representation when the class
representative is proceeding pro se. See, for example, Johnpoll v Thornburgh, 898 F2d 849
(2d Cir 1990), cert den 111 S Ct 63 (1990) (upholding trial court's refusal to certify a class
based in part on pro se litigant's inability to represent adequately the absent class
members).
288 See, for example, Hatch v Reliance Insurance Co., 758 F2d 409, 416 (9th Cir 1985)
(court sua sponte imposed sanction against plaintiffs' attorney, observing that "[c]ounsel's
performance in these proceedings demonstrates an inability to adequately 'and competently
represent a single plaintiff, much less a class of plaintiffs"); Elster v Alexander, 122 FRD
593, 604 (N D Ga 1988); Danik, Inc. v Hartmarx Corp., 120 FRD 439 (D DC 1988), aff'd in
relevant part, 875 F2d 890 (DC Cir 1989), rev'd on other grounds and remanded as Cooter &
Gell v Hartmarx Corp., 110 S Ct 2447 (1990). Although sanctions are occasionally directed
at the client as well as the attorney, see Danik, 120 FRD at 445 (sanction divided between
attorney and named class representative), in the large-scale, small-claim context it would
make no sense to impose sanctions on the named plaintiff. Indeed, the threat of sanctions
against named plaintiffs in this context would potentially further reduce the supply of avail-
able plaintiffs, although to date Rule 11 does not appear to have been frequently applied
against named plaintiffs in such cases.
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qualifications. They typically engage in only the most perfunctory
oversight,2 89 sometimes using their putative obligation to police the
plaintiffs' attorney's adequacy as an excuse for administering ful-
some compliments.290 Often defense counsel, either as a matter of
strategy 91 or professional courtesy, will not contest the compe-
tence of the plaintiffs' attorney. In such cases the courts usually
decline to make any kind of inquiry despite the obvious unreliabil-
ity of defendant's representations regarding the plaintiffs' attor-
ney's skills. 92
The courts' diffidence in evaluating the competence of plain-
tiffs' counsel is not difficult to understand. A court, after all, is
supposed to be a neutral umpire between plaintiff and defendant.
It stretches this idea to require the court to act as de facto man-
ager for one of the teams. Further, evaluating lawyer competence is
exceedingly difficult when the matters involved are ones of judg-
ment rather than simple adherence to rules. There may be few cri-
teria, other than the court's subjective reactions, on which to base
an assessment of the plaintiffs' attorney's competence when it
comes to the most fundamental litigation decisions. While the
court may appropriately use experience in similar litigation as a
proxy for competence, the measure is quite inexact, for exper-
ienced lawyers may in fact be less capable than aggressive new en-
trants into the field. Accordingly, despite the theoretical value of a
judicial inquiry into attorney competence, there are a variety of
practical impediments to actually carrying out such a regulatory
program.
As a practical matter, however, the policing of the plaintiffs'
attorney's competence must be left to the discretion of the trial'
court. If the trial court determines at any point in the litigation
that the class or corporation is receiving representation of excep-
tionally low quality, it would be'appropriate for the court to insist
289 See, for example, Grace v Perception Technology Corp., 128 FRD 165, 170 (D Mass
1989) (court rejected defendant's attack on plaintiff's attorneys' ability with the comment
"[t]he court is convinced that plaintiff's counsel will vigorously prosecute this action and are
qualified to do so"); Getzendanner, 15 Litigation at 30 (cited in note 191); Note, 89 Harv L
Rev at 1471 n 93 (cited in note 85).
290 See, for example, Mashburn v National Healthcare, Inc., 684 F Supp 660, 672 (M D
Ala 1988) (in upholding settlement, court praised plaintiff's counsel as "one of the most able
and experienced trial lawyers in the State of Alabama").
29! See Charles Donelan, Prerequisites to a Class Action Under New Rule 23, 10 BC
Indust & Comm L Rev 527, 536 (1969) (attacking competence of plaintiffs' attorney can be
"strategically disastrous" unless charge is specific and supported by solid evidence).
'9" See, for example, Kirby v Cullinet Software, Inc., 116 FRD 303, 311 (D Mass 1987)
(noting that defendant did not contest attorney's adequacy).
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that co-counsel be appointed to take substantive control of the liti-
gation. Relevant to a court's deliberations on this question would
be an inquiry into whether the existing plaintiffs' counsel had en-
gaged in any acts or omissions that would be inconsistent with the
behavior of any reasonably competent attorney engaged in class or
derivative litigation; missing filing deadlines or procedural defaults
would be prime examples. The court's overall experience with
counsel might also lead it to conclude that the lawyer is incapable
of rendering even minimally competent legal representation. It
might be useful to require the trial court to make explicit findings
as to the plaintiffs' attorney's competence at the time of class cer-
tification and again when approving settlement in order to ensure
that this issue is not entirely overlooked.
We doubt that this proposed judicial oversight of the compe-
tence of plaintiffs' counsel would affect results in many cases. For
the most part courts would be expected to approve the attorneys
without any difficulty. Our proposed approach offers two benefits
over the existing regulatory system in this area, however. First, it
directs attention away from the the misplaced focus on the repre-
sentative plaintiff and to the plaintiffs' attorney. Second, our pro-
posed approach would be likely, at some margin, to deter excep-
tionally poor legal representation, and in this respect it would
serve the interests of absent class members or corporations as well
as the legal system as a whole.
IV. PLAINTIFFS' ATTORNEY'S ETHICS
In addition to challenging the typicality or adequacy of the
named plaintiff, defense counsel in large-scale, small-claim action
class and derivative litigation may launch a direct attack on the
plaintiffs' attorney by claiming some form of ethical default.
Courts often permit the defendant to inquire into the ethics of the
plaintiffs' attorney. The court may be asked to disqualify the
plaintiffs' attorney if defense counsel can document conduct that
violates or arguably violates applicable ethics rules.
This body of regulation is potentially the most quixotic of all
the rules governing the conduct of class and derivative attorneys.
If the rules were to be applied strictly, the result would be to ex-
clude attorneys on ethics grounds who will be competent and zeal-
ous advocates of the plaintiff class, harming the very "clients"
whom the ethics rules are ostensibly designed to protect.
Moreover, the policies underlying the ethics rules often sug-
gest that the plaintiffs' attorney's conduct ought not to be consid-
ered a breach of professional ethics. In general, the ethics rules
[58:1
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were devised to address problems that arise in a traditional litiga-
tion setting; they often have no relevance in the context of large-
scale, small-claim litigation, despite the fact that such litigations
fall within the rules' literal language. Further, even if the conduct
in question does violate the applicable ethics rules, this fact is not
itself a sufficient justification for excluding the attorney on ade-
quacy grounds from representing the class or the corporation. The
assumption that an attorney who behaves unethically cannot be an
adequate advocate for the class or corporation is simply wrong as a
matter of theory. Codes of legal ethics are bodies of rules designed
to regulate attorney behavior in order to protect clients, serve the
well-being of society, and advance the interests of the legal profes-
sion. They have different purposes and arise from a different
source than the adequacy requirement, which is designed to pro-
tect members of the absent plaintiff class. While behavior by an
attorney that may be unethical under a state's ethics rules may (or
may not) be relevant to the inquiry into the attorney's quali-
fication to conduct the litigation, it is not-or not
necessarily-dispositive.
29 3
Attorneys whose ethics are challenged under the. adequacy
rule may be accused of a panoply of disciplinary violations. How-
ever, for purposes of exposition it is useful to separate out the key
problem areas and to analyze them separately. The most impor-
tant ethical violations typically alleged against class and derivative
attorneys are (1) maintenance, (2) solicitation, (3) conflict of inter-
est, and (4) creating the "appearance of impropriety."
A. Maintenance
A maintenance charge alleges that a third party interfered
with or attempted to influence ongoing litigation by assisting or
"maintaining" one of the litigants.294 As noted above, approxi-
293 Judge Jack Weinstein, one of the most thoughtful commentators on the special
problems of class and derivative litigation, may have been the first to make this observation.
See County of Suffolk v Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F Supp 1407, 1413 (E D NY 1989)
("[a] federal court is not bound to enforce New York's view of what constitutes ethical
professional conduct" when ruling on class certification). See also Harris v General Devel-
opment Corp., 127 FRD 655, 662 (N D Ill 1989) ("[a]lthough the fee arrangement may give
rise to a technical deviation from ethical standards, denial of class certification is unwar-
ranted"); Gabaldon, 73 Minn L Rev at 429 (cited in note 256) (in litigation under § 16(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, behavior of attorney that technically violates ethical
requirements can "actually further the goals of generally applicable law").
"' See Black's Law Dictionary 860 (West, 5th ed 1979) (maintenance is "[a]n officious
intermeddling in a suit which in no way belongs to one, by maintaining or assisting either
party, with money or otherwise, to prosecute or defend it").
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mately half the states adhere to the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that while an attorney may advance
the costs of litigation, the client must remain ultimately liable for
such costs.2 95 Such jurisdictions would appear to prohibit agree-
ments between plaintiffs' attorneys and named plaintiffs under
which the attorney promises not to seek reimbursement for costs
in the event the litigation is not successful.
29 6
The problem of maintenance is closely intertwined with the
issue of the representative plaintiff's financial adequacy.297 If the
named plaintiff states at deposition that she is ultimately liable for
costs, the defendant may argue that she lacks sufficient financial
resources to support the litigation adequately and should therefore
be disqualified as class or corporate representative. If, on the other
hand, the named plaintiff states that her attorney will be ulti-
mately liable for the costs, the defendant can then argue that the
attorney should be disqualified for unethically maintaining the
litigation. e9
Although courts have sometimes concluded that the plaintiffs'
attorney's maintenance of the litigation, alone or in combination
with other factors, is a sufficient reason for excluding the attorney
as an unreliable advocate for the interests of the class or corpora-
tion,29 9 we believe these cases are questionable at best because the
costs of applying the disciplinary rule to large-scale, small-claim
litigation far exceed the benefits of such a course.
Everyone knows that plaintiffs' attorneys routinely maintain
litigation in apparent violation of DR 5-105(B), but there appear
to be virtually no sanctions outside the limited context of disquali-
fication determinations. If the rule were perfectly enforced, it
would paralyze class and derivative litigation because no one would
be willing to assume ultimate liability for costs. Analysis of social
policy suggests, therefore, that DR 5-105(B) should not be a basis
for excluding plaintiffs' attorneys in large-scale, small-scale class
and derivative litigation.
29 Model Code DR 5-105(B). The Model Rules drop the requirement that the client
remain ultimately liable for expenses. See Model Rule 1.8(e)(1).
296 But see notes 252-59 and accompanying text.
297 See notes 252-73 and accompanying text.
298 Trial courts, of course, do not enforce the ethics rules directly, but they have the
authority to disqualify attorneys who appear before them on the ground that the represen-
tation is unethical.
299 See, for example, Klusman v Bucks County Court of Common Pleas, 564 A2d 526,
531-32 (Pa Commw 1989), aff'd, 574 A2d 604 (Pa 1990) (attorney inadequate in part because
agreement under which client would not be liable for costs in the event of nonsuccess was
contrary to EC 5-8).
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There are two doctrinal bases on which a court may refuse to
exclude the plaintiffs' attorney in a Model Code jurisdiction even if
it it is established that the attorney will not seek reimbursement
for costs from the client in the event of nonsuccess. First, it is by
no means clear that DR 5-105(B) should apply to the case of large-
scale, small-claim class actions at all. If the purposes of a rule are
not served by the application of the rule to a particular set of cir-
cumstances, it may be appropriate to create an implied exception
even if none appears in the literal language. 00 Because DR 5-
105(B)'s benefits are far outweighed by its costs, there is good rea-
son to believe that the rule would not be applied literally in the
large-scale, small-claim litigation context. In addition, any bar
committee or court considering a proceeding against a plaintiffs'
attorney under DR 5-105(B) might find it persuasive that the ABA
and a large number of states have repudiated the rule that the
plaintiff must remain ultimately liable for costs. 0 1
Second, a determination that DR 5-105(B) applies and that
the attorney violated the rule does not mean that the attorney
should be disqualified in litigation. The attorney's qualification
should be evaluated in terms of the actual risks to the client. The
fact that the attorney is advancing the costs of the litigation and
will remain ultimately liable for those costs if the suit fails is
hardly a sufficient reason to remove her from the case. A court
should deny the motion to disqualify the attorney, leaving for sep-
arate bar disciplinary proceedings the question of whether the
plaintiffs' attorney should receive sanction for maintaining the
litigation.
B. Solicitation
Another potential defense challenge to the plaintiffs' attor-
ney's ethics is to assert that the attorney has solicited the named
plaintiffs and thereby violated the relevant ethics rules. That such
solicitation occurs on a regular basis is patently obvious. Indeed, in
the context of large-scale, small-claim actions, it could not be oth-
erwise. If attorneys were not able to contact potential clients to
300 See note 88 and accompanying text.
301 Also, if the rule were applied literally to class and derivative plaintiffs for actions
undertaken in federal court litigation, there is some possbility that the rule would be
deemed preempted by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Judge Weinstein suggests this
in County of Suffolk v Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F Supp 1407, 1414-15 (E D NY 1989)
(dicta). We doubt that the preemption argument would find acceptance in many courts,
however, because the conflict between the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the state's
ethics regulations is only indirect.
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solicit their participation in the litigation as named plaintiffs,
much litigation would not occur at all because clients with small
claims would be very unlikely to seek out attorneys on their own.
In-person solicitation of named plaintiffs by plaintiffs' attor-
neys would appear to violate the clear commands of the relevant
ethics codes. Under the Model Code, a lawyer generally may not
recommend herself as a private practitioner to any lay person who
has not sought her advice, 02 may not pay any kind of finder's
fee,3" 3 and may not use runners or touters to recommend the attor-
ney's services. 04 Under the Model Rules, an attorney may not so-
licit employment from a prospective client with whom the lawyer
has no family or prior professional relationship "when a significant
motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain. '30°
These provisions of the Model Code and the Model Rules sug-
gest the possibility of frequent defense motions to disqualify plain-
tiffs' attorneys on solicitation grounds. Fortunately, however,
claims of unethical solicitation are fairly uncommon in class and
derivative litigation.306 The relative infrequency of such claims is
probably due to several factors. Any attempt by the defendant to
probe into the named plaintiffs' relationship with the plaintiffs' at-
torney-other than an inquiry into their financial arrange-
ments-would almost certainly be met with vigorous objections on
grounds of privilege. 0 7 The defendant may find it difficult to ob-
tain concrete evidence that solicitation has indeed occurred. In the
absence of established facts, courts are likely summarily to reject
suggestions of solicitation based on circumstantial evidence or
inference.0
312 Model Code DR 2-103(A). See also Model Code EC 2-3.
1o Model Code DR 2-103(B).
'" Model Code DR 2-103(C).
10 Model Rule 7.3.
308 But see, for example, Halverson v Convenient Food Mart, Inc., 458 F2d 927 (7th Cir
1972); Harris v General Development Corp., 127 FRD 655, 662 (N D I1 1989); duPont Glore
Forgan Inc. v American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 69 FRD 481, 484 (S D NY 1975);
Stavrides 6 Mellon National Bank & Trust Co., 60 FRD 634, 637 (W D Pa 1973) (inference
of solicitation). See also Getzendanner, 15 Litigation at 30 (cited in note 191) ("[C]ourts []
disfavor lawyers who blatantly solicit-in fact create-a class action .... [Therefore,] de-
fense counsel should consider questioning the named plaintiffs on how the case arose and
how they chose their lawyers.").
307 See Getzendanner, 15 Litigation at 30 (cited in note 191). Yet the attorney's behav-
ior toward the client in soliciting participation as named plaintiff would not seem to fall
within the normal scope of the attorney-client privilege, at least so long as the questions are
carefully limited to the genesis of the litigation rather than touching on advice the attorney
may have given the client or information the client may have provided to the attorney.
308 See Harris v General Development Corp., 127 FRD 655, 662 (N D Ill 1989).
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In addition, there would today be serious constitutional diffi-
culties with a rule that prohibited plaintiffs' attorneys from solicit-
ing named plaintiffs in large-scale, small-claim class and derivative
actions. Although such solicitation is no doubt made for pecuniary
purposes, and therefore is not within the exception for "public in-
terest" solicitation,30 9 the class action and derivative devices do
have public interest components; they permit "private attorneys
general" to enforce laws that would not otherwise be effectively ad-
ministered. 310 The dangers of undue influence and overreaching
that take the regulation of classic ambulance chasing outside the
protections of the First Amendment 31' are not strongly present in
the case of class and derivative suits; the named plaintiff's personal
stake in such suits is usually low and the matters in issue are not
central to the named plaintiff's well-being. There is good reason to
suppose that the First Amendment protects solicitation of named
plaintiffs in large-scale, small-claim class and derivative suits even
though the attorney's motives in conducting the litigation may be
,pecuniary in nature. 12
The relative infrequency of solicitation claims is reassuring,
for it would be extremely inappropriate to exclude attorneys from
class and derivative litigation on the ground that they solicited
their clients. If a solicitation rule were enforced vigorously, the ef-
fect would be to reduce the efficacy of class and derivative suits
and to further reduce the supply of potential named plaintiffs
(thereby reducing the number of attorneys able to conduct the rep-
resentation). To clear up any confusion, however, the courts should
establish clearly and unequivocally that it is no objection to the
adequacy of representation in large-scale, small-claim class'and de-
309 See In Re Primus, 436 US 412 (1978) (solicitation by nonprofit organization of pro-
spective litigants to engage in public interest litigation protected by the First Amendment).
310 This point was repeatedly made by Professor Hornstein in a series of influential
early articles. See, for example, Hornstein, 69 Harv L Rev at 662 (cited in note 66); George
D. Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 39 Colum L Rev 784, 787
(1939).
1 See Ohralik v Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 US 447 (1978) (First Amendment did not
protect in-person solicitation of injured accident victim where attorney's motive was pecuni-
ary gain).
312 See Vance G. Camisa, The Constitutional Right to Solicit Potential Class Members
in a Class Action, 25 Gonzaga L Rev 95 (1989/90) (advocating broad rights of communica-
tion with absent class members); Gabaldon, 73 Minn L Rev at 449-64 (cited in note 256)
(suggesting constitutional protections for solicition in derivative litigation context); Charles
D. Schoor, Class Actions: The Right to Solicit, 16 Santa Clara L Rev 215 (1976) (same). See
also Gulf Oil Co. v Bernard, 452 US 89, 102-04 (1981) (trial court abused its discretion by
barring communications between class counsel and absent class members because7 of the
mere possibility of abuse by class lawyer).
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rivative suits that the attorney may have personally solicited the
named plaintiff.3 13 (No concerns about solicitation would arise at
all, of course, if plaintiffs' attorneys were allowed to bring "Rich-
ard Roe" or "Jane Doe" complaints on behalf of unidentified, ab-
sent class members.)
C. Fee-splitting
Defendants might also attempt to challenge the ethics of
plaintiffs' attorneys on the ground that the attorneys have engaged
in fee-splitting in violation of the applicable provisions of the
Model Code, which prohibit lawyers from dividing fees with an-
other lawyer who is not a partner in or associate of her law firm
unless the arrangement is fully disclosed to the client and the cli-
ent consents.3 14 The division of the fees must be "made in propor-
tion to the services performed and responsibility assumed by
each," and the total fee for all lawyers must be reasonable. 15
Read literally, this provision would appear to be routinely vio-
lated in large-scale, small-claim cases. Such cases are ordinarily
prosecuted by a consortium of firms on the plaintiff's side, which
necessarily split fees upon conclusion of the case. The client cannot
possibly consent to the fee-splitting for reasons already discussed:
the costs of disclosure of the fee arrangement would be enormous
in the class action context, and any "consent" obtained would be
suspect because of the small interest of each individual class mem-
ber. In the derivative litigation context, the "client"-the corpora-
tion-is under the control of hostile management, and accordingly
cannot be expected to consent to anything requested by plaintiffs'
counsel to aid them in the conduct of the litigation. Large-scale,
small-claim litigation necessarily requires fee arrangements that
are not based on the time spent on the case. For example, in some
cases where clients are hard to come by, an attorney's principal
contribution to a case may be to provide the representative plain-
313 See Newberg, 1 Class Actions § 1120o at 220 n 306 (cited in note 60) ("once courts
candidly recognize the important role of lawyer-motivated class action litigation, enforce-
ment of ethical prohibitions against solicitation of clients becomes questionable"). See also
Halverson v Convenient FoodMart Inc., 458 F2d 927, 931 (7th Cir 1972) (letter to class
members seeking their participation as named plaintiffs constituted "slight breach of eth-
ics" but that misconduct was not serious and did not warrant dismissal of action); duPont
Glore Forgan, Inc. v AT&T, 69 FRD 481, 484 (S D NY 1975) (solicitation does not taint
named plaintiffs' capacity to represent the class if they are otherwise adequate; class counsel
responsible for the solitication had withdrawn from the case).
314 Model Code DR 2-107(A).
315 Id. See also Model Code DR 5-103(A); Model Rule 1.5(e).
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tiff (another unnecessary impediment to class and derivative litiga-
tion that would be obviated if "Jane Doe" or "Richard Roe" com-
plaints were allowed). Such attorneys expect to be compensated for
providing the representative plaintiff in an amount greater than
would be justified by their time records alone. Other attorneys may
front the costs of the litigation at their own expense; they may de-
mand extra compensation for this service to account for the time
value of money and the risk of nonrepayment. 316
To date there appear to be no cases disqualifying counsel for
engaging in unethical fee-splitting. However, the Second Circuit's
recent Agent Orange31 7 decision raises the prospect that motions to
disqualify based on alleged breaches of ethical rules may be seen in
the future. Because the court in Agent Orange required immediate
disclosure of any fee-splitting arrangements, defendants will have
more information in future cases on which to base a challenge to
the plaintiffs' attorneys' ethics on grounds of fee-splitting. We
hope that courts will reject such challenges; the alleged ethical im-
propriety has nothing to do with whether the attorneys in question
can function as adequate advocates for the plaintiff class.
D. Appearance of Impropriety
A further ground for challenging plaintiffs' counsel, which has
proved successful for defendants in several cases, is the claim that
counsel's behavior has created an "appearance of impropriety"
that either aggravates other ethical violations or operates as an in-
dependent disqualifying factor. The ethics rule at issue states that
"[a] lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional
impropriety. '"318
Cases in which the attorney has been criticized for creating an
appearance of impropriety are often intertwined with questions of
typicality of the named plaintiff. A leading case is Kramer v Scien-
316 See In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 611 F Supp 1452, 1454 (E D
NY 1985), rev'd, 818 F2d 216 (2d Cir 1987) (lawyers in consortium agreed that members
who advanced funds to support the litigation would receive threefold reimbursement from
pool of attorneys' fees generated upon successful completion of the litigation); Wolfram, 47
L & Contemp Probs at 303 (cited in note 45) ("Fee-splitting and kindred practices probably
are rather widely engaged in by plaintiff's lawyers in certain clientless litigation such as
class actions for damages.... Related practices include rather blatant and self-interested
'brokering' of power positions in one case in return for power in another-always with a
larger share of the fee award ultimately in view.").
31 In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 818 F2d 216 (2d Cir 1987).
318Model Code Canon 9. There is no direct analog for this canon in the newer Model
Rules.
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tific Control Corp3 19 At issue was whether a named plaintiff, an
attorney, could retain one of his own law partners as class counsel.
The court disqualified the attorney on the ground that serving as
class counsel would create the appearance of impropriety because,
among other things, the attorney-plaintiff had an interest in the
attorney's fee that conflicted with his interest in the class
recovery.2 0
The results in Kramer and similar cases are extremely ques-
tionable. The close connection between the representative plaintiff
and the plaintiffs' attorney did give the representative plaintiff an
interest in the attorney's fee that differed substantially from his
interest as class representative. But for reasons already discussed,
this result is not particularly problematic.32 1 The alternative to
having a close associate of the attorney serve as representative
plaintiff is to have a stranger do so, and in the large-scale, small-
claim class and derivative suit, the named plaintiff cannot be ex-
pected to monitor the attorney. The attorney's actions are unlikely
to be affected by the nature of the representative plaintiff. That a
close relationship between attorney and client would give rise to
public obloquy against the legal profession"' seems far-fetched at
best. The argument that the attorney creates an "appearance of
impropriety" when she represents some close associate in large-
scale, small-claim class or derivative litigation seems extraordina-
rily weak.
At the same time, implementation of the Kramer rule is likely
to harm the interests of the class members or corporation it was
ostensibly designed to protect. In Kramer itself the motion to dis-
qualify counsel was almost certainly a defense counsel litigation
tactic. Rather than moving to disqualify counsel immediately, the
defendant waited until the litigation was relatively well-advanced.
It is hardly likely that the defendant's motives were to protect the
absent class members. Instead, the defendant was apparently at-
tempting to obtain the maximum settlement leverage by threaten-
ing counsel at a time of greatest vulnerability. After Kramer, this
kind of litigation tactic is more likely to be successful, resulting in
319 534 F2d 1085 (3d Cir 1976).
.2o Id at 1092. See also Zylstra v Safeway Stores, Inc., 578 F2d 102, 104 (5th Cir 1978);
Fechter v HMW Industries, 117 FRD 362 (E D Pa 1987); Bachman v Pertschuk, 437 F
Supp 973, 977 (D DC 1977); Flamm v Eberstadt, 72 FRD 187, 190 (N D Ill 1976), aff'd as
Susman v Lincolra American Corp., 587 F2d 866 (7th Cir 1978).
221 See text at notes 208-12.
322 See Zylstra, 578 F2d at 104-05 ("the public suspicion of such a conflict is sure to
outweigh any public benefit from having that attorney continue").
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less favorable settlements for the class or corporation and reducing
the amount of class and derivative litigation brought in the first
place.
In our view, courts should be extremely cautious about dis-
qualifying counsel for an inappropriately close relationship with
the named plaintiff. We can conceive of few circumstances in
which the alleged "appearance of impropriety" would be so serious
as to justify the costs to the class or the corporation of disqualifica-
tion. What matters is whether the representation is likely, as a
practical matter, to be harmed by the relationship between attor-
ney and named plaintiff. Because the harm to the putative clients
is usually entirely speculative, a district court should ordinarily re-
fuse to disqualify an attorney on this ground.
E. Appropriate Use of Ethical Considerations
We do not mean to suggest that a court should never consider
an attorney's ethical behavior in determining whether or not the
attorney is a proper advocate for the class or corporation. There
are obviously many situations in which the attorney's ethics should
be taken heavily into account. For example, the attorney may have
some prior relationship with the defendant that raises questions
either about the confidences of a former client or about potentially
lingering loyalties to a current adversary. The attorney could have
misused client funds or engaged in conduct prejudicial to the
factfinding process in other cases.3 2 3 Given that the putative clients
cannot effectively monitor the attorney in class and derivative
cases, it would seem fitting for the trial court to examine the attor-
ney's actions on its own initiative if there are grounds to suspect
that the attorney will not prove trustworthy in the ongoing case.
V. AN AUCTION APPROACH TO CLASS ACTION AND
DERIVATIVE LITIGATION
So far we have analyzed the existing regulatory structure and
made suggestions for reform within that structure. We turn now to
a more dramatic suggestion for reform: the legal system should ex-
periment with an auction approach to large-scale, small-claim class
and derivative suits.
3 24
323 See Wagner v Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb, Inc., 646 F Supp 643, 656 (N D Ill
1986).
324 Although an auction approach to class and derivative litigation has been suggested
previously, the following is, to the best of our knowledge, the first extended discussion of the
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A. Description of an Auction Model
As we envision it, an auction for the claims in a class action or
derivative suit would look something like the following. A lawsuit
is filed containing class or derivative allegations, or containing alle-
gations that clearly support class relief. At this point the judge can
make an initial investigation of the case to determine whether it
would be appropriate for auction treatment. The judge should be
authorized to conduct a limited examination of the defendant in
order to obtain necessary information. The judge could ask the at-
torney who filed the initial lawsuit to cooperate with this investiga-
tion on the understanding that if the case is auctioned to another
attorney, the original attorney would receive fair compensation for
her efforts and search costs. The judge could also appoint a master
to further investigate the facts.
The judge's determination of whether the case is suitable for
auction should turn on several factors. First, are there a large num-
ber of small claimants-in other words, does the case fall into our
category of large-scale, small-claim litigation? Second, how many
lawsuits have been filed to redress the alleged wrongs? If only one
suit has been filed, this would tend to count against auction treat-
ment. But if several lawsuits are filed, as is typical in large-scale,
small-claim litigation, this factor supports auction treatment.
Third, are the claims involved sufficiently definite to warrant an
auction at this time? If the claims are diffuse, indefinite, and
poorly defined, an auction might be unsuccessful; the court might
then be inclined to wait until further clarity has been achieved in
the ongoing lawsuit. Fourth, are there any other factors that coun-
sel against auction treatment, such as important individualized is-
sues that would require extensive participation by class members?
If the judge determines that auction treatment is appropriate,
she would then define the claim involved as precisely as possible.
idea. Leo Herzel and Robert Hagan briefly suggest the possibility of an auction in their
outstanding article on plaintiffs' attorney fees, Leo Herzel and Robert K. Hagan, Plaintiffs'
Attorneys' Fees in Derivative and Class Actions, 7 Litigation 25, 27 (Winter 1981). Our
analysis generally accords with that of Herzel and Hagan, although it is more developed.
John Coffee also mentions the possible value of an auction approach, see Coffee, 86 Colum L
Rev at 691-93 (cited in note 4), but dismisses the idea out of hand because of difficulties in
compensating the attorneys who frame and initiate the litigation. Janet Cooper briefly men-
tions the Oracle litigation in her unpublished working paper, Do the Merits Matter? at 208
(cited in note 3), but does not discuss the idea at any length. These are the only commenta-
tors who have ever mentioned the possibility of the auction concept.
For an interesting suggestion that a debtor's legal claim against a third party be auc-
tioned in the bankruptcy context, see Matter of Central Ice Cream Co., 836 F2d 1068, 1072-
73 n 3 (7th Cir 1987).
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The court would issue the definition of the claim with the caveat
that further modifications or revisions may become necessary as
the litigation progresses and that the asset being sold is the claim
as defined subject to such potential future modifications. The
judge would then cause notice to be posted in suitable newspapers
and other periodicals announcing that the claim will be auctioned
off, stating where further information about the claim (such as a
formal bid package) can be obtained, and setting forth bidding
procedures. The most workable bid procedure would seem to be a
standard sealed-bid protocol with the claim going to the highest
bidder. To simplify the process, all bids would be in cash or the
equivalent. The judge, at her discretion, might state a minimum
bid in order to prevent an excessively low sale price. There would
be no need for the named plaintiff to have any involvement in the
auction, nor should the bidders be required to provide their own
named plaintiffs. Indeed, for reasons already discussed,325 a named
plaintiff is entirely unnecessary in large-scale, small-claim litiga-
tion; a "Jane Doe" or "Richard Roe" complaint brought on behalf
of absent class members or shareholders should suffice.
After allowing a suitable period of time for potential bidders
to investigate the claims, the judge would award the claim to the
highest bidder. That bidder, not necessarily an attorney or law
firm, would then pay the bid amount to the court. The judge would
deduct expenses, such as the costs of investigation and publicity,
and would, at her discretion, deduct an amount she considers ap-
propriate to compensate the lawyers who initially filed the litiga-
tion, or who assisted the judge in investigating the claim and pack-
aging it for sale.
The judge would then handle the distribution of the remaining
funds. In derivative litigation, the distribution would ordinarily be
a simple payment into the corporate treasury. In class action litiga-
tion, the judge would order notice to those class members who
could be identified with reasonable certainty. The court could
again utilize a master, or "retain" one of the lawyers who has been
involved in framing the litigation, to identify the absent class
members. Plaintiffs would be asked to submit proofs of claim to
the degree that such proofs would be necessary in order to estab-
lish damages in a trial on the merits. The court would then dis-
tribute the funds as in standard class action litigation-but the
funds would come before trial.
M' See notes 229-49 and accompanying text.
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Meanwhile, the winning bidder would succeed to the rights of
the plaintiffs who have not opted out. If the defendant's submis-
sion turns out to be the winning bid, the defendant could simply
move for dismissal of the action with prejudice. There could be
some technical difficulties here-a federal court might be said to
lack jurisdiction over an action brought by a party against it-
self-but these could no doubt be finessed by, for example, an or-
der dismissing the lawsuit issued after the judge has opened the
bids and determined the defendant to be the winner, but before
the court has actually caused the sale to be consummated by for-
mally accepting the winning bid. To facilitate this result, the
defendant's bid could contain a request to the court to dismiss the
action with prejudice in the event that the defendant wins the auc-
tion. In such a case, the court would still follow the above proce-
dure to distribute the fund to the claimants.
If a bidder other than the defendant wins the auction, the
winning bidder would then prosecute the claim. We would assume
that the litigation would appear from the outside much like stan-
dard class or derivative litigation. For the most part, the litigation
would then be expected to closely resemble standard litigation be-
tween contesting parties, with a few wrinkles that we address
below.
B. Advantages of the Auction Approach
There are a number of potential advantages of the auction ap-
proach. Most saliently, it may overcome the agency costs that
plague class and derivative litigation in its current guise.26 The
winning bidder becomes the owner of the claim, and therefore acts
as its own agent.3 27 The winning bidder, in other words, would
326 Realistically, an auction would not totally eliminate agency costs because any large-
scale litigation will itself involve the division of labor, with the attendant costs of agency.
However, the auction could be expected greatly to reduce agency costs by substituting a
relationship in which monitoring and bonding are highly developed and effective for one in
which these devices are virtually absent.
327 Several commentators have noted the benefits, in terms of reducing agency costs, of
selling claims to the attorney or some other party. See Robert Cooter, Toward a Market in
Unmatured Tort Claims, 75 Va L Rev 383 (1989) (analyzing potential function of market
for unmatured tort claims); Marc J. Shukaitis, A Market in Personal Injury Tort Claims,
16'J Legal Stud 329 (1987) (outlining significant advantages to victims from a market for
personal injury tort claims); Miller, 16 J Legal Stud at 196-97 (cited in note 21) (agency
costs in settlement would be largely absent if client could sell the claim to the attorney);
Kevin M. Clermont and John D. Currivan, Improving on the Contingent Fee, 63 Cornell L
Rev 529, 596-97 (1978) (sale of claim would overcome problems inherent in contingent fee
arrangements).
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have the same incentives to litigate the claim as would the sole
owner of a claim in traditional litigation. The principal advantage
of reducing these agency costs is that the plaintiffs' attorney no
longer has an incentive to engage in collusive settlements with the
defendant. Rather, the winning bidder will seek to prosecute the
action for all it may be worth. The benefits of the higher expected
recoveries would, of course, be shared ex ante with the class mem-
bers or the corporation, given that the bidder will have every in-
centive to share some of these anticipated gains with the class or
corporation in the form of a higher initial bid in order to raise the
probability of winning the auction.
The auction device could reduce transactions costs. It would
no longer be necessary, for example, for the court to review the
substance of settlements or fee requests. If after auction the litiga-
tion resulted in a settlement, it would simply be filed in court as in
standard litigation. No judicial scrutiny would be required because
the winning bidder as owner of the claim has optimal incentives to
obtain the best possible outcome, and there are no absent parties
whose rights could be prejudiced by the litigation. Issues of attor-
ney fees would arise only in fee-shifting cases, where the settle-
ment would presumably include defendant's liability for fees.
Again, no problems of simultaneous negotiations over fees and
merits relief would arise, thus obviating any need for judicial scru-
tiny of negotiated fee awards. No judicial determination of fees
would be required at all in common fund cases, where the winning
bidder would pay its own attorneys.
Transactions costs could also be reduced in the conduct of the
litigation on the plaintiffs' side. The winning bidder could be ex-
pected to conduct the litigation through a single law firm or team,
in contrast with the current system in which the plaintiffs' side is
typically represented by a loose consortium of plaintiffs' firms
under the general coordination of lead counsel. Consolidation of
the litigation within a single firm could be expected to reduce the
high costs of monitoring, coordination, and duplicative work that
characterize the current conduct of plaintiffs' class and derivative
litigation. Of course, an auction of the claim would itself entail
transactions costs. The claim must be defined, the offer must be
brought to the attention of potential bidders, and the asset under
sale must be investigated by bidders. We think, however, that
these costs will be less than those of the current system.
Another advantage of the auction procedure is that, as in the
case of any market arrangement, it tends to direct the asset under
sale to the most efficient (i.e., highest-valuing) user. This would
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represent a major change from the present system, which contains
no meaningful guarantee that the litigation will be conducted by
the most qualified attorney. Indeed, in some contexts (such as se-
curities fraud litigation) the system appears subject to pervasive
problems of entrenchment by established firms occupying rela-
tively well-defined positions in a long-standing pecking order. 28
Other things equal, we would expect the winning bidder in an auc-
tion to be better qualified and more competent at prosecuting the
claim than the losing bidders. Better representation would presum-
ably benefit the class members or the corporation because they can
be expected to share in some of the gains from the improved repre-
sentation in the form of higher bids at the auction.
Finally, an auction should enhance the private enforcement of
the law by replacing a party whose interest is only in the profits
flowing from the award of fees (the plaintiffs' attorney under the
current regime) with a party with a bona fide interest in maximiz-
ing the net return to the claim for a party (the winning bidder of
the auction process). Potential defendants could be expected to ad-
just their primary conduct accordingly in order to equilibrate their
marginal costs of expected litigation losses with their marginal
costs of complying with the law. Assuming that the underlying le-
gal principles are worthy of enforcement in the public interest,32 9
enhancement of the private enforcement of the law would appear
to represent a significant social benefit.
C. Problems with the Auction Approach
We do not mean to imply that an auction approach is a pan-
acea for the problems attending large-scale, small-claim litigation.
It is not. There are a number of obvious difficulties with the ap-
proach, both in theory and in practice, and undoubtedly other dif-
ficulties would arise if the approach were implemented. In our
view, these difficulties are not insurmountable and do not refute
the desirability of experimenting with an auction approach. We are
confident that the benefits of an auction process in large-scale,
small-claim litigation outweigh the costs in a wide range of cases.330
First, defining the scope of the claim being auctioned would be
difficult in many cases. To be sure, class and derivative litigation
328 See note 197 and accompanying text.
12' This is a matter on which we take no position. See note 19 and accompanying text.
130 We recognize that an experiment with an auction approach might lead to the con-
clusion that reform of the existing system-according to our suggestions in the preceding
sections of this Article-may be the best we can do in an imperfect world.
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eventually do result in outcomes, whether settlements or judg-
ments, in which the claim is sufficiently defined as to establish
claim preclusion against subsequent litigation. But these outcomes
occur after the litigation has been underway for some time and the
scope of the claims has been refined as a result of discovery. The
auction procedure would require that the claim be defined with
reasonable precision at the outset.
This difficulty is not overly serious, however. As mentioned al-
ready, it should be open to the trial court either on its own author-
ity or in cooperation with the initial plaintiffs' counsel to conduct
limited discovery of the defendant for purposes of defining the
claim, as well as to engage in further investigation as necessary.
The trial court could also make clear that the "claim" being sold
was only provisionally defined, and that additional refinements
might be necessary as the litigation progressed. These refinements
might be either beneficial or detrimental to the winning bidder at
the auction, but there is no reason to think that they would be
biased in either direction. The only problem with maintaining the
definition of the asset being sold in somewhat fuzzy fashion would
appear to be that doing so increases the riskiness of the litigation
to the winning bidder. The indeterminate nature of the claim
would probably reduce somewhat the amount risk-averse bidders
would be willing to pay for the assets. Although this is a real cost
of an auction procedure, it is not enough in itself to justify aban-
doning the experiment.
Second, the auction procedure would be ineffective to the ex-
tent that the bidders engaged in collusion to keep prices low. The
defendant will always be a potential bidder who might be expected
to keep the other bidders at least reasonably within bounds. How-
,ever, in the case of the plaintiffs' securities bar in particular, which
is currently dominated by a relatively small number of firms, the
dangers of collusion should not be ignored.'31 The danger of collu-
sion would seem relatively slight; however, the threat of criminal
penalties for price-fixing, not to mention disbarment, should ordi-
narily be sufficient to deter the practice.
Third, there may be too few bidders, or too few bidders with
sufficient finances to make adequate bids. The amounts in con-
trovery in large-scale, small-claim litigation can be enormous, run-
ning into the millions or even tens of millions of dollars. Obviously
331 This is not to say, of course, that there is any reason to expect the excellent firms in
the plaintiffs' securities bar to engage in improper behavior. Collusion is always more proba-
ble when there are a small number of participants in a market.
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the number of bidders at such rarefied price levels might well be
fewer than for assets of lesser value. If the number of bidders falls
too low, the value of the auction may be dissipated because the
bidders will pay too little for the claim.32
Again, however, this problem may not be as serious as it ap-
pears at first blush. The auction should be open to all bidders, in-
cluding defendants, whether or not they are lawyers or law firms.3
Venture capital firms, wealthy investors, specialized corporations
or limited partnerships, among others, should be allowed full par-
ticipation rights. Increasing the number of bidders in this fashion
should enhance the auction prices. Further, especially if an auction
procedure were instituted, we would expect to see the development
of creative financing structures to provide funds for bidders with
legal expertise. These structures, which might include securitized
equity or limited partnership offerings, could provide financing
that would not otherwise be available to bidders through sources
such as banks or other financial intermediaries. Although creative
financing of litigation faces potential ethical limitations 334 and has
not been particularly successful when attempted in the past,3 5 the
Virtually no information exists on how much bidders would be willing to pay for
unliquidated damage claims of this magnitude. There is some indication that attorneys
would be able to raise substantial funds to support the litigation of large cases, if the courts
were to permit them to do so. See, for example, In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability
Litigation, 818 F2d 216, 218-19 (2d Cir 1987) (six members of plaintiffs' attorneys' consor-
tium agreed to advance $200,000 each-later raised to $250,000 for five of the members-to
fund massive product liability litigation; court invalidated arrangement because those ad-
vancing the money received a 300 percent return).
See Herzel and Hagan, 7 Litigation at 27 (cited in note 324).,
s See Vincent Robert Johnson, Ethical Limitations on Creative Financing of Mass
Tort Class Actions, 54 Brooklyn L Rev 539 (1988). Recently a federal disctrict judge, in an
unreported decision, dismissed a syndicated lawsuit on grounds of champerty-the practice
of dividing awards in lawsuits with third-party investors. See Leslie Spencer, Some Call it
Champerty, Forbes 72 (Apr 30, 1990) (describing dismissal of patent infringement case in
which patent holder had raised $750,000 to prosecute the suit by syndicating it to 32
investors).
... Perhaps the most notable failure was the attempt by a public interest group to
launch a "Public Equity Corporation" by means of a registered stock offering of 480,000
shares of common stock at $5 per share. See Comment, Financing the Market for Legal
.Remedies: The Public Equity Company Concept, 4 Class Action Rep 308, 310 (1975). The
organizers stated that the funds raised would be used, among other things, to support public
interest class action litigation. The offering, however, failed to attract the minimum number
of initial subscribers and had to be cancelled.
More recent attempts to syndicate class action litigation have been less altruistic, and
sometimes more successful. See Spencer, Forbes at 72 (cited in note 334) (describing one
syndicated lawsuit in which 44 individuals apparently received a return of $63 million on an
initial investment of $4 million); Catherine Yang, Psst! Wanna Buy a Lawsuit?, Forbes 67
(May 19, 1986).
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existence of an auction mechanism might stimulate the develop-
ment of more effective means for obtaining public financing.
Nevertheless, financing remains a potentially serious problem
for the largest claims. If it turns out that such claims cannot be
effectively sold at auction due to their size, the regulatory system
could experiment with an auction format that does not involve the
complete sale of the claim. For example, the court could auction
the right to litigate the claim, but not the claim itself, to the attor-
ney who offers to do so at the lowest percentage of the recovery.
Indeed, one federal district court judge recently conducted an auc-
tion for lead counsel rights in a large securities class action, with
apparently successful results.3 36 This approach would not require
the attorneys to put forward any cash to obtain the right to litigate
the claim, and would have the advantages of opening up the mar-
ket for plaintiffs' attorneys and reducing the systematic overcom-
pensation feature of the percentage-of-the-recovery approach.
3 3 7
However, this approach would reintroduce a substantial element of
agency costs, in that the winning attorney would have an incentive
to settle early in order to obtain a larger profit on the fee.3  The
competence or financial qualifications of the low bidder in this
type of auction might also be suspect.
An alternative would be for the court to set a percentage
fee-say 30 percent-and then conduct a cash auction for the right
to represent the plaintiff class or corporation and to recover the fee
out of the common fund. The cash bids required at such an auc-
tion would be far lower than the bids required in an outright sale
of the claim, thus mitigating the financing problem. At the same
time, the requirement that the attorney front cash aligns the attor-
ney's interests with those of the absent class members better than
in the case of an auction based on percentage bids. It also tends to
substantiate the attorney's competence and financial resources.
"' See In re Oracle Securities Litigation, 131 FRD 688 (N D Cal 1990) (court in-
structed teams of lawyers competing for lead counsel designation to submit competitive liti-
gation budgets; when attorneys refused to compete and "filed joint budget, the court rejected
the proposal and insisted on in camera competitive bids, including statements of qualifica-
tions and percentage of the judgment counsel would accept as a fee). The court received
bids from four firms and chose one as representing the best value for the class. See In re
Oracle Securities Litigation, 132 FRD 533 (N D Cal 1990).
See also Bennet A. McConaughy, Back to the Future: Use of Percentage Fee Arrange-
ments in Common Fund Litigation, 12 Puget Sound L Rev 43, 65-66 (1988) (recommending
that plaintiffs' counsel be required to file a fee agreement with the complaint stating the
lowest percentage of the recovery she will accept, but not specifically advocating an auction
based on the percentage bids).
"' See notes 68-70.
Ms See note 71.
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Nevertheless, a cash auction for the right to receive a specified per-
centage recovery would only partially mitigate the agency problem
over the issue of settlement. Any approach that does not involve
the complete auction of the claim will involve substantial agency
costs. In large cases, however, these costs may be preferable to the
costs of an auction in which the bidders are too few or inade-
quately financed.
Let us return to the analysis of the complete auction of the
claim, in order to discuss a fourth problem with this proce-
dure-namely, ensuring the cooperation of the plaintiff class in the
proof of the claim. 39 The problem here is particularly acute if-as
would be common in securities litigation, for example-the dam-
ages suffered by each class member will depend on individualized
facts about when and how much she traded. We mentioned above
that in such cases the class members could be required to submit a
proof of claim in order to obtain their share of the auction results,
and those proofs would be used by the auction winner to establish
its own claim. There could, however, be thorny legal problems with
this procedure if the defendant chose to contest the claim on the
ground that the proofs of claim were hearsay or that the defendant
had a constitutional right under the due process clause to cross-
examine class members as to whether they actually incurred the
damages they claimed. The defendant might also seek to examine
individual class members as to the existence of any individualized
defenses, such as lack of reliance in a fraud-on-the-market case.340
These class members could be subpoenaed, of course, but their co-
operation would be in doubt if they no longer had a viable eco-
nomic stake in the outcome. A court would need to develop inno-
vative procedures for dealing with these difficulties.
Another problem with the auction approach is that of compen-
sating the plaintiffs' attorney who first identified the claim. Under
the current regulatory system, the "first mover" receives some
compensation for identifying and researching the claim. Although
the first attorney to file is rarely able to exclude other attorneys
3 Problems of cooperation are emphasized as an impediment to the sale of legal claims
in Danzon, 14 Bell J Econ at 223 (cited in note 47) (At the limit, a "profit-maximizing
plaintiff could capture twice the value of the claim by selling it first to his attorney for its
expected value and then selling his services to the defense to save them that expected
value."). Danzon's concerns, however, appear more relevant to personal injury lawsuits with
single plaintiffs than to large-scale, small-claim class action litigation with multiple plain-
tiffs similarly situated for most purposes. The cooperation problem is not present in the case
of derivative litigation.
340 See Basic, Inc. v Levinson, 485 US 224 (1988).
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from participating in large-scale, small-claim suits, she at least has
a share in the litigation and a claim to a position of some impor-
tance in the plaintiffs' consortium, especially if the claim was not
widely publicized prior to the filing of the complaint. An auction
approach could deter first movers by threatening to deprive them
of any benefit from their research into the case.
However, this problem would not appear to be insurmounta-
ble. The contributions of first movers in large-scale, small-claim
litigation can easily be overstated. It would appear that in most
cases, the existence of the claim is widely known among the plain-
tiffs' bar prior to filing, as a result of prior government action 4' or
because of newspaper or other publicity. In any event, the first filer
could simply receive some sort of quantum meruit award for her
services in the litigation, to be taken out of the winning bid. The
judge could make such awards as a matter of discretion and, in
determining the amount to award, could examine the likelihood
that the suit would not have been brought in the absence of the
first mover's services in identifying and framing the litigation and
filing the initial complaint. Although the rewards to the first mover
would not be set very accurately under this system, they would
seem to be no worse, in this regard, than the current arrangements
for compensating first filers. 42
The auction approach would also face inevitable problems of
multidistrict litigation. If suit is filed in one federal district court,
the trial court would not have the power to conduct a nationwide
auction that would preclude the prosecution by plaintiffs' attor-
neys of the same claim in other districts. The auction method pre-
supposes the aggressive use of the consolidation procedures set
forth in theManual for Complex Litigation. But even if these pro-
cedures effectively consolidate litigation as between federal district
courts, it is unclear how the auction procedure would deal with
cases in which class or derivative claims are filed simultaneously in
state as well as federal courts. 43 Because of the critical importance
14' See John E. Kennedy, Securities Class and Derivative Actions in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Texas: An Empirical Study, 14 Houston L Rev
769, 809, 824 (1977) (at least one-third of securities class actions studied follow SEC pro-
ceedings or bankruptcy filings); Benjamin S. Duval, Jr., The Class Action as an Antitrust
Enforcement Device: The Chicago Experience (II), 1976 Am Bar Found Res J 1273, 1282
(high incidence of private class actions following on heels of government antitrust enforce-
ment proceedings).
MWe disagree, therefore, with Professor Coffee, who views the problem of compensat-
ing first movers as fatal to the auction approach. See Coffee, 86 Colum L Rev at 691-93
(cited in note 4).
M Under current law, a state action cannot be consolidated with a federal action by the
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of the size of the claim to the auction process, this state-federal
conflict, although also extant in the current regulatory regime,
presents more significant problems in the auction context.
In jury cases that have been auctioned, defendants would un-
doubtedly attempt to bring the fact of the auction to the attention
of the jury, on the theory that a large corporation or other entity
owning a $10 million claim purchased in a speculative auction is a
considerably less appealing plaintiff than thousands of innocent
small individuals. Because this is indeed likely to be an accurate
assessment of the jury's response, we see no reason to bring the
fact of the auction to the jury's attention. The presence of a new
real party in interest does not change the underlying facts or law of
the case, and should not have any relevance to the jury's
deliberations.
Finally, an auction approach would face difficulties in civil
rights and other cases in which injunctive relief is the primary re-
lief sought. Because the bidders at such auctions generally expect
no pecuniary benefit from the litigation other than an award of
attorney's fees if the suit is successful, it may be necessary at a
minimum to exclude defendants from any participation in such
auctions. An auction approach may simply be infeasible in injunc-
tive cases where ideology is a imajor factor.
Although the problems we have identified counsel caution in
implementing an auction procedure, the auction approach also
promises significant benefits. These potential benefits support at
least preliminary experimentation with the idea.
CONCLUSION
In attempting to explain how his earlier philosophy had fallen
into egregious error in its account of the meaning of a word,
Ludwig Wittgenstein remarked that "a picture held us captive.
344
Our analysis of the regulatory system applicable to class and deriv-
ative cases likewise suggests that an erroneous picture has cap-
tured the imaginations of those who craft the rules in this area.
The picture is that of the traditional lawsuit in which the client
actively attempts to monitor and control the activities of the attor-
Federal Multidistrict Judicial Panel unless the defendants remove the action to federal
court. Federal injunctions against parallel state litigation are generally barred by the Anti-
Injunction Act, 28 USC § 2283 (1982). See Coffee, 54 U Chi L Rev at 910-11 (cited in note
4).
34 Ludwig Wittgenstein (G.E.M. Anscombe, trans), Philosophical Investigations 1 115
at 48e (Macmillan, 3d ed 1958) (emphasis in original).
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ney. Although the regulations applicable to class and derivative lit-
igation are typically justified on the ground that client monitoring
is absent in this setting, too often the regulatory system has not
gone far enough in recognizing the unique dynamics of class and
derivative litigation, especially in large-scale, small-claim cases.
This Article has attempted a comprehensive analysis of the
economic incentives facing plaintiffs' attorneys in class action and
derivative litigation. Drawing on the theory of agency costs, we
demonstrated that the standard devices for reducing conflicts of
interest between principal and agent-monitoring, bonding, and
incentives-are almost totally ineffective in large-scale, small-claim
class and derivative suits. Nor are the standard regulatory re-
sponses for overcoming the agency problem in traditional litigation
settings effective in the class and derivative context.
Three regulatory programs are specifically designed to control
agency costs in the class action and derivative litigation setting:
regulatory devices for allocating litigating authority away from the
plaintiffs' attorney and into the hands of others involved in the
process (absent class members, corporate management in deriva-
tive suits, the representative plaintiff, and the court itself); regula-
tion of the named plaintiff under the rules for typicality of claim
and adequacy of representation; and challenges to the qualification
of the plaintiffs' attorney on grounds of ethical violations. These
systems of rules, however, are often ineffective and sometimes self-
defeating. Whether this regulatory failure is due to a conceptual
block on the part of the policymakers, or to some unspoken agenda
of hostility to class and derivative suits, the result is the same: the
utility of the class action and derivative devices as mechanisms for
the private enforcement of the law is undermined.
At various points in this paper we have made concrete sugges-
tions for improvements in the existing regulatory system. The es-
sential thrust of each of these suggestions has been the same:
abandon the attempt to assimilate class and derivative litigation
with the picture of traditional lawsuits, and instead devise sensible
rules crafted to account for the fact that it is the plaintiffs' attor-
ney who controls such litigation. In addition to proposing a variety
of concrete doctrinal reforms, we suggested that many current
problems could be mitigated if plaintiffs' attorneys were not re-
quired to provide an actual named plaintiff as their ticket into the
litigation.
An auction approach to class and derivative claims promises a
number of benefits, most importantly reductions in agency costs
and increases in the efficiency of private enforcement of legal
1991]
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norms. The approach is subject to a number of potentially serious
problems. Yet, particularly in light of the current regulatory fail-
ure, the auction idea has sufficient merit to warrant at least a lim-
ited experiment to determine whether such a system would indeed
be workable on a larger scale.
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